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Bureaucratic Resistance and the National
Security State
Rebecca Ingber *
ABSTRACT: Modern accounts of the national security state tend toward one
of two opposing views of bureaucratic tensions within it: At one extreme, the
executive branch bureaucracy is a shadowy “deep state,” unaccountable to the
public or even to the elected President. On this account, bureaucratic obstacles
to the President’s agenda are inherently suspect, even dangerous. At the other
end, bureaucratic resistance to the President represents a necessary benevolent
constraint on an otherwise imperial executive. This account hails the
bureaucracy as the modern incarnation of the separation of powers, an
alternative to the traditional checks on the President of the courts and
Congress, which are faulted with falling down on the job. These “deep state”
and “benevolent constraints” approaches to bureaucratic behavior track
debates in the scholarship over the legitimacy of the administrative state more
broadly, and are used as rhetorical devices to challenge or defend current
allocations of power. These accounts lead, respectively, to fear of or overreliance on bureaucratic resistance—which I define here broadly as action or
inaction within the executive branch that hinders executive movement—as a
means of checking Presidential power. Fear of bureaucratic resistance results
in an erosion of valuable internal checks on the President. Alternatively, overreliance on these internal checks may result in complacency, and an
abdication of responsibility by the traditional external checks, namely members
of Congress and the courts. Both approaches result in an insufficiently
constrained President, which should concern most advocates and opponents
of the administrative state.
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This Article seeks to navigate the tension between these approaches in order to
craft a more realistic account of bureaucratic resistance, divorced from
substantive views about the policies or President at hand. This account
suggests that critics of the bureaucracy underestimate the extent to which
bureaucrats wield formal authority well-tethered to politically accountable
sources. And both critics and champions of bureaucratic resistance
overestimate the extent to which bureaucrats exercise functional power free
from practical constraint. Ultimately, the bureaucracy is neither all-powerful
nor unaccountable. While it plays an essential—and endangered—role in
the modern separation of powers, it is neither the threat that some fear, nor
the holistic cure to a President who is.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In January 2017, a momentous transition in the U.S. presidency loomed
on the horizon, and the Israeli press carried a fantastical allegation. According
to the country’s main daily newspaper, career U.S. intelligence officials had
warned their Israeli counterparts against providing information to the
incoming U.S. President’s administration, their own government, for fear that,
through malfeasance or trickery, the information might land in the wrong
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hands. 1 The allegation was explosive, and quite possibly inaccurate. But it fed
into a narrative—nurtured by friend and foe of the incoming President
alike—that lurking within the executive branch bureaucracy were career
operators who harbored reservations about the new President and might seek
to undermine him.
As such, the existence of misgivings among career bureaucrats inside the
executive branch regarding the incoming President’s motivations and
intentions is hardly controversial. 2 Nor is it unique to this President, though
there may be significant differences of degree. But the extent to which these
misgivings have or could lead to active subversion by career bureaucrats, and
the propriety of any such “resistance” from within the executive branch to an
elected President, are matters of hot debate. That debate has fed and been
fueled by longstanding disagreements in scholarship over the legitimacy of
the administrative state writ large. But two underlying questions—the
practical power and the formal authority of bureaucrats to resist—have not
been adequately examined in the literature. They, and the ensuing extent to
which the bureaucracy should be either feared or revered as a threat to the
republic or as its last hope, are the focus of this Article.
Fear or reverence animates many accounts of bureaucratic tension within
the “national security state.” Modern accounts, to the extent they ascribe any
significance to actors beyond the President himself and his appointed cabinet,
tend toward one of two diametrically opposed conceptions of resistance to the
President’s agenda from the broader bureaucracy. Painted in the broadest
brushstrokes, one school views bureaucratic resistance as a benevolent,
apolitical constraining force on what might otherwise be an imperial
autocrat. 3 On this account, the bureaucracy is the modern incarnation of the
traditional separation of powers, reining in the President from abuses of
power in areas where the courts and Congress have fallen down on the job.
The other camp views the bureaucracy as a self-interested, power-hungry cabal
of conspiratorial operators, a “deep state,” acting in darkness to wield the vast
military and surveillance powers of the state at the expense of the accountable,

1. Ronen Bergman, US Intel Sources Warn Israel Against Sharing Secrets with Trump Administration,
YNETNEWS (Dec. 1, 2017, 2:12 PM), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4906642,00.html.
2. See, e.g., Jeffrey Gettleman, State Dept. Dissent Cable on Trump’s Ban Draws 1,000 Signatures,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/world/americas/state-deptdissent-cable-trump-immigration-order.html; Michael D. Shear & Eric Lichtblau, ‘A Sense of Dread’
for Civil Servants Shaken by Trump Transition, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/02/11/us/politics/a-sense-of-dread-for-civil-servants-shaken-by-trump-transition.html.
3. For scholars who view bureaucratic constraints as critical and legitimizing checks on the
President, see, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2317 (2006); Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving
Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 551–60 (2015); Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional
Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1688, 1716 (2011) (reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND
FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010)).
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elected leadership, namely the President. 4 I call these different approaches
the “benevolent constraints” and “deep state” models of bureaucratic
behavior. These are, of course, stark characterizations, but much scholarship,
including my own, engages elements from one or the other (or even, at times,
from both).
These divergent accounts of the national security state invoke different
conceptions of the ideal balance of political accountability and expertise
within the government, and perhaps more significantly, they reveal
contrasting instincts regarding the nature of the actors at stake. Yet they share
an assumption—based in historical evidence, experience, and common
sense—that bureaucratic actors will at times act in ways that frustrate the
stated will of their politically-appointed leadership. This frustration of the
expressed will of political leadership—and more broadly any action or
inaction within the executive branch that hinders movement—is what I
identify as bureaucratic resistance. 5 While the term “resistance” has a political
life of its own, I intend it here in its broadest sense, to include any friction or
force that acts as a counterweight to a particular decision or action. This
includes, therefore, not only the affirmative actions by bureaucrats seeking
actively to thwart the President’s agenda, but also what I have previously
termed the “neutral friction” that constrains all bureaucratic action,
irrespective of substance. 6
Both approaches to bureaucratic behavior are preoccupied with the
legitimacy of presidential power and the administrative state. Indeed, these
approaches track debates in the scholarship about the legitimacy of the
administrative state more broadly, and are used as rhetorical devices to
challenge or defend current allocations of power. The “deep state”—a term
historically associated with abuse of the national security powers of a
government—has recently been appropriated by those engaged in the project

4. See, e.g., MARC AMBINDER & D.B. GRADY, DEEP STATE: INSIDE THE GOVERNMENT SECRECY
INDUSTRY 4 (2013); MIKE LOFGREN, THE DEEP STATE: THE FALL OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
RISE OF A SHADOW GOVERNMENT 34–36 (2016); Peggy Noonan, The Deep State, WALL ST. J.: PEGGY
NOONAN (Oct. 28, 2013, 9:10 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/peggynoonan/2013/10/28/thedeep-state. See generally Jack Goldsmith, Paradoxes of the Deep State, in CASS R. SUNSTEIN, CAN IT
HAPPEN HERE?: AUTHORITARIANISM IN AMERICA (2018) (providing a cogent and nuanced
argument in favor of the position that the U.S. national security state has “deep state” tendencies,
which can both be anti-democratic and legitimizing). Other scholars have critiqued the national
security bureaucracy as powerful, unaccountable, and overly secretive without necessarily
employing the term “deep state.” See MICHAEL J. GLENNON, NATIONAL SECURITY AND DOUBLE
GOVERNMENT 11–28 (2015). A broader group of scholars express similar concerns with power in
the hands of an unelected bureaucracy across the administrative state. See, e.g., STEVEN G.
CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM
WASHINGTON TO BUSH 17 (2008).
5. I define the term more fully in Section II.B.
6. Rebecca Ingber, The Obama War Powers Legacy and the Internal Forces that Entrench Executive
Power, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 680, 687 (2016) (identifying the concept of “neutral friction” as forces
hindering change within the executive branch bureaucracy).

A4_INGBER (DO NOT DELETE)

144

10/26/2018 8:47 AM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 104:139

of delegitimizing the administrative state more broadly as untethered to
democratic accountability. The deep state rhetoric conjures images of
shadowy, powerful bureaucrats, evoking and stoking fears of the power that
has accrued in the executive branch’s national security bureaucracy, for the
purpose of challenging the administrative state and its regulatory power writ
large, or any bureaucratic hurdles to the President’s agenda specifically.
Advocates of benevolent internal constraints, for their part, (or ours, as I
fall loosely within this camp) point to the existence of bureaucratic resistance
as enhancing the legitimacy of the administrative state and the modern
accrual of executive power, specifically because the bureaucracy sometimes
checks the President and his political leadership, thus demonstrating that
their power is not uncabined. Scholars within this school range from
embracing these internal constraints as legitimizing of a given exercise of
executive power, to proffering them as essential to the constitutionality of the
administrative state. Both the deep state and benevolent constraints projects
thus recognize the existence of bureaucratic tension within the executive
branch. But when it comes to determining the locus of their disagreement,
they are ships passing in the night. Of particular relevance here, the
benevolent constraints scholarship, focused as it is on countering fears of
presidential power and not of shadowy bureaucrats, simply does not speak to
the threat of an unaccountable deep state. To the contrary, by often
simplifying the tensions within the executive branch to a bipolar careerPresident dynamic in order to hail the importance of checks by the former on
the latter, this literature may incidentally bolster, rather than answer, deep
state fears.
While much of the political rhetoric surrounding the “deep state” is
overwrought, it is a successful narrative not only because it evokes historical
abuses—for example, the Iran Contra affair, or FBI surveillance of Martin
Luther King, Jr. under J. Edgar Hoover—but also because it taps into a
common anxiety in the public mind: a frustration with a lack of connection
to one’s government, a belief that the federal bureaucracy has expanded
beyond its purview, and a sense that little changes from one administration to
the next. Much of this has a real basis in evidence. Government actors have in
some instances abused their power. Abuse aside, there is significant continuity
between presidential administrations, and the entrenched bureaucracy has a
lot to do with that. 7 Moreover, though constraint may be valued for its own
sake, it does not necessarily produce benevolent results. In fact, it often stands
in the way of benevolent action. 8 As I have written elsewhere, while a primary
effect of bureaucratic constraints is to restrain political actors from quickly
7. See id. at 687.
8. Of course, what constitutes “benevolent” action necessarily turns on substantive views
about the policy at hand. For example, views will differ on whether the internal constraints that
hindered President Obama’s ability to close the detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay aided or
harmed U.S. national security or were otherwise normatively “benevolent.” Id. at 688.
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effecting significant changes, these institutional features also operate to
defend and entrench executive claims to power, over time leading to
incremental aggrandizement that internal forces alone cannot—or at least
will not—dial back. 9
This Article seeks in part to navigate the tension between these accounts
in order to assess the experience of bureaucratic resistance divorced, to the
extent feasible, from substantive views about the particular policy or President
at hand. 10 To the extent these approaches toward bureaucratic resistance are
proxies for debates about the legitimacy of the administrative state, I view my
intervention here as follows: The deep state decriers’ invocation of
bureaucratic resistance as a threat to the legitimacy of the administrative state
rests on an argument that bureaucrats both exercise significant power to steer
government action against the President, and are unaccountable in their
exercise of that power. I demonstrate that this is inaccurate or at least
incomplete on both fronts, and thus deep state rhetoric obscures rather than
illuminates debates about the administrative state.
The benevolent constraints literature, by contrast, presents the existence
of bureaucratic constraints as legitimizing of the administrative state and as
the last safeguard of the republic should the traditional checks of the courts
and Congress fall down on the job. I agree that the existence of internal
process and constraint has salience for questions about the legitimacy of any
given exercise of executive power, as well as to how the other branches should
engage. Because I demonstrate that these internal actors and mechanisms are
inextricably, symbiotically interwoven with the external—deriving from them
both power and constraint—I view them as necessary to the continued ability
of all three branches to govern and to constrain executive action. But as such,
I do not view bureaucratic constraints as ultimately surviving the failure of the
traditional separation of powers, and therefore they are not a substitute for it.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I explores academic accounts of
bureaucratic resistance and the interplay between historical perspectives on
bureaucratic behavior and the rise of the modern deep state narrative.
Part II challenges several common mischaracterizations of the
bureaucracy and resistance within it, which can fuel both fear and
complacency. The first is the misrepresentation of the bureaucracy as
comprising a clear dichotomy between two polar opposites: a crisply defined
career bureaucracy, on the one hand, and the President and his inner circle,
on the other. The second is the depiction of resistance within that
bureaucracy as unidirectional, originating within that defined career
bureaucracy, and directed against the President. These oversimplifications

9. Id. at 687.
10. Of course, we cannot divorce substantive views entirely from this assessment, as questions
of legality, abuse, or corrupt intent behind executive action will all be relevant to the question of
bureaucratic authority to resist. See infra Part III.
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are sometimes useful heuristics, but they lend themselves to distortion,
particularly when paired with fear of the bureaucracy as a “deep state” bent
on undermining the President. By the same token, they may undergird
unrealistic expectations of the “bureaucracy’s” capacity to rein in executive
overreach. This Part thus provides a more textured description both of the
diverse array of actors throughout the executive branch bureaucracy and of
the multi-directional nature of resistance within it.
The Article next addresses the formal and functional authority that
bureaucratic actors actually wield and, specifically, the power that they have
to resist the President or other bureaucratic actors. Does their discretion to
act align with their authority to do so? This Article challenges both the deep
state and benevolent constraints accounts of bureaucratic power. I argue that
the deep state account underestimates the extent to which bureaucrats wield
actual formal authority tethered to political accountability. And while both
critics and champions of bureaucratic resistance alike rely on conventional
accounts portraying bureaucrats as wielding significant functional power to
act, this article demonstrates the practical constraints on that power facing all
actors within the executive branch. The reality is that all bureaucratic actors
at every locus throughout the executive branch reasonably sense themselves
to be hemmed in, most of the time, from all directions.
Leaks merit their own brief treatment in this Part, both because they are
frequently held out as the evidence of an aggressive and powerful deep state,
and because leaking is the rare mechanism that does not require organized
action in order to have real consequences. Access to explosive information
alone can be a force-multiplier for a lone wolf executive branch actor. As such,
leaking is immune from several of the practical constraints on bureaucratic
power that I discuss in this section. Leaks are often likened to that
paradigmatic example of “deep state” corruption, the Hoover-era hoarding of
secrets to blackmail political officials. Both involve the use of information to
affect decision-making, but that is where the similarity ends. Leaks effect
change only if they are made public; their power rests in the public’s hands.
As such, they are antithetical to blackmail, whose power rests in the hands of
the blackmailer, and only so long as the public does not discover the secret.
The leaker’s power is thus heavily circumscribed by the intended recipients
of the leaks themselves, the public, over whom the individual leaker has littleto-no control. Leaking can raise many legitimate concerns, to be sure, but
power untethered to public accountability is not usually one of them. 11
Part IV establishes a a framework for assessing bureaucratic resistance. It
first establishes zones of discretion in undertaking acts of bureaucratic
11. A notable exception is the use of leaks or other selective release of information timed
specifically to affect public opinion decisively, such as immediately preceding an election. I might
distinguish this from other leaks because the finality of an event like an election gives information
released immediately prior more weight than it otherwise might have and any defects cannot be
remedied by subsequent releases of information.
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resistance, using legality as the normative trait (though not the only potential
trait) against which to weigh appropriateness of action. These zones range
from legally-compelled resistance to unlawful action. In between are acts that
might be authorized by not compelled, as well as acts that are unauthorized
but not strictly unlawful. Where a specific action falls within these zones is
dependent not only on the act itself, but on the purpose for which it is taken.
Therefore, this Part next maps out the relationship between purpose and
mechanism. Refusing to change language in a report, for example, falls within
one zone (legally-compelled action) if done for the purpose of challenging
an order to doctor facts, and another zone (unauthorized but not necessarily
unlawful) if done due to a mere policy disagreement with one’s boss.
I then deploy this framework in Part V to revisit the story I discuss above
of U.S. intelligence agents-gone-rogue, as well as three familiar examples of
bureaucratic resistance to political leadership. These are: President Nixon’s
last Defense Secretary’s efforts to rein in the President’s potential use of
military force during the waning days of his administration; the bureaucratic
hurdles President Obama faced in attempting to close the Guantanamo Bay
detention center; and the ongoing executive branch investigation into
Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential campaign, despite President
Trump’s frequent entreaties that it end. While the national security sphere is
the focus of this Article and the case studies I dissect, the broader
reconceptualization of bureaucratic constraint, resistance, and power
resonates across the administrative state.
This Article is ultimately a cautious defense of the robust exercise of
formal bureaucratic power, tempered by—and in fact reliant upon—the
manifold existing practical constraints on that power. Both the deep state and
benevolent constraints bodies of scholarship recognize the considerable
power that has accumulated in the modern executive branch. It is concern
over the risks of executive overreach and the potential for containing that
power that animates much of this work. The most significant point of
departure between these bodies of scholarship is that the benevolent
constraints account views the unelected bureaucracy as a solution to the
modern accretion of power in the Executive, whereas the deep state decriers
see it as the threat. This Article argues that the bureaucracy itself is not the
threat that some fear, nor is it the whole cure to a President who is.
Nevertheless, it is an essential component of our modern system of checks
and balances, and it is in jeopardy.
II.

THE DEEP STATE AND THE INTERNAL SEPARATION OF POWERS

Public law scholarship on both the international and domestic planes has
been engaged for years in projects aimed at peeling away the outer layers of
the black box of the state to reveal more and more of its inner workings to the
next group of interested scholars. While conventional international law
scholarship often treated states as though they were individual, rational
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actors, imbued with anthropomorphized thoughts and self-interests, many
modern scholars have moved beyond this treatment. They have opened up
those states to examine how the many institutions within affect the state’s
actions and legal positioning, and thus the development of international law.
Scholarship on these intra-state institutions similarly initially treated these
institutions—such as the branches of U.S. government—as distinct unitary
entities, only to have those initial accounts overcome by subsequent
scholarship opening up our conceptions of Congress, the courts, and the
Executive Branch to account for the many actors within. 12 Scholars of
presidential powers have explored dynamics between the President and actors
within his administration, most notably between the President and his
appointees, 13 or between the President and his lawyers, 14 and even among
those lawyers themselves. 15 Likewise, scholars of administrative law have
moved beyond treating agency action as deriving from or empowering one
sole source, and have looked behind the outer veneer of the agency and top
administrator to examine the role played by professionals, career bureaucrats,
within the agency. 16 This Article follows in this trend of opening up the
complexity of the executive branch further, to assess the experience of
bureaucratic resistance within it.

12. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron,
12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 240 (1992).
13. See, e.g., CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 4, at 10–22 (detailing the history of presidential
claims to control over political appointees); John Yoo, Unitary, Executive, or Both?, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1935, 1936 (2009) (reviewing CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 4, and arguing in favor of a
broader conception of the unitary executive to include significant substantive powers).
14. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 87–116
(2010); ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN
REPUBLIC 137–42 (2010); Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical
Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1101–03 (2013); Trevor W. Morrison,
Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1448, 1460–70 (2010); Richard H.
Pildes, Law and the President, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1389–90 (2012) (reviewing POSNER
& VERMEULE, supra).
15. See generally, e.g., Rebecca Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal
Decisionmaking, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 359 (2013) (examining the process of legal decision-making
inside the U.S. executive branch, and arguing that the trigger or “interpretation catalyst” forcing
the executive branch to respond to a legal question shapes the specific decision-making process,
including the hierarchy of legal decision-makers involved, and ultimately has a significant effect
on the executive’s legal position); Neomi Rao, Public Choice and International Law Compliance: The
Executive Branch Is a “They,” Not an It, 96 MINN. L. REV. 194 (2011) (arguing that the array of
different legal voices on matters of international law inside the executive branch provides the
President with legal options, thus aiding his ability to shape his administration’s views).
16. JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 205–08 (2017) (hailing the importance of the career civil service as against the threat of
privatization); David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV.
201, 203 (2001); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2260 (2001);
Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1057 (2011).
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A. BENEVOLENT CONSTRAINTS: THE INTERNAL SEPARATION OF POWERS
In recent years, a rich body of scholarship has emerged exploring the
role of institutional features and actors within the executive branch in
constraining presidential prerogative, a dynamic often referred to as the
“internal separation of powers.” 17 This scholarship has developed largely in
response to concerns that over time too much power has accumulated in the
Executive, at the expense of the other branches, and possibly also at the
expense of individual rights. These “Imperial Executivists,” borrowing loosely
from Arthur Schlesinger, 18 raised concerns that the courts and Congress—the
entities formally charged with checking presidential overreach—have lapsed
in these responsibilities and instead over time have acquiesced in a dangerous
accretion of power to the President. 19 In response to these genuine concerns
regarding congressional and judicial abdication of power to the President, a
number of scholars rose to defend the merits of the current system and, to
varying degrees, to decry the argument that the presidency had become an
imperial one, divorced from constraint. (I say “to varying degrees,” because
these scholars have differed over the extent to which the status quo is working
just fine, thank you very much, 20 or whether additional internal constraints
are necessary to best preserve the checks and balances of our system of
government). 21 Some of these scholars had themselves served within the
executive branch, which gave them a perch from which to observe in practice
the relationship between the President and legal constraint. As part of their
defense of modern executive power, these scholars identified the existence of
internal constraints within the executive branch that they deemed reasonable
“second-best” alternatives to the traditional Madisonian separation of powers,
giving rise to the term “internal separation of powers.” 22
This scholarship has predominantly considered the question of legal
constraint on the President, responding as it does in particular to the matter of
whether the President is constrained by law. Thus, much of this scholarship is
17. Katyal, supra note 3, at 2316–17; Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship
Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 423 (2009); Michaels, supra
note 3, at 536; Morrison, supra note 14, at 1524.
18. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 377 (1973).
19. ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 87–89, 95; Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch,
105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1732 (1996).
20. Michaels, supra note 3, at 530; Morrison, supra note 3, at 1692.
21. Katyal, supra note 3, at 2318 (calling for the creation of an internal independent court
with the power to check the President).
22. See id. at 2316–17. I include within this body of scholarship scholars who have explored
internal constraints on the President as part of the checks and balances without necessarily using
this term. Jon Michaels has delved extensively into the layers of bureaucratic dynamics, which he
defends as an essential component of the checks and balances of the modern government.
See, e.g., MICHAELS, supra note 16, at 205–08; Michaels, supra note 3, at 551–60; Jon D. Michaels,
Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers,
91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227, 229 (2016).
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focused on a small but critical office within the executive branch long devoted
to grappling with the most significant legal questions facing the President: the
Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”), within the Department of Justice (“DOJ”). 23
But more broadly, the unifying contribution of this body of literature is a
grappling with the internal dynamics of the executive branch and some of the
varied ways in which these dynamics may constrain a President inclined to
excesses.
The internal separation of powers literature is responsive to, and to my
view answers many of the concerns of, scholars warning of an “Imperial
Presidency.” 24 Certainly, Congress and the courts have relinquished some
responsibility for direct oversight of the national security state, and in doing
so may be seen as weakening the checks and balances of the traditional
Madisonian separation of powers. This may be due in part to abdication, but
it is also a function of the sheer impossibility of reaching into all of the dark
corners of the behemoth that is the modern executive branch. Whatever the
reason, as scholars of internal constraints rightly note, this has not resulted in
a presidency wholly unchecked by or without concern for legal limits. To the
contrary, we have seen in recent years a presidency almost obsessed with law,
along with an explosion of NGOs, reporters, and scholars steeped in national
security law expertise—scrutinizing its every move. 25
Much of this presidential engagement with law owes a debt to the
growing legions of executive branch lawyers toiling away in their windowless
offices and “SCIFs” 26 from DC to the northern Virginian suburbs. Many of
these executive branch actors tend to hold over in their positions from
presidential administration to administration. That continuity of personnel
—as well as the trail of paper it creates and the respect for norms it
entrenches—is partly responsible for the fact that executive branch legal
positions and other policies do not immediately or easily reverse course from
administration to administration. 27 On that account alone, internal
separation of powers scholars are correct about the existence of a constraining
effect of internal institutions on whoever happens to be sitting in the Oval
Office.
23. See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 3, at 2336; Morrison, supra note 14, at 1458; see also Daphna
Renan, The Law Presidents Make, 103 VA. L. REV. 805, 813 (2017) (exploring the possible decline
of the importance of OLC in recent years).
24. SCHLESINGER, supra note 18, at 377.
25. See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY
AFTER 9/11, at 36–39 (2012).
26. A “Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility” (“SCIF”) is a secure room used for
viewing and discussing highly classified information. See Dennis C. Blair, Intelligence Community
Directive Number 705, U.S. OFF. DIRECTOR NAT’L INTELLIGENCE (May 26, 2010), https://
www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD_705_SCIFs.pdf.
27. Rebecca Ingber, Co-Belligerency, 42 YALE J. INT’L L. 67, 105 (2017) (examining the
evolution of executive branch legal positioning and the constraints on radical change in the
context of the U.S. government’s position on its authority under the AUMF).
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But many scholars concerned with an Imperial Presidency rightly fear not
just the person of the President himself, but the executive branch as a whole. For
critics of the national security state who may view existing policies in the areas
of surveillance, targeted killing, detention, or other areas as examples of
Executive overreach, the existence of internal constraints that keep the
President from changing course are not merely insufficiently comforting;
these internal forces for continuity are something to fear in and of
themselves. 28 For at least when the President himself is the danger, there exists
a potential solution—seek to elect someone with better policies. Much more
elusive is how to course correct in the face of an entrenched bureaucracy,
bound by its nature to keeping a President from easily changing that course.
B. THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN “DEEP STATE” NARRATIVE
Concerns with the substantive policies of the national security state
coincide with a recent narrative in accounts of the presidency: that of the
“deep state.” Historically, the term “deep state” has been employed with
respect to regimes in Turkey, Pakistan, and Egypt, to describe control of the
state, irrespective of democratic institutions, by powerful and clandestine
alliances among the intelligence, military, and business elite, often with ties
to organized crime. 29 As it is used in the U.S. context, the “deep state”
generally connotes an organized bureaucratic power base within the
executive branch, typically within the national security arm, that may operate
independently of, or in tension with, the politically elected leadership. 30 The
“deep state” narrative takes various forms—from conspiracy theories about a
cabal of bureaucrats seeking to undermine the President, 31 to very real
concerns about the outsized power of the national security state and its past

28. GLENNON, supra note 4, at 91–99. For a contrasting view of the relationship between
internal constraints and individual rights see Shirin Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within? Inspectors
General and National Security Oversight, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1074 (2013).
29. See David A. Graham, There Is No American ‘Deep State’, ATLANTIC (Feb. 20, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/02/why-its-dangerous-to-talk-about-adeep-state/517221; David Remnick, There Is No Deep State, NEW YORKER (Mar. 20, 2017), https://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/03/20/there-is-no-deep-state.
30. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 107–10. Recently some scholars who favor
bureaucratic checks on the President have sought to reappropriate “deep state” rhetoric. See Jon
D. Michaels, The American Deep State, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1653, 1666 (2018); Cass R. Sunstein,
In Praise of the Deep State, DEEP STATE (June 13, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://thedeepstate.com/inpraise-of-the-deep-state.
31. See Mark Hensch, Gingrich: ‘The Deep State Exists’, HILL (Mar. 14, 2017, 4:07 PM),
http://thehill.com/homenews/news/323950-gingrich-the-deep-state-exists; David J. Lynch, Trump
Loyalists Lash Out at ‘Deep State Gone Rogue’, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.ft.com/
content/64b8f8d2-7d47-11e7-9108-edda0bcbc928; Patricia Mazzei, Rubio: ‘Bureaucrats’ to Blame for
Softening Trump Cuba Policy, MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 8, 2017, 6:27 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/
news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article183486726.html; Tom Porter, Deep State: How a
Conspiracy Theory Went from Political Fringe to Mainstream, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 2, 2017, 12:23 PM),
http://www.newsweek.com/deep-state-conspiracy-theory-trump-645376.
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abuses. 32 The “deep state” terminology itself evokes a shadowy, conspiratorial
tone, particularly considering its origins in states where the use of the term
coincides with a breakdown of faith in elected institutions. 33
What the various “deep state” narratives share is a concern that the large
and powerful national security bureaucracy might operate untethered from
the democratic controls of elected political oversight. In this regard, they
provide a more conspiratorial spin on and old problem, the longstanding
frustrations of presidents seeking to push their agendas through the vast and
seemingly calcified bureaucracy. 34
While skepticism of the bureaucracy as a whole has been a particular
feature of some Republican administrations in recent decades, as well as a
longstanding critique in legal scholarship, 35 that concern did not historically
extend to the national security bureaucracy such as the military and
intelligence community. 36 Criticism of the national security state has instead

32. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 107–12. “Deep state” terminology has also been
employed more broadly to describe power elites at high levels of government and the
phenomenon of government secrecy more generally. See, e.g., LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 4.
33. Ryan Gingeras, Last Rites for a ‘Pure Bandit’: Clandestine Service, Historiography and the Origins
of the Turkish ‘Deep State’, 206 PAST & PRESENT 151, 152 (2010) (the “phrase” deep state “generally
refers to a kind of shadow or parallel system of government in which unofficial or publicly
unacknowledged individuals play important roles in defining and implementing state policy”);
Sarah Childress, The Deep State: How Egypt’s Shadow State Won Out, PBS FRONTLINE (Sept. 17, 2013),
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/the-deep-state-how-egypts-shadow-state-won-out; Philip
Reiner, Pakistan’s ISI: The True Deep State, CIPHER BRIEF (July 20, 2017), https://www.thecipher
brief.com/pakistans-isi-the-true-deep-state.
34. Presidents have long expressed frustration with bureaucratic impediments, but some
Republican presidents have expressed a more specific view that the bureaucracy is left-leaning
and predisposed against their agenda. Joel D. Aberbach & Bert A. Rockman, Clashing Beliefs Within
the Executive Branch: The Nixon Administration Bureaucracy, 70 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 456, 456 (1976)
(stating that all presidents face concerns about loyalty from the bureaucracy, but that this
dynamic is heightened “when the changeover is from Democratic to Republican control because
of Republican suspicions that the career bureaucracy is heavily infiltrated by Democrats”); Francis
E. Rourke, Responsiveness and Neutral Competence in American Bureaucracy, 52 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 539,
541–42 (1992) (“Republican presidents in recent decades have tended to see bureaucracy as
being in the camp of their political enemies, as being perhaps Democrats in disguise—or worse,
closet liberals. Democratic presidents, on the other hand, have been inclined to view bureaucrats
as having an agenda of their own, which they pursue no matter who occupies the White House.”).
But see Richard L. Cole & David A. Caputo, Presidential Control of the Senior Civil Service: Assessing the
Strategies of the Nixon Years, 73 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 399, 409 tbl.6 (1979) (noting the longstanding
frustration of presidents vis-à-vis the career bureaucracy, but showing that the majority of career
civil servants during Nixon’s presidency did not, in fact, oppose the President’s policy agenda).
35. Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231
(1994) (deeming the modern administrative state unconstitutional); Gillian E. Metzger, Foreward:
1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (2017) (chronicling
modern and historical antipathy toward the administrative state).
36. See Aberbach & Rockman, supra note 34, at 457–58. An intriguing exception is the Nixon
administration’s attempt to blame the Watergate break-in on the CIA. See, e.g., David Greenberg,
Watergate Fueled Conspiracy Theories, Too, POLITICO MAG. (June 17, 2017), https://www.politico.com/
magazine/story/2017/06/17/trump-watergate-and-how-conspiracy-theories-get-made-215274;
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largely been a focus of the political left, from scholars to NGOs and activists.
For these groups, concerns with the national security state aligned with
concerns about an unchecked imperial executive. 37 That fear of the national
security state has a sturdy foundation based on a long history of abuses, which
boil over from time to time, and which often require course corrections such
as the reining in of the intelligence community in the wake of the Church
Committee report. 38 Over the past decade, however, with a left-leaning
presidential administration wielding the instruments of the national security
state, some among the political right began to adopt the critiques, and fears,
of that bureaucracy. 39
The most recent presidential campaign capitalized upon fears of the
national security state, with a twist. With Trump’s transition into the Oval
Office, his surrogates and supporters could no longer decry the President
himself, but they continued their assault on the entrenched bureaucracy. 40
They adopted and then adapted the concept of the “deep state” to their new
purpose. While the traditional critique of the national security state focused
on the power of the state—including the President at its helm—as against
individual rights, the new “deep state” decriers railed against the power of the
federal bureaucracy as against the President, incorporating the old
Republican critiques of the domestic policy-focused bureaucracy and now
turning them against the national security state as well. Any perceived
bureaucratic resistance to the President’s agenda—from the career analysts
in the intelligence agencies, to line officials at the EPA, to his own political
appointees at the helms of agencies and inside the White House—became
evidence to the President’s supporters of a “deep state” seeking to undermine
him. 41
Richard Nixon: Statements About the Watergate Investigations (May 22, 1973), AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=3855 (last visited Oct. 10, 2018).
37. Flaherty, supra note 19, at 1742.
38. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 94-755, bk. I at 7 & bk. II at 93 (1976) (presenting the final report
of the Senate Church Committee, which investigated abuses by the CIA, NSA, FBI and IRS that
included illegal attempted assassinations of foreign leaders and illegal domestic surveillance);
RONALD KESSLER, THE SECRETS OF THE FBI 38 (2011); TIM WEINER, ENEMIES: A HISTORY OF THE
FBI 83–84 (2013) (detailing excesses of the FBI under the leadership of J. Edgar Hoover,
focusing on the existence of the bureau’s secret ‘enemies’ list).
39. See, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, LAWLESS: THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S UNPRECEDENTED
ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RULE OF LAW 68–69, 112–13 (2015).
40. Patrick J. Buchanan, After the Coup, What Then?, BUCHANAN (Aug. 8, 2017, 12:46 AM),
http://buchanan.org/blog/after-the-coup-what-then-127443; Joe Concha, Gingrich Says Mueller
Represents ‘Deep State’ at Worst, HILL (Aug. 4, 2017, 9:01 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/
media/345290-gingrich-says-mueller-represents-deep-state-at-worst; Ian Schwartz, Hannity Rips “Deep
State”: “Unelected Fourth Branch of Government Looking for Retribution”, REAL CLEAR POL. (June 17, 2017),
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2017/06/17/hannity_rips_deep_state_unelected_fourth_
branch_of_government_looking_for_retribution.html.
41. See, e.g., Kalev Leetaru, What the ‘Rogue’ EPA, NPS and NASA Twitter Accounts Teach Us
About The Future of Social, FORBES (Jan. 25, 2017, 10:35 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
kalevleetaru/2017/01/25/what-the-rogue-epa-nps-and-nasa-twitter-accounts-teach-us-about-the-
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C. POINTS OF CONVERGENCE AND POINTS OF DEPARTURE
While all these approaches to bureaucracy generally share a conception
of bureaucrats as sometimes resistant to the President’s agenda, they part ways
on when such resistance is legitimate.
Under the “deep state” model, unelected bureaucrats are unaccountable
to the public and therefore, at least under an extreme version of this view, any
resistance to those officials who are duly elected must be intrinsically
illegitimate. On the other end of the spectrum, scholars hailing benevolent
constraints accept bureaucratic resistance as not only legitimate in itself but
legitimizing of the President’s power. 42 And yet this scholarship does not
provide an answer as to when such resistance is appropriate, or not, and where
the line should fall. Moreover, because this scholarship has responded
generally to fears of presidential power, it has focused on how bureaucratic
checks limit and thus legitimize the President himself; as such, it has not
provided a full response to critiques of the national security state as a whole,
nor does it respond to fear of those bureaucratic checks themselves. 43
In between are scholars who have long raised concerns with the breadth
of power currently amassed by the national security state as a whole, or who
are focused on the specific substantive policies the government establishes,
rather than the particulars of the behind-the-scenes process that results in
such policies. 44 These scholars are not wholly uninterested in the balance of

future-of-social (exploring the existence of social media accounts purporting to be the vehicles
for “rogue” bureaucrats within those government agencies); Jonathan Lemire, Trump White House
Sees Deep State Behind Leaks, Opposition, AP NEWS (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/363c
cdba946548bfa4b855ae38d1797a/Trump-White-House-sees-%22deep-state%22-behind-opposition,leaks (discussing the preoccupation within the Trump White House with a perceived “deep state”
seeking to undermine the President); Michael S. Schmidt et al., Mueller Removed Top Agent in
Russia Inquiry Over Possible Anti-Trump Texts, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/12/02/us/politics/mueller-removed-top-fbi-agent-over-possible-anti-trump-texts.html.
42. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
43. Some internal constraints advocates propose additional institutional mechanisms that
would be even more independent of the President. See Katyal, supra note 3, at 2318.
44. Scholars have hailed instances of resistance when it has been in the service of individual
rights, for example, as against presidential illegality, and bemoaned it when it has entrenched or
furthered policies the author disfavors. See Ingber, supra note 6, at 686; Michael P. Scharf,
International Law and the Torture Memos, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 321, 346 (2009) (describing the
State Department Office of the Legal Adviser’s opposition to the “torture memos” and
techniques); Sinnar, supra note 28, at 1036–40; cf. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The
President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104, 197 (2015) (defending the merits of
constraining the civil service in the service of effectuating particular policy goals); Aziz Z. Huq, The
President and the Detainees, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 499, 500 (2017) (explaining the “bureaucraticlegislative alliance” that hindered President Obama’s plan to close the military detention facility at
Guantanamo Bay). See generally JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT
INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2009) (describing administration officials’—including the
author’s—confrontation with the administration over the “torture memos”). There are some
notable exceptions. Michael Glennon, for example, is concerned both with the substantive powers
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power between the entrenched bureaucracy and the political leadership, but
their interest in internal process is usually a means to a substantive ends.
Bureaucratic resistance is thus likely to be favored or disfavored depending
on the policy it is resisting.
This Article seeks to intervene at precisely this point. It follows to some
extent in the vein of the “benevolent constraints” project and is deeply
informed by this scholarship. Yet I see risks in both the deep state and the
benevolent constraints models of bureaucratic behavior: the twin dangers of
fear and complacency. Fear of the bureaucracy may provoke attempts to
erode that check on the President. But over-reliance on bureaucratic checks
is also dangerous, as it may lead to an abdication of responsibility by the other
branches, resulting in insufficient cabining of executive power as a whole. I
seek to contribute here a complexity necessary to assessing what the
bureaucracy can feasibly accomplish, within both its functional and formal
power, and what it cannot. To do so, I draw on bodies of scholarship on
executive power and national security, political science literature on
bureaucratic behavior, and administrative law scholarship on the allocation
of power within the executive branch—as well as other sources, historical and
contemporaneous—that provide data on government behavior. 45
III.

BUREAUCRACY AND RESISTANCE

Bureaucratic resistance within the U.S. executive branch, as elsewhere,
takes countless shapes. The phrase “bureaucratic resistance” is typically
employed to describe a unidirectional activity—“resistance”—from one
clearly defined group-—the “bureaucracy,” or perhaps the “career
bureaucracy”-—as against another-—the President or political leadership. 46
Yet that crisp conceptual dichotomy between these two entities masks the
complexity of both the bureaucracy and resistance within it. To be sure, all of
these categories are useful heuristics, and I employ them myself. But in order
to consider the extent to which this “bureaucracy” might employ “resistance”
in such a manner that it truly constrains-—or alternatively, truly threatens
—the President in a way that should be either relied upon or feared, it is
necessary to unpack what each of these components actually entails.
Before diving in, it is worth considering the means and mechanisms of
recognizing and identifying evidence of resistance inside the bureaucracy.
Evidence of internal decision-making, let alone dissent, is particularly elusive

and policies of the executive branch as a whole and with what he perceives as an “illusion” of political
leadership, in fact steered by the unelected bureaucracy. GLENNON, supra note 4, at 29–37.
45. Sources of evidence on government behavior include formal government documents,
information from government leaks, press reports, congressional statutes and legislative histories,
government briefs and oral arguments, statements by executive officials, judicial opinions, and
accounts of former government officials.
46. See, e.g., Jennifer Nou, Bureaucratic Resistance from Below, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT
(Nov. 16, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/bureaucratic-resistance-from-below-by-jennifer-nou.
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in the context of the national security state, where so much executive branch
deliberation takes place in secret. Nevertheless, evidence of resistance and
internal dissent comes from numerous sources. The most noticeable comes
from leaks to the press or criticism from political actors about bureaucratic
intransigence. But there exist more subtle means of discerning internal
conflict. Shards of evidence exist in inconsistent statements from different
agencies, an evolving position, or even an intentionally ambiguous one. 47
Evidence of resistance and dissent can also be found in the dogs that do
not bark. Consider for example the norm of agency signatures on legal briefs
in litigation to which the United States is a party or is intervening: a lack of a
relevant official’s signature may signal nonconcurrence with the
government’s position. 48 Similarly, discontent with a position may be inferred
when officials fail to provide documentation of internal support that would
ordinarily be expected. Courts have sometimes drawn such inferences. For
example, in litigation over President Trump’s travel ban, one court noted as
significant that the government had not included in its briefing evidentiary
support for its position from relevant agency professionals, along with
evidence that a leaked draft report from civil servants had not been filed with
the court. 49 At times, courts conflate concerns over lack of involvement by a
particular agency with concerns over lack of involvement of particular actors
within the agency, and thus when courts raise concerns about internal
“process,” this may imply a deeper interest in the involvement of particular
actors who may be assumed to have greater expertise, or who may be assumed
to act free from partisan political motivations that the court may deem
inappropriate to the matter at hand.
A. BUREAUCRATIC AXES
Bureaucratic resistance and perceptions thereof are anything but
monolithic. The vast executive branch “bureaucracy” has not only thwarted
and befuddled Democrat and Republican presidents alike, 50 it has also
47. For a discussion on divining an understanding of the U.S. government’s legal position
—or conflicting positions—on the scope of the 2001 statute governing the conflict with al Qaeda
through evidence from public sources, see Ingber, supra note 27, at 80–86.
48. See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, The Solicitor General as Mediator Between Court and Agency, 2009
MICH. ST. L. REV. 185, 197 (noting that under typical practice, officials from relevant agencies with
a stake in litigation sign the briefs DOJ files in court; lack of signature thus signals dissent). At times
of internal debate, the DOJ may act as arbiter. See Rex E. Lee Conference on the Office of the Solicitor
General of the United States, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1, 73 (including a statement of former Deputy Solicitor
General, now Chief Justice John Roberts, likening such mediation to “Thanksgiving dinner at a
dysfunctional family” in which the SG’s office plays the parents).
49. Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 756, 766 (9th Cir. 2017).
50. A famous quote attributed to Truman, contemplating his successor, Dwight Eisenhower,
as President, evokes this frustration: “He’ll sit here, and he’ll say, ‘Do this! Do that!’ And nothing
will happen. Poor Ike—it won’t be a bit like the Army. He’ll find it very frustrating.” RICHARD E.
NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP 9 (1960). While all presidents
have shared frustration with the bureaucracy, some political scientists have suggested that a
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thwarted the plans of every human being within the executive branch, low
and high-level alike. And despite the narratives that divide the bureaucracy
into neat, opposing categories, in reality there are few true crisp dichotomies,
whether between the President and the bureaucracy; the politically appointed
and civil service; the partisan and the impartial; or the high-level officials and
the low. 51 Each of these categories itself represents a spectrum rather than a
binary dichotomy, as I will discuss in this section. And bureaucratic actors at
each point along each of these many spectra intersect and tussle with others
above, below, and horizontal to them across the bureaucracy. 52
1. Career-Political Continuum
One such spectrum exists between the President and the paradigmatic
career civil servant line officer, between which sit a tangle of actors. Within
the White House staff alone, where one might expect to find the highest
consolidation of political actors, such as senior advisors who came with the
President from the campaign, also sit high-level officials appointed to their
positions from within the ranks of career officers, 53 high-level civil servants
who run offices within the national security council and sit alongside political
counterparts, and lower-level civil servants detailed to the White House from
agencies. 54 Within agencies, the staff will include a politically appointed head
partisan imbalance among career bureaucrats results in a more “disruptive” relationship with a
Republican President. See Aberbach & Rockman, supra note 34, at 468. Others have suggested
that this imbalance is overstated. See Cole & Caputo, supra note 34, at 406.
51. Career officials are often in positions of decision-making authority throughout the executive
branch. See Aberbach & Rockman, supra note 34, at 458 (discussing their sample set as limited to both
“political appointees and high-level career civil servants” who “occupy positions with administrative
responsibility for some program or set of programs,” with an objective of interviewing only those
officials “whose jobs clearly entailed a responsibility for policy making and implementation”).
52. For a thorough study of the modern personnel architecture, see DAVID E. LEWIS & JENNIFER
L. SELIN, SOURCEBOOK OF UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE AGENCIES (2012), https://www.acus.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/Sourcebook-2012-Final_12-Dec_Online.pdf.
53. See, e.g., Ryan Browne, Who Is H.R. McMaster, Trump’s National Security Adviser?, CNN POL.
(last updated May 16, 2017, 1:05 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/16/politics/hr-mcmasternational-security-adviser-donald-trump/index.html (noting McMaster’s trajectory from career
military officer to national security adviser under President Trump); John Brennan Fast Facts, CNN
(last updated Aug. 17, 2018, 2:25 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2013/01/08/us/john-brennan---fastfacts/index.html (providing a list of facts on former CIA director John Brennan); Press Release,
White House Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Announces More Key Administration
Posts (Apr. 17, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/04/17/
President-obama-announces-more-key-administration-posts (noting Avril Haines’ prior positions
as a career lawyer in the State Department); Statement by the President on the Selection of Avril
Haines as Deputy National Security Advisor (Dec. 18, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
the-press-office/2014/12/18/statement-President-selection-avril-haines-deputy-national-security-advi.
54. Freedom of Information Act Request, JMD FOIA Tracking No. 110520 (Jan. 23, 2018)
(revealing that there were six DOJ employees detailed to the White House and two to NSC on
November 1, 2016, and one DOJ employee detailed to the White House and zero to NSC on Feb.
1, 2017); Karen DeYoung, How the Obama White House Runs Foreign Policy, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-the-obama-white-house-runs-foreign-
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at the very top and her immediate advisers, many of whom may be politically
appointed but not necessarily all; a mélange of politically appointed and highlevel career officials running the many offices inside the agency, as well as a
mix of career and appointed officials, like special assistants, occupying both
more and less important mid and lower-level jobs throughout. 55 A civil servant
acting as head of an office may oversee political appointees assigned to that
office, and will attend meetings, work together, and spar with colleagues from
other agencies who will also be a mix of politically appointed and career
officials.
As a matter of interests and policy positioning, a high-level politically
appointed official running an agency or office full of career civil servants may
find she has more in common professionally with those working under her
than with her politically appointed peers working within another agency or at
the White House. That may be due either to the personal interests that led
her to the job in the first place, or it may result from the day-to-day interaction
with the institutional environment itself. 56 The converse is true for the array
of employees serving within the White House, who often find themselves
understanding those needs and interests, irrespective of their particular
employment status. Policy positions therefore often align according to agency
lines as much (or more than) along an individual’s placement in the
hierarchy.
2. Burrowers and Ladder Climbers
In addition to the cross-section of a career-political spectrum I describe
above, the placement of any given individual actor at a point along that
spectrum is itself a moving target. Any particular executive branch official may
invariably occupy different roles throughout his or her career. It has been
discussed in both academic literature and public discourse that individuals
who have been appointed to political positions in one administration may
later “burrow” into a career position in order to stay on in the executive
policy/2015/08/04/2befb960-2fd7-11e5-8353-1215475949f4_story.html (providing organizational
charts of the National Security Council).
55. For a discussion of the “modern personnel system” see DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS: POLITICAL CONTROL AND BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE 20–25
(2008). Lewis describes the plethora of statuses within the executive branch, from the “positions
requiring presidential nomination and Senate confirmation (PAS)” as well as the Senior Executive
Service (“SES”) and Schedules A–C. Id. at 22. SES positions include both career and political
appointments, and Lewis refers to Schedule C as a “subtype of political appointment.” Id. at 24; see
also Kathleen M. Doherty et al., Controlling Agency Choke Points: Presidents and Turnover in the Senior
Executive Service 3 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper
No. 17-64, 2017) (describing the SES as “typically occupy[ing] top level positions, and by design,
serv[ing] as the link between the administration and the career officials more generally”).
56. See, e.g., FRANCIS E. ROURKE, BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 194 (3d ed. 1984)
(describing how agency officials may find they “care more about the needs and problems of the
agency whose work they are directing than they do about representing the President’s views in
developing the organization’s policies”).
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branch within the next administration. 57 But the opposite, less-familiar
phenomenon also occurs: Career officials may rise sufficiently high in the
executive branch that they hold significant positions of power, at times taking
on a new appointed, non-career slot. 58 In contrast to burrowers, these “ladder
climbers” will at times find it difficult or impossible to remain long into a new
administration, whether or not technically holding the right to a protected,
tenured position. 59
Burrowers and ladder climbers may have different cultural and
institutional instincts and biases than others who occupy similar positions due
to their different backgrounds. They also share a keener understanding of
how to work the levers of the bureaucracy than do their more static
counterparts. These features give them certain powers, and potentially a
different willingness to use those powers, than others in similar roles. An
official who rose to senior status from a career as a civil servant may be more
comfortable pushing back on political operatives than would a purely political
appointee who owes his career to his boss. By contrast, a political appointee
who burrows into a career position may have political instincts unusual for
purely career officials. Similarly, officials who switch agencies may also have
residual proclivities and loyalties left over from their former role, or a unique
ability to engage with other offices. These kinds of temporal blurring are not
unique to higher-level officials. Lower-level officials may also be temporarily
detailed to the White House, or to special assistant positions typically held by
politically-appointed officials, and will similarly accumulate a hybrid of career
and political loyalties and instincts.

57. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before a
New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 557, 606–09 (2003) (discussing presidents’ reliance,
promotion, hiring, and transferring of political personnel into career positions in order to
entrench like-minded personnel in anticipation of a presidential transition).
58. See Rourke, supra note 34, at 542 (discussing the potential “for civil servants to become
key players in the policy process by demonstrating a strong sympathy with the political goals of
the administration in power,” thus executing a “metamorphosis of executive officials from career
to political status”). Falling into this “ladder climber” category are officials like Sally Yates, who
was temporarily the Acting Attorney General of the DOJ until she was fired by President Trump.
Statement, The White House, Statement on the Appointment of Dana Boente as Acting Attorney
Gen. (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-appointmentdana-boente-acting-attorney-general.
59. Foreign service officers often rise to the level of Ambassador or other appointed
placements within the State Department and later return to their career positions. But reports
suggest that after the Trump transition, some foreign service officers holding high-level
appointments found their continued service untenable and left the government. See, e.g., Josh
Delk, State Department Wracked by Departures Under Trump: Report, HILL (Nov. 25, 2017, 10:55 AM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/361783-state-department-wracked-by-departuresunder-trump-report; Gardiner Harris, Diplomats Sound the Alarm as They Are Pushed Out in Droves,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/24/us/politics/state-departmenttillerson.html.
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3. Ideological Alliance with the President
The representation of partisan or ideological leanings among the
bureaucracy form another important spectrum. While the bureaucracy is
sometimes painted in broad brushstrokes as leaning “left,” political science
research has shown that partisan leanings among the bureaucracy, and
attitudes toward presidential administrations directly, tend to shift from
administration to administration. 60 Moreover, ideological leanings are hardly
constant across the entire bureaucracy; rather, they tend to vary agency to
agency, according to the alignment of the agency’s mandate with particular
ideological views or party affiliation. 61 Individuals who value environmental
protection will be more inclined to seek jobs at the EPA than those who do
not; whereas ICE will be populated generally by those who prioritize border
security. This kind of self-selection is natural but may lend some support to
the notion that some agencies may have more personnel inclined toward the
politics of a given President than others. 62
This also means that the ideological spectrum does not map neatly onto
the career-political spectrum. In fact, this is even true at the level of political
appointees. The cabinet itself may include members of the opposition
political party, as Presidents have historically reached across partisan aisles to
fill even highly important appointments in their inner circle. 63 At the other
end, in some cases, entire offices, like OLC, have high turnover and thus while
the line attorneys are officially “career” positions, the high rate of turnover
between administrations, and type of work such offices tend to do, ensures
that a fairly high percentage of the office will ultimately align with the political
preferences of the President. 64
4. Political Taint and Independence
Another critical axis that does not align as one might expect with the
career-political divide is the expectation by any given official or office of
60. See, e.g., Joel D. Aberbach & Bert A. Rockman, The Political Views of U.S. Senior Federal
Executives, 1970-1992, 57 J. POL. 838, 842–52 (1995) (“[T]he top career service in the United
States turns out to be surprisingly flexible in adapting to the political forces around it.”); Cole
& Caputo, supra note 34, at 406.
61. Mark D. Richardson et al., Elite Perceptions of Agency Ideology and Workforce Skill, 80 J. POL. 303,
304–07 (2017) (demonstrating significant variances in political affiliation among civil servants
according to agency).
62. MARISSA MARTINO GOLDEN, WHAT MOTIVATES BUREAUCRATS?: POLITICS AND
ADMINISTRATION DURING THE REAGAN YEARS 27 (2000); Aberbach & Rockman, supra note 34,
at 461–66.
63. President Obama, for example, held over as his defense secretary Robert Gates, who
had previously served Republican presidents. Dr. Robert M. Gates, DEP’T OF DEF., https://
www.defense.gov/About/Biographies/Biography-View/Article/602797 (last visited Sept. 2, 2018)
(“Dr. Robert M. Gates served as U.S. Secretary of Defense from December 2006 [under President
Bush] to July 2011 [under President Obama].”).
64. GOLDEN, supra note 62, at 96–98; Aberbach & Rockman, supra note 34, at 467.
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independence from the President, and from politics or partisanship more
broadly. 65 In other words, to what extent should an individual expect to fall
in line with the President’s political considerations, in lieu of exercising
independent judgment? Some offices—including within the politicallyappointed leadership—view themselves as necessarily insulated from policy
preferences, others from partisan politics. 66 In the realm of legal decisionmaking, the expectation of independence from politics between DOJ and the
White House is to some extent more significant than that between the career
bureaucracy and political leadership, and there are further shades of gray as
between different offices and actors within DOJ. 67 There is “a spectrum of
accepted political or policy motivation among executive branch legal
decision-makers, from the President at one end, to White House counsel to
OLC to civil servants working in agency general-counsel offices to career
prosecutors at the other extreme.” 68 In light of recent events, I would note
the FBI director’s place on that spectrum is historically closer to that of career
prosecutors in terms of expected independence from the President, despite
the fact that he is politically appointed (albeit for a fixed term) and removable
by the President like other cabinet officials. 69
5. The Entrenched and Transient Bureaucracies
There is one additional dichotomy that may better describe what many
scholars of the national security state—or of the internal separation of
powers—have in mind when they consider bureaucratic constraints on
political change. This is the dynamic between what I will call the entrenched
and the transient bureaucracy, that is, those actors within the bureaucracy
who tend to remain in the government through ideologically-opposed
presidential administrations, and those who swap out when their President or
party is out of power. Again, the reality is less a dichotomy than a spectrum.
Actors leave at different points after a transition, based on the nature of their
particular appointment, or whether they may return to a career post, or the
extent to which they are comfortable working for a new administration. 70
65. I identify this spectrum in Ingber, supra note 6, at 688.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. (footnote omitted); see also Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence,
113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1202–03, 1209–11 (2013) (discussing the “convention” of
independence between the President and U.S. attorneys and OLC).
69. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 1101,
82 Stat. 197, 236 (1968), amended by Crime Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-503, § 203,
90 Stat. 2407, 2427 (1976) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 532).
70. See, e.g., Doherty et al., supra note 55, at 9–12 (discussing when and why certain career
officials—and specifically those who have attained high-level positions—choose to leave at times
of political transition); Maggie Haberman & Charlie Savage, U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara Says He
Was Fired After Refusing to Quit, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/
11/us/politics/preet-bharara-us-attorney.html (discussing U.S. Attorneys appointed by President
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Some burrow or ladder climb. But this is another useful—and distinct
—heuristic, and one that I think targets most directly both the dangers and
benefits of bureaucratic tension.
Despite the complexity I describe in this section, and the risks that
oversimplification creates in assuming or assessing bureaucratic proclivities,
heuristics are nevertheless useful and can be employed with care. I use them
in this Article and elsewhere. The category distinctions I discuss in this
section, and the tensions among them, are real. Civil servants do, of course,
exist, as do political appointees. Different officers are more or less connected
to partisan politics. My goal in this section is not to have us do away with
classifications. Rather my intent is to establish three points: First, these
classifications do not present perfectly binary dichotomies. Second, when
scholars and others paint the bureaucracy in binary terms they often group
together features that do not necessarily align. For example, as I show here,
the career-political axis does not—as many might expect—map perfectly onto
the political taint-to-independence spectrum, or onto the spectrum of
ideological affinity with the President. Finally, the oversimplification of
bureaucratic categories, particularly as a crisp dichotomy between the
President and the career bureaucracy, risks engendering erroneous
assumptions about how bureaucratic “resistance” might operate.
Disaggregating the many different spectra of the bureaucracy is thus a
necessary precursor to considering the many forms and many directions
resistance takes within it.
B. DISAGGREGATING RESISTANCE
Having pulled apart the bureaucracy, we can now consider the reality of
bureaucratic resistance. The bureaucratic defiance of clear categories I
describe above muddies the conventional conception of unidirectional
“resistance” from the bureaucracy as against the President. Each of the
innumerable offices and actors throughout the bureaucracy is more likely to
tussle with another office or actor within the bureaucracy (not to mention
actors outside the bureaucracy, such as Congressional members or staffers),
as they are with the President specifically. Career line officials may at times
Obama whom Trump asked to resign); Harris, supra note 59 (explaining how staff reductions,
dismissals, and early retirements have fueled “the exodus of more than 100 senior Foreign Service
officers” during President Trump’s first year in office); Sam Schwarz, Who Is John Feeley? Trump’s
Panama Ambassador Resigns, Says He Can’t Faithfully Serve the President, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 12, 2018,
12:06 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/john-feeley-donald-trump-resigns-ambassador-shithole779852 (highlighting a case of a career member of the civil service who rose to ambassadorial
rank and then chose to resign because of disagreement with President Trump’s policies nearly a
year after President Trump took office); Michael D. Shear et al., Trump Fires Acting Attorney General
Who Defied Him, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/us/
politics/trump-immigration-ban-memo.html (detailing the dismissal of Sally Yates, a long-term
civil servant turned political appointee, upon her refusal to defend President Trump’s executive
order initiating the travel ban shortly after his inauguration).
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frustrate the will of their political superiors, and supervisors may overturn or
otherwise wreak havoc with the work of their subordinates; but as often as not,
officials at different levels within the same office (career and political) may sit
on the same side of a conflict as against another agency or office. Each agency
has its own mission and culture, as does each component within each agency.
They often work together effectively, and can create powerful synergies when
they do so. 71 But these multifarious components of the executive branch also
spar over turf they are invested in and play hot potato with matters they do
not want on their plates. 72 In the process, they frustrate each other’s plans,
battle over each other’s positions, and generally “resist” in both neutral and
active measures the movement of executive action.
1. Mechanisms of Resistance
Scholars of bureaucracy, from political science to administrative law, have
long sought to understand bureaucratic behavior, and how to control it. As
part of these studies they have documented the variety of actions (or
inactions) that bureaucrats take to slow down or push back against policy
changes, and have generally classified bureaucratic action, including
resistance, according to the mechanism employed. Albert Hirschman crafted
the well-known tripartite scheme of “exit, voice, and loyalty” to describe the
potential range of organizational behavior in the face of unsatisfactory
conditions. 73 One might “exit”—in other words, quit; or one might stay and
speak up in order to remedy the matter from the inside. 74 Loyalty helps
explain why some might choose the latter over the former. 75 John Brehm and
Scott Gates created a model more specifically attuned to government
bureaucrats. 76 Under their schema, bureaucratic action falls within one of
three categories: working, shirking, or sabotage. 77 Working, they define as
“devoting energy in order to accomplish the policy goals of the principal.” 78
Shirking “may be either leisure-shirking or politically motivated shirking; and

71. See Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 256 (2015).
72. See, e.g., ROURKE, supra note 56, at 190 (“[M]any bureaucrats look upon power as a burden
rather than an opportunity, and shift it from their hands whenever possible.”); MICHAEL P. SCHARF
& PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES OF CRISIS: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER 52–54, 57 (2010) (discussing turf battles between the
Departments of State and Justice over international litigation and interpretation of international law).
73. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 4, 77 (1970).
74. Id. at 21–43.
75. Id. at 82.
76. See JOHN BREHM & SCOTT GATES, WORKING, SHIRKING, AND SABOTAGE: BUREAUCRATIC
RESPONSE TO A DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC 21 (1997).
77. Id. at 22.
78. Id.
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sabotage [is] devoting time at work in order to undermine the policy goals of
the principal.” 79
I draw on these categories, but as I characterize resistance it includes
elements of each. Exit and voice, from Hirschman’s model, are certainly
forms of resistance under any definition, and understanding bureaucratic
loyalty—to the country, to the executive branch, to an agency, to one’s
colleagues—is essential to comprehending bureaucratic behavior, particularly
when it seems at odds with conventional ideas of self-interest. 80 Of Brehm and
Gates’ schema, I include “working” as well as “shirking” and “sabotage” in my
conception of resistance. I would expand the definition of “working” that
Brehm and Gates employ to include not only forwarding the goals of the
principal, but also “seeking to accomplish the goals of that worker’s position,”
which might include the goals of the institution, and the legislation creating
that position, office, and agency, and thus might at times conflict with the
President’s prerogatives. Thus, each of Brehm and Gates’ three categories
—shirking, sabotage, and working, includes actions that could fall within my
definition of “resistance.”
Jennifer Nou has taken these categories to a more granular level and
identified several specific “mechanisms” she associates with bureaucratic
resistance, as follows: “slow down,” “build a record,” “leak,” “enlist inspectors
general, ‘offices of goodness,’ and other allies,” “sue the agency,” and
“resign.” 81 These generally fall within the shirking and sabotage categories,
and I might add some additional examples, such as: refusal to act, either
publicly or privately; 82 and the seeking of support from potential allies outside
the executive branch, such as members or staff of congressional committees.
On top of these “shirking and sabotage” mechanisms of resistance,
however, I would also classify within resistance many acts that Brehm and
Gates might consider “working,” such as the daily activities of executive
branch officials asking questions, seeking information, sticking to facts and
law regardless of the policy implications, and seeking to persuade others,
either their colleagues in other offices or agencies, or the political leadership,

79. Id.
80. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 73, at 76–105.
81. Nou, supra note 46. In the early months of the Trump administration, several commentators
put forward lists of potential actions bureaucratic actors might take to “resist” the President. See
Oona Hathaway & Sarah Weiner, Dissenting from Within the Trump Administration, JUST SEC. (Jan. 17,
2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/36420/dissenting-trump-administration; Ian Samuel, The Nervous
Civil Servant’s Guide to Defying an Illegal Order, SLATE (Feb. 2, 2017, 3:53 PM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/politics/2017/02/legal_protections_for_civil_servants_who_refuse_to
_carry_out_illegal_orders.html.
82. Sally Yates’s decision to refuse to defend the Trump administration travel ban executive
order is a recent, very public example. Lydia Wheeler, Acting Attorney General Orders DOJ Not to
Defend Trump’s Travel Ban, HILL (Jan. 30, 2017, 6:43 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/
administration/316990-justice-department-wont-defend-trump-immigration-order.
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of the advantages of particular decisions, or of the risks of others. 83 This kind
of resistance may take the form of a range of actions, including disagreeing in
a meeting, framing the agenda in a particular way, or drafting a memo seeking
to persuade the other relevant actors. 84 An official who, after taking one of
these actions, then loses a policy dispute may at that point choose to stand
down, or she may take additional action, such as “elevate” the dispute to a
higher-level official, or register dissent with formal channels to the extent they
exist. 85 Of course, she may at times move on to activities better categorized as
shirking or sabotaging, such as switching portfolios, or seeking support from
congressional staff, or even resigning or leaking damaging information about
the proposed course of action, but these actions are the outliers. The piece of
resistance that is simply “work,” but that nevertheless keeps the machinery of
the bureaucracy from changing direction on a dime or from taking action as
quickly as it otherwise might, is the bread and butter of bureaucratic life.
On top of this classification by mechanism, I add classification of
resistance by underlying purpose, as follows. Many of the mechanisms
discussed above may be employed for many of the purposes discussed below.
2. Purposes of Resistance
i.

Neutral Friction

In past work on continuity in executive power, I identified a feature of
bureaucratic behavior I termed “neutral friction,” which I defined as: the
existence of forces within the executive branch “that operate to constrain
. . . change generally, in any direction, without regard to substance.” 86 These
forces for continuity exist in part because of the simple practical hurdles of
making the gears of an enormous organization move, and in part because of
the continuity of bureaucratic actors themselves, working on the same issues
from one administration to the next. There will inevitably be transaction costs
to making a change, whatever the substance of the baseline.
Thus, for example, despite a presidential transition, DOJ attorneys will
continue to file briefs in ongoing cases that take the same legal positions as
—indeed are often based on the same templates of—briefs written under the

83. See, e.g., GOLDEN, supra note 62, at 91 (discussing that attorneys in the DOJ civil rights
division “argued vociferously, both orally and in written memoranda” with the political appointees
in their office).
84. Charlie Savage, Obama Team Is Divided on Anti-Terror Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/29/us/politics/29force.html (discussing dueling internal
memos between the State Department and Pentagon over the legal theory for detention in the
conflict with al Qaeda).
85. HANNAH GURMAN, THE DISSENT PAPERS: THE VOICES OF DIPLOMATS IN THE COLD WAR
AND BEYOND 171, 191 (2012).
86. See Ingber, supra note 6, at 687. In that piece, I was referring specifically to continuity
in legal positions between administrations and neutrality vis-à-vis claims of executive power. Here,
I am referring to neutrality vis-à-vis a particular substantive policy.
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prior administration. 87 The Department of Defense (“DOD”) will continue
preparing for natural disasters despite an Executive Order directing the
rescission of key climate change regulations. 88 Bureaucratic behavior will tend
to continue on its path unless countervailing actors directly force a change,
and counteraction requires time and energy to effectuate, not to mention
knowledge of the matter. 89 Until officials within an agency receive direct
orders to change course, they will generally continue their work as usual. 90
They may do so despite awareness of the President’s publicly stated view, and
whether or not they agree with that stated view.
Such continuity may read as “resistance” to a President’s agenda, yet an
official working within an agency is expected to continue doing her job as she
has always done until specifically directed otherwise, even if that means
continuing to work under a mandate that the President has denigrated. 91
Officials may struggle to make sense of how the President’s stated agenda may
affect their priorities, and may work to incorporate that agenda into their
actions or not; but until they receive clear, direct guidance from a superior,
they may not know how they will be expected to effectuate the President’s
intent. There is good reason to wait for clear orders to trickle down through
the hierarchy—policy changes are often not simple binary choices and must
be implemented while taking into consideration the interests and work of
numerous actors throughout the executive. Moreover, as presidential
prerogative weaves its way through the normal process of becoming workable

87. See id.
88. Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16093 § 3 (Mar. 28, 2017); Tara Copp, Pentagon
Is Still Preparing for Global Warming Even Though Trump Said to Stop, MIL. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2017),
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2017/09/12/pentagon-is-still-preparing-forglobal-warming-even-though-trump-said-to-stop.
89. See GOLDEN, supra note 62, at 91 (discussing the significant steps the political appointee in
charge of the DOJ civil rights division under Reagan took in order to effectuate major changes in
the office’s positions, including placing political appointees in the frontline task of brief-drafting).
90. See, e.g., Nik Steinberg, Rex Tillerson Is Running the State Department Into the Ground: Skilled
and Patriotic Diplomats Are Leaving Like Never Before in an Exodus that is Damaging the United States,
POLITICO (Oct. 4, 2017), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/10/04/rex-tillersonis-running-the-state-department-into-the-ground-215677. The author reflected on his interaction
with career foreign policy officials in the aftermath of Trump’s election who focused on
continuity and stated their mandate, in the words of one foreign service officer, as follows: “We
will keep serving this country. That’s what we do.” Id.
91. This “neutral friction”—and not a more aggressive affront to the President’s authority
—was likely responsible for military officers’ dismissive response to President Trump’s “tweet” in
July 2017, declaring “that the United States Government will not accept or allow transgender
individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. Military.” Richard Sisk, Dunford Taps Brakes on
Trump’s Call for Transgender Ban in Military, MIL. TIMES (July 27, 2017), http://www.military.com/
daily-news/2017/07/27/dunford-taps-brakes-on-trumps-call-for-transgender-ban-in-milit.html
(quoting the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as stating that there would be “no modifications to the
current policy until the President’s direction has been received by the Secretary of Defense and
the Secretary has issued implementation guidance,” in other words, until the order had been
processed through the normal chain of command).
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policy, the position itself may change shape. The President himself may
change course, incrementally or even dramatically, upon hearing from all of
the relevant parties. 92
Changing the status quo simply requires more effort than allowing it to
continue. This is why effective bureaucracy wranglers seek to frame decisionmaking tasks such that their preferred outcome is positioned as the status quo,
rather than as a novel change.
ii.

Legal Constraint

Most legal scholarship on constraints within the executive branch is
concerned primarily with whether, and the extent to which, executive branch
actors are constrained by law, and why. Much of this literature focuses on the
President-checking function played by lawyers inside the executive branch, in
particular the office of OLC, and the extent to which it adequately
circumscribes the President’s actions within legal boundaries. 93 Very recent
scholarship has suggested a decline in the prominence of OLC in favor of
other institutional processes for assessing and delivering legal advice to the
President, such as the National Security Council (“NSC”)-led “Lawyer’s
Group.” 94 But whichever set of government lawyers is the focus, the implicit
understanding of this body of scholarship is that there is some tension
between the “President,” on one side, and his “lawyers,” on the other, as if
these were each discrete and unitary categories with one line of bilateral
tension between them.
But the bureaucratic mechanisms of legal constraint within the executive
branch are far more complex than a simple dichotomy between the President
and “the lawyers.” A realistic assessment of legal constraint must account for
not only the potential friction between policy actors and lawyers, but also

92. See President Donald Trump, Remarks on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia
(Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/08/21/remarks-presidenttrump-strategy-afghanistan-and-south-asia (acknowledging his own change of heart on the preferred
course of action in Afghanistan, after having met with his cabinet and military leadership).
93. See supra notes 13–15. For example, there is a longstanding debate over the extent to
which the President is practically constrained by law—international or domestic—in determining
whether to use force unilaterally, without congressional authorization, or in violation of the UN
Charter. See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 14, at 155–57; Marty Lederman, Why the Strikes
Against Syria Probably Violate the U.N. Charter and (Therefore) the U.S. Constitution, JUST SECURITY
(Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/39674/syrian-strikes-violate-u-n-charter-constitution.
See generally ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THE ROLE OF
LAW (1974) (exploring the role and effect of law in high-level crisis decision-making within the
U.S. government, through the lens of the Cuban missile crisis); JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A.
POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) (pointing to the Kosovo intervention, in
violation of the UN Charter, as an example of the “common” occurrence of state violations of
international law, which, the authors argue, must be judged on normative rather than formal
grounds, in part because international law changes through state violations, and may in fact
change for the better).
94. See Renan, supra note 23, at 830–35.

A4_INGBER (DO NOT DELETE)

168

10/26/2018 8:47 AM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 104:139

between and among lawyers themselves. Legal disagreement inside the
executive—and the corresponding resistance that it may entail—is anything
but unidirectional. Lawyers throughout the executive branch clash regularly
over their different interpretations of legal obligations and authorities
—between agencies, between offices within agencies, between individuals. 95
Often these disputes are longstanding and survive one or more presidential
transitions. Such interagency tussling may involve a longstanding dispute
about a legal position between colleagues at a horizontal “peer” level between
the agencies, in other words at about the same pay grade. At other times there
may be a dispute about a legal question between career attorneys in an office
and their politically appointed heads. 96 But as often as not, the political head
may be more institutionally inclined to agree with her career subordinates
than with her own horizontal “peers” at other agencies. And thus, should
career-level officials feel the need to “elevate” the matter—in other words, to
raise it with higher-level officials in the bureaucratic food chain—the political
head will in such circumstances be inclined to plead the case of her own
subordinates in an interagency dispute—or in a dispute with a policy office
within the agency—rather than to side automatically with her counterparts in
other offices or agencies. At the very least, career attorneys—along with the
particular preferences and interests of the particular agency—will often have
a significant influence on the leanings of the politically appointed lawyers
within those agencies. Likewise, a political appointee seeking to change the
government’s legal position may encounter more resistance from peer
colleagues at other agencies than from her subordinates. 97
Of course, some internal legal friction involves disputes between lawyers
in the entrenched versus the transient bureaucracies. Such friction occurs
both within and among offices. In fact, OLC itself is an office more likely to
be on board with the President’s general agenda than opposed; considering
its prominence within the executive, the office is typically led by a carefully
chosen political appointee and staffed with career lawyers who tend to change
over at a much higher frequency than those in agency general counsel offices,
and are thus more likely to have chosen to work in the office under the
contemporaneous President. By contrast, longstanding career officials in

95. For an excellent discussion of the diversity of lawyers and lawyering throughout the executive
branch, along with the varying incentives and preferences these lawyers bring to the decision-making
table, see generally David Fontana, Executive Branch Legalisms, 124 HARV. L. REV. F. 21 (2012).
96. See GOLDEN, supra note 62, at 91 (discussing an empirical study of the Reagan-era civil
rights office).
97. See, e.g., Marko Milanovic, Harold Koh’s Legal Opinions on the US Position on the
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 7, 2014), http://
www.ejiltalk.org/harold-kohs-legal-opinions-on-the-us-position-on-the-extraterritorial-applicationof-human-rights-treaties (discussing reports of leaked opinions by then-State Department Legal
Adviser, Harold Koh, advocating—unsuccessfully—for the U.S. Government to change its position
on the extraterritorial application of its ICCPR and CAT obligations); Savage, supra note 84.
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other offices often have more discretion over their portfolios—based on
deference, respect, or simple necessity and workload. 98
This multi-directional legal disagreement between and among agencies
may create friction to a path forward. It certainly creates impediments to
coming to a uniform legal position. But that does not necessarily result in a
holdup of action. By contrast, this legal conflict may suggest to policymakers
that the law is less of a clear constraint, and thus less of a check on moving
forward. 99
In any event, while scholars disagree over the effectiveness of internal
constraints in checking executive branch illegality, there is general consensus
that concerns about illegality are reasonable bases on which bureaucratic
actors might push back on political leadership. Illegal activity, and the related
category of abuse, which I discuss next, are perhaps the most clearly accepted
categories of bureaucratic resistance.
iii.

Ethics, Abuse, and Norm-Breaking

Internal actors may also seek to resist what they perceive to be otherwise
unethical or abusive behaviors within the executive branch. This might
include waste and mismanagement, as well as violations of norms that do not
rise to the level of illegality. Even activities that are not illegal per se may
—when brought to light—entail significant repercussions. The reported
firing of career prosecutors for political purposes under the George W. Bush
administration, for example, generated public outrage and was ultimately the
subject of a highly critical Inspector General report in the Department of
Justice. 100
Public accounts of resistance to internal abusive behavior often
categorize such resistance under the general heading of whistleblowing,
which may entail raising the matter with superiors or with particular offices
within the executive designed for this purpose—like the Inspector General or
the Office of Special Counsel—or more drastic measures like leaks and
resignation. But more mundane resistance against abuse and norm-breaking
occurs regularly, with officials simply raising potential problems with
colleagues and bosses, pointing out potential risks of proposals in meetings
98.

See CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS: THE RELENTLESS RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY
(2015) (providing a discussion of Ed Kneedler, a longstanding career attorney
in the Office of the Solicitor General, who had significant influence on the government’s
litigation decisions and, at times, ultimate decision-making authority).
99. See Ingber, supra note 6, at 693 (discussing why the NSC Lawyers Group may at times
inhibit rather than promote legal constraint); Bruce Ackerman, Legal Acrobatics, Illegal War,
N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/opinion/21Ackerman.html
(suggesting that the availability of multiple legal positions on the President’s authority to
continue military strikes in Libya provided an opportunity for the President to “cherry pick” his
legal advice to conform to his policy interests).
100. U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE REMOVAL OF NINE U.S. ATTORNEYS
IN 2006, at 325 (2008), https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0809a/final.pdf.
AND SECRECY 324
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or individually, and thus creating a culture in which such overstepping is not
tolerated.
Of course, institutional culture can cut the other way. To the extent
ostensibly abusive activities become the norm in an office, it can be difficult,
for the same cultural and institutional reasons that enforce positive norms,
for longstanding members of that office to raise concerns. Under such
circumstances, external actors who do not “belong” to that cultural ingroup—such as agency lawyers, officials from another office or agency, or
political actors who newly arrive in an office—may be the ones raising
problems with abusive behavior, rather than the other way around.
Violations of ethics and executive branch norms, along with allegations
of illegality, have the most clear-cut formal authorities for a range of
mechanisms of resistance. 101
iv.

Evidentiary Disagreement and Professional Standards

Like lawyers within the Executive, scientists and other professional
bureaucrats have their own exogenous source of expertise upon which to
draw in forming positions on bureaucratic action. Analysts throughout the
intelligence community analyze ongoing events and monitor national security
risks. Military officers provide threat assessments on ongoing conflicts around
the globe, craft and present risk analyses on proposed action, and assess the
resource needs of troops abroad and at home. Foreign service officers in
diplomatic missions draft reports about conditions abroad. Analysts in the
State Department Bureau of Counterterrorism monitor terrorist activity and
make findings necessary to designate foreign terrorist organizations. 102
Outside the national security context, scientists at the EPA research and
analyze matters such as the effect of greenhouse gasses on climate change. All
of these actors will inevitably be influenced by the mandate and culture of
their particular agency, as well as their own policy preferences, preferences
that led them to embark on a career within that agency. They also have
professional obligations, both to provide dispassionate guidance as well as to
the standards of their profession. 103 All of these factors may at times be at odds
with the preferences of political leadership.
The President, agency heads, and other policy actors rely upon this
professional analysis in drawing conclusions and making policy
determinations, and in justifying those policy positions once made. Resistance
to policy positions may affect this process at different decision
points: professional bureaucrats may at the outset insist on an evidentiary
101. I discuss formal authorities in Section III.B.
102. 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2012); Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism,
U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/ct (last visited Sept. 2, 2018).
103. See, e.g., Stephanie J. Bird, The Role of Professional Societies: Codes of Conduct and Their Enforcement,
4 SCI. & ENG’G ETHICS 315, 316 (1998); Departmental Ethics Office, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, https://
www.justice.gov/jmd/departmental-ethics-office (last visited Sept. 2, 2018).
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analysis that challenges the preferred policy-leanings of policy-makers, and on
the other end, they may refuse to change conclusions or provide evidence to
bolster particular policy decisions once announced. 104 This tension, even
when wholly internal, may surface publicly through the Freedom of
Information Act (“FOIA”), litigation, congressional testimony, leaks, or
resignation. Internal divisions also may at times be inferred when policy
makers are not able to provide evidence of bureaucratic support when they
might typically be expected to do so, through reports, affidavits in litigation,
signing of briefs or public statements. 105
v.

Policy Disagreement

Most attacks on bureaucratic resistance as illegitimate are not focused on
concerns that bureaucrats may raise alarms about abusive or unlawful
activities; rather, such criticism centers on concerns that bureaucrats may
impede legitimate change—change which the electorate demanded—based
on disagreement over policy. Disagreements over policy—and even resistance
to policy change—are frequent features of executive branch life. But the
extent to which there exists a clear political-career divide within the
bureaucracy over policy decisions is less clear or frequent than it may
appear in the simplified media and pundit accounts. This is true for two
reasons: (1) what may appear as policy disagreement to outside observers is
often in fact a combination of other forms of resistance described above,
including neutral friction; and (2) longstanding multidirectional policy
disagreement between offices within the executive branch transcends a pure
career-political divide.
First, critiques of bureaucratic resistance often assume policy
disagreements underlie any friction, even when other factors—neutral
friction, legal hurdles, and evidentiary disagreement—may play a significant
or concurrent role. In many areas, of course, the line between these different
purposes underlying bureaucratic resistance may not be strictly defined. 106 If

104. At other times they may succumb to political pressure to change such assessments.
See, e.g., Walter Pincus & Dana Priest, Some Iraq Analysts Felt Pressure from Cheney Visits, WASH. POST
(June 5, 2003), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/06/05/some-iraq-analystsfelt-pressure-from-cheney-visits/4afb2009-20e7-4619-b40f-669c9d94dcf3 (suggesting that analysts felt
pressure from senior Bush administration officials to change their assessments to fit policy objectives).
105. See Lemos, supra note 48, at 200 (identifying the presence or absence of agency officials’
signatures on briefs as evidence of agency views on the position the U.S. was taking in court); Benjamin
Wittes, The Friendliest Lawsuit Ever Filed Against the Justice Department, LAWFARE (Aug. 12, 2017, 7:29 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/friendliest-lawsuit-ever-filed-against-justice-department (requesting from
the Justice Department evidence that the President “lied before Congress about data kept by his
Justice Department,” due to Wittes’s own research suggesting that “the National Security Division of
the Justice Department [had not] provided any data or analysis to the White House that could
reasonably be read to support the president’s claim”).
106. Golden has shown, for example, that career attorneys in the DOJ civil rights division
who clashed with political appointees over positions taken in civil rights litigation did so because
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military officials differ with the President over reducing troop levels in
Afghanistan, the dispute may revolve around disagreement over evidence
regarding the risks, but all parties involved may view that evidence through
the lens of their policy preference.
In any event, disagreement over policy abounds within the executive
branch, as in any organization, and does not map simplistically onto a careerpolitical axis. Horizontal policy disagreements between agencies and offices
are frequent, exacerbated by differing priorities and biases. And vertical
disagreements also occur, which need not be tied to a presidential transition,
such as when new political leadership arrive to run an office who may not
share the same priorities and biases as the career bureaucrats who had been
working on the issue under prior management.
In fact, policy disputes typically transcend presidential administrations.
Career officials in the Departments of State and Defense may have ongoing
disagreements over how to interpret particular legal obligations regarding
detainees. 107 Officials within DOJ and the CIA may disagree over priorities
about declassifying evidence litigators believe is necessary to present in court.
Offices may disagree over not only substantive questions but process as well,
such as which office or agency should have control over decision-making in a
particular area. For example, the Office of the Legal Adviser within State and
the Office of Legal Counsel in Justice have for years tussled over which office
should be the final authority on matters of international law. 108
The most significant feature of a change in political leadership is less
that the new political actors will butt heads with the entrenched bureaucracy,
but rather that they will change the balance of power among the bureaucratic
actors already engaged in a policy disagreement. Career officials may rightly
sense new opportunities to advance their position in these longstanding
debates, while others may fear losing their mandate. The President or agency
head’s position on a matter may be clear coming into office, or it may develop
while in office, and career officials may find political actors siding with their
career opponents after a somewhat transparent adversarial process, or find
that they are simply cut out of the decision-making loop altogether. 109 Even
under such circumstances, this is often more a horizontal dispute than a
vertical one; political officials will often have policy preferences that are more

they believed those “policies were seriously misguided, detrimental to the effective enforcement
of civil rights, and in conflict with existing statute and case law.” GOLDEN, supra note 62, at 91.
107. SAVAGE, supra note 98, at 534–38.
108. See SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 72, at 52–54, 57; Ingber, supra note 15, at 70–73; see
also supra text accompanying note 15.
109. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing internal debates over the torture
memos, in which a small group of executive branch officials attempted to restrict decision-making
and cut out key agencies and officials likely to dissent).
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closely connected to those of the career officials within their office than to the
politically appointed colleagues in other agencies or the White House. 110
IV.

FORMAL AUTHORITY AND FUNCTIONAL POWER TO RESIST

In order to evaluate both the threat and the efficacy of bureaucratic
resistance as a check on the President, it is necessary to consider and
distinguish both the formal authority and functional power of bureaucrats to
resist. Common characterizations of bureaucrats paint them as wielding a
great deal of practical, discretionary power to act, but with little real,
traditionally-sourced authority to do so. I refer to these here respectively as
“functional power” and “formal authority.” On this account, the bureaucrat
—an unelected official, untethered to popular accountability—nevertheless
wields significant behind-the-scenes discretion to effectuate his or her
preferred course of action, even to challenge the duly-elected President.
Those who fear bureaucrats find the prospect of them wielding practical
power divorced from traditional sources of authority understandably
concerning. On the other end, some who hail the benefits of bureaucratic
checks may view traditionally-sourced accountability as having fallen down on
the job, and thus may be willing to accept a “second-best alternative” in order
to check the President from within. These camps may differ on the extent to
which bureaucrats hold formal authority, but both camps tend to
overestimate the practical ability of bureaucrats to wield it. To put it plainly,
critics and champions of bureaucratic resistance alike may overestimate the
extent to which bureaucrats exercise functional power free from constraint,
and underestimate the extent to which bureaucrats wield actual formal
authority connected to political accountability.
This Part will therefore consider the elements of this conversation that
are underestimated, and that are yet necessary to weighing the merits,
legitimacy, and efficacy of bureaucratic resistance: I will first consider the
robust formal authority to resist that is granted to even lower-level bureaucrats
within the executive branch, from Congress, from the courts, and from the
executive branch itself. And I will then consider the significant practical
constraints on bureaucrats’ functional abilities to exercise that authority.
110. For example, then-Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and his Legal Adviser, William
Howard Taft, IV, both wrote memos to counterparts at DOJ, DOD, and in the White House,
disagreeing with the suggested dismissal of international law protections for military detainees in
the conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban. Memorandum from Sec’y of State Colin Powell to
Counsel to the President (Jan. 25, 2002), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/torturingdemocracy/
documents/20020126.pdf; Memorandum from William H. Taft, IV to the Counsel to the
President (Feb. 2, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/politics/20040608_DOC.pdf.
Likewise, reporting suggests that then-Secretary of State, John Kerry, agreed with many of the
career foreign service officers in his building, and not with the White House, about the proper
course of action on Syria. See Mark Landler, John Kerry Is Said to Side with Diplomats’ Critical Memo
on Syria, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/18/world/middleeast/
john-kerry-syria-diplomats-criticism-memo-assad.html.
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A. DEFINING FORMAL AUTHORITY AND FUNCTIONAL POWER
I should define at the outset what I intend by these two types of
bureaucratic power: functional power and formal authority. The concept of
“power” itself is fairly amorphous, and scholars have long grappled with its
multiple meanings. 111 Many have drawn distinctions between the capacity to
act or compel action—what I call here “functional” power—on the one hand,
and legal or “formal” authority, on the other. And they have argued that one
form or the other constitutes “real” power, usually when wielded by the
President himself. 112 I find both of these features to be complementary and
essential components of the exercise of political power, and not only that of
the President, who is the focus of much of this scholarship on power, but also
of bureaucrats within the executive branch. Each of these components speaks
to different features and concerns regarding bureaucratic resistance, and can
be summarized in two questions: What are the actual capacities of bureaucrats
to act; and how are these capacities tied to formal, democratically sourced
authorities?
Functional power, as I define it here, is akin to what Daryl Levinson calls
“capacity,” or the “ability to accomplish things.” Formal authority, by contrast,
is marked not by capacity to accomplish but by permission to do so by the
relevant authority—be it the Constitution, a controlling statute, or even a
longstanding norm or an oral request. 113 Within the state, at the first level of

111. ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?: DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY 1–8 (2d
ed. 1961); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS
TO BILL CLINTON 17–18 (rev. ed. 1997) (differentiating between “power,” which he defines as
“the resources, formal and informal, that presidents in a given period have at their disposal to
get things done,” and “authority”—“the expectations that surround the exercise of power at a
particular moment . . . [and] perceptions of what is appropriate for a given President to do”);
Robert A. Dahl, The Concept of Power, 2 BEHAV. SCI. 201, 201–03 (1957) (arguing that there is no
one theory of power, but suggesting that the theory that aligns with most intuitions of power is
the ability to compel another actor to act in a way he or she might otherwise not have done).
112. NEUSTADT, supra note 50, at 10 (distinguishing the President’s “extraordinary range of
formal powers” from actual power to act or effect action, and coining the phrase “presidential
power is the power to persuade”); see also WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION:
THE POLITICS OF DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 8–14 (2003) (diverging from Neustadt to argue
that presidential power lies in their ability to act unilaterally, without necessarily ever having to
rely on persuasion); Daryl J. Levinson, Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 39
(2016) (“For most (though not all) purposes, ‘power’ in public law should be understood to refer
to the ability of political actors to control the outcomes of contested decision-making processes
and secure their preferred policies. When we talk about power in political life and in
constitutional law, this is the kind of power we are typically talking about: the ability to effect
substantive policy outcomes by influencing what the government will or will not do.”). Levinson
also differentiates between “capacity,” which he describes as the “ability to accomplish . . . things”
and “control,” which is “the political power to determine what state capacity will and will not be
used to accomplish,”—in other words, the “power over the power of the state.” Id. at 46–47.
113. In Levinson’s model, these two types of power inhere in different entities—the state as
a whole has capacity, and a particular actor within the state exercises “control” over that capacity.
Id. As I use the terms formal authority and functional power—or capacity and control—both may
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disaggregation, formal authority is allocated via the Madisonian separation of
powers, the constitutional divvying up of specific features of governance.
Functional power is then the “capacity,” to use Levinson’s word, of any given
branch to carry out a particular act. In this piece I disaggregate further—to
the allocation of both types of power within the executive branch, as between
the different actors along the bureaucratic spectra I discuss in Part II.
It is well understood that even lower-level bureaucrats have a certain
degree of functional power, whether or not it is described as such, simply by
virtue of their frequent position on the front lines. Functional power is a
matter of practical reality. The line attorney drafting a brief that she is due to
file at three o’clock p.m. in the district court is able, by virtue of her position
as the first and last eyes on the brief, to add her own language affecting,
perhaps even altering or undermining, the position her superiors had signed
off on the government taking in the case. This is functional power. Formal
authority is the permission that same attorney received to argue the case
within a particular discretionary zone agreed to by the head of her office and
colleagues in other relevant agencies. Functional power, as I use the term, is
a question of whether an individual or group can accomplish something.
Formal authority, by contrast, is whether she or they may.
B. FORMAL AUTHORITY TO RESIST
This section explores the formal authority to resist delegated to
bureaucrats from the three sources with the soundest power to do
so: Congress, the judiciary, and the executive branch itself. It is widely
understood that Congress and the courts allocate power to different actors
within the executive branch, for example, to one agency over another. Less
considered is the extent to which these grants of power or constraints on their
exercise allocate power further to lower-level officials within these agencies or
within the executive branch more broadly. Elizabeth Magill and Adrian
Vermeule have explored the phenomenon of intra-agency power allocation
through judicial doctrine. 114 I draw on their scholarship and others’, and
extend this examination to other sources of power, including congressional
delegations of authority, and executive branch sub-delegations to lower-level
officials.
1. Congressionally-Sourced Bureaucratic Power to Resist
Congress empowers different actors throughout the bureaucracy,
including the career bureaucracy vis-à-vis political leadership, via the
following three mechanisms: through the creation of affirmative protections

inhere in the same individual or entity whether it be a state or a state actor. They are separate
forms of power—at times they coincide; at times they do not.
114. See generally Magill & Vermeuele, supra note 16 (identifying the effects of administrative
law doctrine on the allocation of power within agencies).
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for career bureaucrats and others, in many cases specifically for the purpose
of protecting resistance, through direct delegations of power to particular
actors or actions, and, more implicitly, through broader delegations of power
to the President or executive branch as a whole made against a backdrop of
expectation that the power will be employed and curtailed by internal actors.
i.

Congress Protects, and Limits, Bureaucratic Resistance

First, and most directly, Congress empowers bureaucratic actors, and
bureaucratic resistance specifically, by creating protections against removal or
ill-treatment for specific types of officials within the bureaucracy, such as civil
servants, who may find themselves in tension with the political decisionmakers for reasons of politics, illegality, corruption, or otherwise, and through
the limitations it places on political appointments. 115
The web of statutory protections, which evolved from the initial reform
of the spoils system of the 1800s, with the Pendleton Act of 1883, 116 the Hatch
Act of 1939, 117 and the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 118 as well as
subsequent amendments and statutes, includes significant protections against
partisan hiring or removal practices. 119 The clear intent and result of these
reforms is a body of federal employees who are buffered from political
coercion and thus able to act as a counterweight to politicized decisionmaking.
Congress did not stop at protecting the career bureaucracy from political
coercion, however. They went several steps further, and crafted protections
for whistleblowers specifically—through the Civil Service Reform Act, and
later in the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, and subsequent
amendments. 120 These acts protect bureaucrats’ authority to resist, by
prohibiting retaliation on the basis of their disclosure of abuse,
mismanagement, or violations of law. 121

115. See LEWIS, supra note 55, at 60–61 (stating that members of Congress limit presidential
control by limiting presidential appointees through appropriations, legislation, and oversight).
116. Pendleton Act, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 5 U.S.C. §§ 3104–7212) (creating a merit-based, rather than patronage-based, system for
hiring federal employees).
117. Hatch Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-252, 53 Stat. 1147 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 118 & 18 U.S.C. § 61) (limiting political activity for civil service employees and protecting civil
servants from coercive political activity).
118. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321–26).
119. See id.; Pendleton Act, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 3104–7212); Hatch Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-252, 53 Stat. 1147 (codified as amended at
5 U.S.C. § 118 & 18 U.S.C. § 61).
120. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
121. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
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Furthermore, rather than simply leave these statutes as toothless
statements of intent, Congress established what Margo Schlanger has called
“offices of goodness” 122—entities throughout the executive branch such as
Inspectors General and the Office of Special Counsel, established to enforce
this web of statutory protections. 123 Together, these rules and institutions are
intended to safeguard the independence of career bureaucrats and others,
and the discretionary space in which they are lawfully authorized to operate.
In the national security context, some of these protections are more
limited. The Whistleblower Protection Act, for example, does not apply to
employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or certain other intelligence entities. 124
Other statutory protections extend to such employees, but they do not
provide the same level of protection against retaliation. 125 Additionally,
statutory restrictions on disclosure of classified information constrain the
means of disclosure national security whistleblowers may lawfully employ
—classified leaks remain prohibited—but the Special Counsel and Inspectors
General are available to receive classified information. 126
This thick web of statutory protections for executive branch actors both
explicitly recognizes that these actors have formal authority to act, and
affirmatively protects those actors’ right to do so, within certain parameters,
without retaliation. This protection is not unbounded—Congress has lowered
protections for certain types of activities and could adjust these protections
further—but the existing protections operate even when bureaucratic action
might be contrary to the wishes of political superiors. 127 In fact, it is precisely
that set of circumstances—the lawful exercise of bureaucratic discretion in
the face of disapproval by political superiors—that these statutory provisions
are explicitly designed to protect.
ii.

Congress Delegates Directly to Areas of Bureaucratic Competence

Congress also allocates specific power among bureaucrats by granting
authority to the President or to agencies with conditions that necessitate
involvement by specific professionals or “technocrat” officials. Grants of

122. Margo Schlanger, Offices of Goodness: Influence Without Authority in Federal Agencies,
36 CARDOZO L. REV. 53, 60 (2013); see also Sinnar, supra note 28, at 1032–34.
123. See Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 5315–16); Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201–7703).
124. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C).
125. Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-272,
112 Stat. 2413 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 10, 18, 21, 28, & 50 U.S.C.).
126. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
127. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A) (prohibiting retaliatory employment actions against employees
for, inter alia, “the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or grievance right granted by any law, rule,
or regulation”).
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authority conditioned on making a “finding” of certain facts, 128 or on the
issuance of a report, 129 or on the creation of an administrative record, 130 all
require the involvement of experts within the bureaucracy, and thus result in
a known allocation of certain types of power to particular officials, often
within the career bureaucracy. The conferred power is not necessarily
decision-making power—final decision-making power may be specifically
designated elsewhere (and that delegation, if to any actor other than the
President, is itself a bureaucratic constraint on the President) 131—but a
delegation need not include decision-making authority for it to nevertheless
result in authority to act and even, to some degree, to resist the will of the
decision-maker within the bounds of the bureaucrat’s zone of autonomy. If
the President cannot take an action under a statute without first finding that
“x” has occurred, and career bureaucrats hold the information and tools
necessary to confirm whether “x” has in fact occurred, then the requirement
creates a defined zone of authority for those bureaucrats to resist presidential
action. It is neither uncabined—as it is authority only to find a particular
fact—nor is it untethered to political accountability—as it is sourced in a
Congressional grant. And Congress furthermore retains the ability to effect
compliance through oversight of agency action. 132
As one example, Congress grants the Secretary of State power “to
designate an organization as a foreign terrorist organization,” which has
severe legal ramifications, including bars on immigration for members, and
criminal and financial sanctions for those doing business with them. 133 The
authority for the Secretary to effect this designation is cabined by several
administrative requirements, such as the requirement that the Secretary

128. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2291–94 (authorizing executive branch officials to aid foreign officials in
the interdiction of aircraft if the President has made certain factual findings regarding a threat
from drug trafficking, and requiring a highly detailed annual report to Congress).
129. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1189(a)(1) & (2) (requiring that in order to designate a foreign terrorist
organization, the Secretary of State must provide a report to Congress detailing the factual basis
for the determination that the organization “threatens the security of United States nationals or
the national security of the United States”).
130. Id. § 1189(a)(3)(A).
131. See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81,
125 Stat. 1567, § 1028 at 1567–69 (2001) (requiring that, before the government may transfer
a detainee from the military base at Guantanamo, the Secretary of Defense must personally certify
that certain risks have been mitigated, including that the foreign government “has taken or
agreed to take such actions as the Secretary of Defense determines are necessary to ensure that
the individual cannot engage or reengage in any terrorist activity”).
132. Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 142 (2006) (“[A]
positive element of oversight is that it may make an entrenched bureaucracy more responsive to the
popular will when even the President cannot secure control over agency policy. Oversight can be
viewed as a way to combat the general insulation of agencies from political accountability.”).
133. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1); see also Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE,
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2018).
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“create an administrative record,” 134 provide Congress with a report detailing
the findings and factual basis for the designation, 135 and provide a review of
the designation at specified intervals. 136 Congress further provided for judicial
review of the designation, including the ability to set aside the designation if
these procedures were not followed. 137 Within the State Department, the
office responsible for analyzing and providing this information is the Bureau
of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism. 138 As of this writing,
the office is led by a political appointee who was sworn in under the current
administration, and four deputies who belong to what I have termed the
“entrenched bureaucracy,” each having long served in the State Department,
including in senior positions under the prior administration. 139 The rest of
the office is staffed with a mix of career foreign service officers and civil
servants. 140 A congressional delegation to the Secretary of State to provide
detailed findings before designating a foreign terrorist organization thus
results in a delegation to factfinders within the State Department, and
specifically within this office, to find and memorialize the factual record, with
the added threat of judicial review if these procedures are not followed.
iii.

Congress Bargains in the Shadow of the Bureaucracy

Finally, when Congress grants power to the “President” or to a particular
agency, it does so with full understanding that it is the vast executive branch
bureaucracy, much of which is comprised of career bureaucrats and other
officials who are distanced from the President by ideology or other buffers of
institutional independence, that will in fact wield much of that power. This
fact—that bureaucratic actors will play a significant role in shaping and
deploying much of the power Congress grants the President—is not merely a
practical reality of which any member of Congress is naturally aware; in many
cases it is reasonable to conclude that Congress would not allocate precisely
the same power in precisely the same manner were this not the practical
reality. Reaching consensus on allocations of discretionary authority is often
fraught. Considering the clear awareness by members of Congress regarding
how the authority they grant will be deployed, and the narrow margins on
which much legislation moves forward, their fragile consensus on any piece
of contested legislation surely often rests on the assumption that the expert,
non-partisan hands of the vast executive branch bureaucracy will be
exercising a good part of that discretion, and thus checking political actors. I
134. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(3)(A).
135. Id. § 1189(a)(2)(A)(i).
136. Id. § 1189(a)(4)(C)(i).
137. Id. § 1189(c)(3)(E).
138. See Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 133.
139. See Leadership of the Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, U.S. DEP’T.
OF JUSTICE, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/about/leadership (last visited Sept. 2, 2018).
140. I have a FOIA request pending regarding the detailed makeup of the office.
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therefore consider congressional delegations of power made in that
understanding to be implicit delegations to the broader professional, career,
and politically-buffered actors of the executive branch to engage in the
normal checking functions expected of them. In essence, Congress bargains
in the shadow of the bureaucracy. 141
The existence of this implicit delegation is supported by empirical and
theoretical research suggesting that members of congress often employ
ambiguous language, knowing that doing so will create discretion for the
executive branch, as a means of reaching consensus on an otherwise difficult
issue. 142 Were that discretion to be employed only by political actors within
the executive, actors within Congress not hailing from the President’s own
political party would quite likely be more hesitant, or even refuse, to approve
ambiguous language and thus discretionary authority. 143 The awareness that
this power will be exercised by non-partisan “experts” and “technocrats”
enables Congress to delegate authority that members might otherwise be
more reticent to grant. 144

141. Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968–69 (1979) (considering the “impact of the legal system on
negotiations and bargaining that occur outside the courtroom,” but nevertheless against the
backdrop of that existing system).
142. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 571 (2009) (“Both PPT
scholars and legal scholars have observed that a divided Congress may choose deliberately
ambiguous words to obtain consensus, thereby delegating interpretive authority to agencies or
courts.”); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 997
(2013) (finding widespread acknowledgment among congressional drafters that statutory
ambiguity may be the result of a desire to delegate to agencies, a lack of time to craft tighter
language, or the need to find consensus); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory
Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons:
Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 769–70 (2014) (finding that congressional drafters “often have a
desire for agencies to fill textual gaps,” which “are often necessary to keep statutes at a level of
detail that is not overwhelming”). But see Rourke, supra note 34, at 543 (“[T]he institutional rivalry
between the President and Congress that is so salient a feature of the American constitutional
process has long made it difficult for legislators to defer to executive agency bureaucrats merely
because they are supposed to have some special kind of knowledge or skill at their disposal.”).
143. Scholarship suggests Congress is more swayed by political connections than by interbranch rivalries. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2375–76 (2006).
144. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 35, at 1245 (“Judging from the political conflict that is often
generated by disputes between Congress and the President, it is at least arguable that Congress
would never have granted agencies their current, almost-limitless powers if Congress recognized
that such power had to be directly under the control of the President.”); see also Jack Goldsmith
& Susan Hennessey, The Merits of Supporting 702 Reauthorization (Despite Worries About Trump and the
Rule of Law), LAWFARE (Jan. 18, 2018, 9:20 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/merits-supporting702-reauthorization-despite-worries-about-trump-and-rule-law (noting that Democratic lawmakers
who voted to reauthorize the surveillance powers to the executive branch despite their criticism
of the administration do so knowing those powers will be exercised “mostly by career public
servants and supervised by all three branches of government”).
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As between these three sources of Congressional authority—special
protections, direct delegations to areas of core bureaucratic competence, and
implicit delegations made in the shadow of the bureaucracy, each lends
support to some degree of bureaucratic autonomy. This bureaucratic power
may not necessarily or only entail decision-making authority; but it surely
involves the authority to find and analyze facts, to insist upon them, to refuse
to craft a report contrary to these findings in the face of contrary orders from
political leadership, and even, finally, to blow the whistle on political superiors
when they fail to heed the constraints on that grant of power, as interpreted
by these bureaucratic actors. These bureaucratic checks can ultimately mean
the success or failure of an executive branch endeavor.
2. Judicially-Sourced Bureaucratic Power to Resist
Like Congress, the courts also allocate power to different actors within
the executive branch both implicitly and explicitly. 145 They do so through a
variety of doctrinal mechanisms and canons of interpretation, including: by
conditioning deference upon a showing that the executive branch has
engaged in specific decision-making processes or included particular offices;
by requiring detailed rationales that require the involvement of technocrats
or other bureaucratic professionals, sometimes prioritizing executive branch
expertise over politics; and by upholding congressional protections for career
bureaucrats.
Elizabeth Magill and Adrian Vermeuele have written about the extent to
which different administrative law doctrines alter the allocation of power
within agencies, both horizontally (as between different types of actors, like
technocrats or lawyers), and vertically (as between different levels of the
hierarchy). 146 As they describe the results of these doctrines, many allocate
power to higher-level officials, but several allocate power to lower-level career
officials and experts. 147 While I may differ somewhat from Magill and
Vermeule on the precise effects of some of these doctrines, I agree with the
overarching argument that different judicial doctrines allocate power in each
of these ways, including to lower-level officials. 148
Other scholars, such as Elena Kagan and David Barron, have more
implicitly acknowledged that courts have the capacity to effect intra-executive
145. See generally Henry Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(1983) (premising his defense of the administrative state on this dynamic: judicial deference to
congressional delegations of power).
146. Magill & Vermeuele, supra note 16.
147. Id. at 1061–78.
148. For example, they argue that the effect of the Chenery requirement that agency actions
be upheld on the rationale they provided at the time of action, not post-hoc rationalization given
in litigation, allocates power away from lawyers and toward policymakers. See id. at 1043–44.
I would argue that a more likely result is the involvement of agency lawyers—if not litigators—at
the earlier stage of decision-making, which in fact empowers rather than disempowers a particular
type of agency lawyer (advisers versus litigators).
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allocations of power as between high and low-level officials. 149 Kagan and
Barron press a normative argument that courts should defer to only those
decisions made at a sufficiently high level, such as by political appointees, and
thus their argument is superficially at odds with my account of diversified
internal power. But in their explicit defense of a strong allocation of power to
high-level political actors, Kagan and Barron acknowledge the current reality
of entrenched bureaucratic power as a force weighing against these political
actors. Moreover, they defend political power within the executive as a means
of countering, not of entirely engulfing, that acknowledged authority of the
entrenched bureaucracy. At a minimum, their work lends support to
descriptive accounts of the inherent existence of judicially allocated
bureaucratic power among internal actors.
Examples of judicial allocation of power to lower-level bureaucrats
include judicial deference to expertise; 150 or conditioning deference on
requirements that particular processes be followed; as well as requirements
that executive decision-making occur at particular times 151 or in a particularly
rigorous manner, 152 each of which may empower professional actors within
the agency vis-à-vis their political counterparts. 153
Doctrines that allocate power downward away from high-level decisionmakers tend to do so quietly, with implicit rather than explicit allocations of
authority to these actors. Judges rarely demand the involvement of “low-level”
or “career” officials directly, and are often loath to appear to be intervening
in the internal workings of the executive branch, even as their decisions may
result in internal reshuffling. 154 But the conditioning of a favorable decision
on the processes the agency takes in formulating its position, or the timing in

149. Barron & Kagan, supra note 16, at 204–05 (arguing that courts should defer to only those
decisions made at a sufficiently high level, such as by political appointees, and thus acknowledging
that courts have the capacity to reallocate executive power internally); Kagan, supra note 16, at 2372.
150. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 864 (1984).
151. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943) (“The grounds upon which an
administrative order must be judged are those upon which the record discloses that its action was
based.”); see also Magill & Vermuele, supra note 16, at 1043 (“The primary effect of the Chenery
principle is to affect the timing of reason-giving by the agency itself. Under Chenery . . . the agency
must speak before, rather than during, litigation.”).
152. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983) (explaining that the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of the Administrative
Procedure Act requires that an “agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action”).
153. See Magill & Vermeule, supra note 16, at 1038–40.
154. See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 547 F.2d 633,
653–54 (D.C. Cir. 1976), vacated, Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 964 (1978) (requiring that the agency generate a more fully developed factual record
before promulgating rules, but stating that the court does “not presume to intrude on the
agency’s province” to determine how to flesh out that record). See generally Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (critiquing the DC
Circuit’s “improper[] intru[sion] into the agency’s decisionmaking process”).
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which it makes it, or the level of expertise involved, all result in an allocation
of power to officials whose involvement is necessary to the undertaking of
these requirements, and these are predominantly the lawyers, scientists,
professionals, and generally officials making up the middle tier of the
bureaucracy.
In addition to administrative law doctrine, the courts’ national security
jurisprudence suggests an interest in internal process, even outside of the
formal requirements that bind the rest of the administrative state. The courts’
interest in cracking open the executive branch bureaucracy to scrutinize its
decision-making processes appears to ebb and flow to some degree with the
courts’ trust in the administration’s actions in a given realm. Evidence that
the President has flouted traditional executive branch norms, or typical interagency review or process, for example, has at times resulted in less judicial
deference to the executive’s position. 155 The corollary to this is that the
executive branch itself does, and should, capitalize on the courts’ interests in
its internal dynamics, by specifically signaling adherence to internal processes
and the inclusion of specific decision-makers, where applicable, through a
variety of means, including through the signing of briefs by agency officials
and the explicit highlighting of internal process. 156
3. Executive-Sourced Bureaucratic Power to Resist
Finally, bureaucratic power to resist other actors within the executive
branch, including the President, comes not only from external sources but
also from the executive branch itself. Theoretically, this source of authority
should be least concerning to critics of bureaucratic resistance, particularly
those who view such resistance as a threat to the “unitary executive,” because
it ultimately flows from—and thus falls more readily within the control of
—the President himself. 157 But why Presidents might allocate power to others
155. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 756, 766 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting, in ruling
against the government’s “travel ban,” many unusual process details regarding the creation of the
executive order, including that the first order had been issued “without interagency review,” that
“federal officials themselves were unsure as to [its] scope,” and that a high-level letter signed by
cabinet officials regarding security risks seemed to lack a clear basis in evidence from
contemporaneous reports from DHS).
156. See, e.g., Hamlily v. Obama, No. 05-0763-JDB, 2009 WL 369456, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 11,
2009) (noting the government’s request for a delay in reaching a detention policy standard in
light of the new President’s executive order creating a new review process and permitting “some
delay [] only to accommodate the ongoing ‘new’ Executive Branch review”); see also
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Application for Stay Pending Appeal and Pending
Disposition of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 28, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 542 (2017) (No.
16A1191), https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/hawaii/hidce/1:2017cv00050/
132721/304/2.html (emphasizing the government’s “interagency process that culminated in a
revised Order reflecting material substantive changes and detailed factual findings”).
157. Theories of the “unitary executive” take different degrees. Gary Lawson, for example,
takes the view that agency heads are themselves appendages of the President, who should be able
to nullify their actions if he so chooses. Lawson, supra note 35, at 1244. Others take a somewhat
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within the executive branch not only to carry out his prerogative but also to
resist it might be less apparent. The reasons are diverse: The creation or
protection of internal constraints can be a means of bolstering the President’s
or political actors’ legitimacy, sometimes for the purpose of maintaining
discretion. As discussed above, courts or Congress concerned with the
creeping aggrandizement of executive power may be somewhat mollified by
the idea that internal constraints are checking the President’s wielding of that
power. Thus, executive branch officials may virtue signal by pointing to, for
example, the involvement of career officials in a matter, as a way of staving off
judicial or congressional interference. 158 Likewise, political actors concerned
about the power that has inhered in their position may seek to create limits
on the office itself as a means of constraining its future occupants.
In fact, the President and heads of agencies allocate power within the
executive in ways that protect significant discretion by lower-level, often career
bureaucrats to question and resist other actors, even their political leadership.
We might call these “sub-delegations” 159 of executive power, or perhaps “suballocations” is more appropriate, as they arise from more than clear grants of
power—including the creation of structures, processes, and established
norms for acting that allocate power and generate potential and necessity for
resistance—and they may proffer something less than decision-making
authority. 160 These sub-allocations may be ephemeral or longstanding, formal
or informal, intentionally created or organic, written or unwritten, and they
may derive from presidents and other political actors both present and past.
I will distinguish a few of these categories here.

narrower view and argue that the President has unlimited power to any executive branch officials
at will, and others narrow that argument further to the power to remove officers. CALABRESI
& YOO, supra note 4, at 3–4; Richard A. Epstein, Executive Power in Political and Corporate Contexts,
12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 277, 305 (2010).
158. See, e.g., Laura Jarrett, Rosenstein Consulted with Ethics Adviser at DOJ on Russia Probe, CNN
(Apr. 13, 2018, 7:51 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/13/politics/rod-rosenstein-ethicsrecusal/index.html (reporting, in the wake of criticism that Deputy Attorney General, Rod
Rosenstein, should recuse himself from the Russia probe, that he had “consult[ed] with a career
ethics adviser at the Justice Department about his ability to oversee the . . . probe”).
159. For a broader discussion of the implications of formal agency sub-delegations see Jennifer
Nou, Subdelegating Powers, 117 COL. L. REV 473, 474–77 (2017). Under Nou’s account, sub-delegation
refers to the formal act of delegating decision-making authority to bureaucratic underlings. Id.
I intend to use it here to refer to any allocation of power down the bureaucratic ladder, not only final
decision-making authority, and through a range of direct and indirect mechanisms.
160. See, e.g., U. S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL sec. 3-1.130 (1997), https://www.justice.gov/usam/
usam-3-1000-organizationprior-approvals (admonishing that U.S. Attorneys implement DOJ policy,
but stressing “the need for their impartiality in administering justice [which] directly affect[s]
the public’s perception of federal law enforcement”); Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack,
Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1239, 1290–91 (2017).

A4_INGBER (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

10/26/2018 8:48 AM

BUREAUCRATIC RESISTANCE
i.

185

Ephemeral Versus Longstanding Sub-Allocations

One important consideration in analyzing executive sub-allocations is the
extent to which the allocation of authority is ephemeral, such as a one-off
assignment, or instead intended to be more longstanding. A paradigmatic
model of an ephemeral sub-allocation is the tasking by a higher-level official
to a lower-level one, such as an assignment by the head of OLC to an attorneyadviser within her office to prepare a legal memo on a particular question.
That head might delegate an assignment to one staff attorney one day,
without precluding herself from tasking a different staff attorney with the next
question, or from taking a first crack at the task herself the next time rather
than assigning it away. Each of these decisions might be made without
incurring notable transaction costs in making a change. 161
An example of a more longstanding sub-allocation is the regulation
under which the Attorney General’s statutory authority to provide legal
guidance is delegated to OLC. 162 Another longstanding sub-allocation,
though an informal one, is the organic development of an interagency
working group that meets to decide how to handle a given set of issues arising
regularly in litigation—like state secrets, or Guantanamo detention cases.
Ephemeral and longstanding sub-allocations may each take various forms;
they can be written or unwritten, formal or informal. 163 But a longstanding
sub-allocation may be more difficult to reverse, and entail greater costs in
doing so, than an ephemeral one. The practical power to resist the specific
will of political superiors on any given issue will thus vary according to the
costs of altering these sub-allocations. If a line official with an ephemeral
tasking insists on writing a memo that goes against his or her superior’s views,
the superior can simply switch the assignee with relatively little cost. That
taskee’s power to resist through this mechanism is minimal.
In the case of longstanding sub-allocations, the costs of change will be
greater and so will the concomitant power to resist. If the Attorney General
or the President is not happy with the legal guidance coming from, say, the
office of OLC, there are tools available for suppressing that guidance, but they
involve costs. The White House might redirect taskings, or refer questions to
OLC with less frequency, or dilute OLC guidance by adding other high-level
lawyers to the mix, such as the use of a lawyers’ group, 164 or by explicitly

161. There are some necessary transaction costs inherent in forcing one official to recreate
what another has done.
162. 28 C.F.R. § 0.25 (2017); see also Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Deputy
Attorney General, to the Office of Legal Counsel (July 16, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/olc/legacy/2010/08/26/olc-legal-advice-opinions.pdf.
163. The lawyer could be tasked, for example, orally or by email. He might be assigned a
formal, clearly delineated portfolio, or else be assigned to projects on an ad hoc basis.
164. Jack Goldsmith, The Decline of OLC, LAWFARE (Oct. 28, 2015, 6:11 PM), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/decline-olc.
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requesting guidance from another office. 165 It might simply disregard OLC’s
legal guidance altogether. 166 Each of these options entails costs, some of them
quite high, such as the institutional and resource costs of creating other
avenues for legal advice, the political cost of appearing to have disregarded
what is generally understood to be dispassionate legal advice, or even the
litigation costs that might come with the appearance of flouting law. 167 These
costs are tied up in the perception of OLC as something of an honest broker,
if one with a predilection for protecting executive power. These costs are
reduced, and OLC thus loses some power, if and when it is seen as tainted
with politics or otherwise corrupt. The high costs associated with dismissing
or evading OLC give that office significant power to resist the will of political
leadership, as long as the office itself retains the image of dispassionate legal
advice that undergirds its power. 168
ii.

Formally-Created Versus Organic Sub-Allocations

As I note above, an important distinction can be drawn between
executive branch sub-allocations that are formally, and intentionally,
generated from those that develop organically, and evolve over time through
the practice and acceptance of actors both inside and outside the
Executive. These two categories are neither mutually exclusive nor
immutable: Organically created norms or allocations of power may later be
codified through hard or soft law, and formal allocations may later evolve
through organic practice, or may themselves subvert organically created
norms.
This division is distinct from the fleeting or longstanding nature of the
allocation in question. To continue the tasking example: The head of an
office might circulate a written memo to the office designating tasks for a

165. Ackerman, supra note 99; Jack Goldsmith, President Obama Rejected DOJ and DOD Advice,
and Sided with Harold Koh, on War Powers Resolution, LAWFARE (June 17, 2011, 11:38 PM), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/President-obama-rejected-doj-and-dod-advice-and-sided-harold-koh-war-powersresolution; see also Aaron C. Davis, Eric Holder Raises Issue of D.C. Voting Rights a Day After Announcing
Resignation, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/
eric-holder-to-raise-issue-of-dc-voting-rights-a-day-after-announcing-resignation/2014/09/26/e406eb
38-457a-11e4-9a15-137aa0153527_story.html (“In a rare move [following a negative opinion from
the Office of Legal Counsel], Holder ordered the Obama administration’s solicitor general to
provide a second opinion on the bill’s legality.”); Carrie Johnson, Some in Justice Department See D.C.
Vote in House as Unconstitutional, WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/03/31/AR2009033104426.html.
166. Jim Baker, Donald Trump, Twitter and Presidential Power to Interpret the Law for the Executive
Branch, LAWFARE (Aug. 24, 2018, 10:35 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/donald-trumptwitter-and-presidential-power-interpret-law-executive-branch.
167. Morrison, supra note 3, at 1747 (“[A] President who goes against OLC would invite
substantial criticism, which helps explain why it virtually never happens.”).
168. By that same token, the legitimizing effect on the President’s course of action that the
President seeks by requesting OLC sanction is also lessened when that office is perceived as
corrupt, thus providing some incentive for Presidents to facilitate its dispassionate distance.
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short-term project. At the other end, an official within that office may take on
an informal assignment, which leads to taking on additional work when the
matter escalates, which then leads to the development of expertise, and
ultimately to that individual becoming the established point person in that
field, and potentially over time even the institutional memory of the entire
executive branch in a particular area. Eventually, despite the fact that this role
developed organically, and whether or not the individual is given a formal
title or portfolio, any attempt to address a matter in that area without seeking
the input of that individual could raise concerns within and without the office.
The first example is formal, ephemeral, and simple to change; the second is
organic, longstanding and might incur real costs to alter.
iii.

Contemporaneous Versus Past-Presidential Sub-Allocations

Finally, and perhaps most controversially, I argue that sub-allocations of
executive branch power are made not only by the current sitting President or
agency head, but also by their predecessors.
Executive branch structures, processes, norms, office portfolios, and even
minor taskings often transcend specific presidential administrations. When a
new presidential administration arrives, the cabinet secretaries and highest
tier of political appointees will generally (although not always) turn over
immediately, with some exceptions both formal and informal. 169 But a
significant degree of the rest of the executive branch remains in place, and
this means not just the personnel, but their organizational structure, norms,
and processes as well.
In order to change these sub-delegations, a new administration must
expend the resources to overturn, in effect, the actions of a prior
administration. The status quo bias and collective action hurdles to doing so
are not dissimilar from the difficulties one Congress may have in repealing or
amending legislation that no longer has majority support. This lack of
contemporaneous support—without legislative action—does not invalidate
the existing legislation; nor does lack of presidential support invalidate subdelegations he has not moved to alter. Recent scholarship considering such
internal regulation as a form of administrative law supports a notion of any
bureaucratic power created by these structures as more permanent, less
reliant on the substantive positions taken or proximity of views to those of
political appointees. 170 Both practically and formally, authority delegated by

169. The FBI director, for example, is appointed for a ten-year term and under normal
circumstances does not turn over with a new administration. An acting official may often need to
oversee an agency or office while a new appointee is confirmed.
170. See Metzger & Stack, supra note 160, at 1256–57, 1294. Their account approaches these
internal norms and institutions as a form of administrative law. Id. Under that approach, any
allocation of power to career officials would have more permanence, and thus must take into
account the reality that at times the bureaucracy will resist presidential prerogative. See id.
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a prior administration may empower career bureaucrats within a new
administration.
These categories and others exist in multiple permutations. Consider the
longstanding phenomenon of DOJ and FBI independence from White House
interference and partisan politics, which has both organic and formalized
features, is longstanding, and is created and entrenched across multiple past
presidential administrations. DOJ is situated clearly within the executive
branch, headed by a cabinet official who is nominated by and serves at the
pleasure of the President. The FBI, which falls under DOJ supervision, is also
headed by a presidential appointee, who also may be fired at will (though he
is appointed for a ten-year term). 171 Yet the traditions and history of these
entities have established powerful norms under which DOJ and the offices
within it expect—and are expected—to be shielded to differing degrees from
partisan politics. 172
These norms are guarded today by the culture of the institution and the
people working within it, and they have also been codified over time in a
number of soft law documents, like manuals, best practices guidelines for
individual offices, 173 and written memoranda from the Attorney General’s
office. 174 The culture of independence from partisan interference trickles
down to the attorneys working both within the building and outside it (such
as U.S. attorneys at offices throughout the country), and reinforces an
environment in which all actors perceive their role—to varying degrees—as,
if not entirely neutral arbiters of the law, then at least buffered from partisan
politics. Thus when Preet Bharara, then-U.S. attorney for the SDNY, received
an unexpected phone call from the President soon after his inauguration, in
the midst of public outcry over the President’s business relationships (which

171. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 1101,
82 Stat. 197, 236 (1968) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 532 (2006)). The Executive
Branch’s position is that the FBI director is removable at will by the President. See Memorandum
Op. from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., for the Counsel to the
President on Constitutionality of Legislation Extending the Term of the FBI Director (June 20,
2011), https://www.justice.gov/file/18356/download.
172. For an excellent discussion of the history of the DOJ independence see generally Jed
Handelsman Shugerman, The Creation of the Department of Justice: Professionalization Without Civil
Rights or Civil Service, 66 STAN. L. REV. 121 (2014) (documenting both the organic and formal
elements of DOJ’s creation that created and entrenched norms of independence from the White
House and partisan politics).
173. See, e.g., Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice and Written Opinions, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://
www.justice.gov/olc/best-practices-olc-legal-advice-and-written-opinions (last visited Sept. 2, 2018).
174. Memorandum from Alberto Gonzales, U.S. Attorney Gen., to Heads of Dep’t
Components and U.S. Attorneys (May 4, 2006), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
ag/legacy/2009/02/10/ag-050406a.pdf (updating standards for “[c]ommunications with the
Executive Office of the President”); Memorandum from Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., to
Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Attorneys (May 11, 2009), https://lawfare.s3-us-west2.amazonaws.com/staging/2017/2009%20Eric%20Holder%20memo.pdf (updating standards
for “[c]ommunications with the White House and Congress”).
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could one day end up on the U.S. attorney’s desk), Bharara declined to call
back, citing DOJ protocols on communications with the White House. 175
Instead, he memorialized the phone call in an email to his staff, citing these
protocols, and contacted the Attorney General’s staff to discuss his concerns
about the President’s call. 176
These norms of independence thus provide some level of authority, but
only to the extent the parties respect them. Bharara ostensibly countered the
wishes of the President in acting upon what I consider an allocation of power
to assert such independence, an allocation made by presidents past, from a
mélange of formal memoranda, as well as practice between former presidents
and their Attorney Generals who created, cultivated, acquiesced in, and
entrenched that practice over time (with the addition of congressional grants
of power to the executive made on the understanding that this independence
would continue, as I discuss above).
Bharara’s particular act of independence ultimately may have resulted in
his dismissal, which the President had the authority to effect, though he may
have incurred or risked costs in doing so. 177 Presidents cannot simply
instantaneously or costlessly reverse all ongoing sub-allocations of executive
power. Yet on the other side, the President’s ultimate ability to counter
Bharara’s resistance, here through dismissal, reinforces the existence of
practical constraints on bureaucratic autonomy, even when bureaucrats act
entirely within the bounds of their formal authority. Of the three traditional
sources of authority I discuss in this section, authorities that are sourced
entirely to the executive branch are typically more easily overridden by
executive branch actions than those derived from external sources.
C. FUNCTIONAL POWER TO RESIST
The deep state and benevolent constraints models may differ significantly
in their understanding of the formal authority allocated to different
bureaucratic actors, but they take a similar view of their functional power. The
alternating fear and reliance animating these approaches both rest upon a
conception of bureaucrats as wielding significant practical discretion to resist
other bureaucratic actors. This perception finds support in political science
research on bureaucracy, which finds bureaucrats exercising significant
175. Haberman & Savage, supra note 70; see also Jason Leopold & Claudia Koerner, Memo
Shows Preet Bharara Was Concerned After Phone Call from White House, BUZZFEED (June 23, 2017,
12:23 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/jasonleopold/memo-shows-preet-bahrara-was-concernedabout-contact-from (finding that in an email to his staff Bharara states, “we printed out and reviewed
a copy of the May 11, 2009 (as well as the December 19, 2007) Memos relating to Communications
with the White House”).
176. Id. Note that Bharara was then asked to resign the following day and was fired the day
after that. Id.
177. Whether this was connected to Bharara’s small act of resistance is speculative. Bharara
was only one of 46 U.S. attorneys who the President asked to resign at once. See Haberman
& Savage, supra note 70.

A4_INGBER (DO NOT DELETE)

190

10/26/2018 8:47 AM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 104:139

discretion, if not at the decision-making stage, then at the implementation
and enforcement stages. 178 This functional power that bureaucrats wield
derives from a variety of sources. These include: institutional relationships,
both within the executive branch and external to it, with civil society, with
members of Congress and staff, and with foreign counterparts; executive
branch norms privileging independence; deference by transient political
officials to entrenched officials’ expertise; the proximity of line officials to the
actual “action” and to sources of information, 179 including at times the
practical ability to release that information without authorization (leaking); 180
and the ability of line officers to frame questions and decisions for superiors
in a way that influences the result. 181 These facets of bureaucratic reality often
endow career bureaucrats with significant practical discretion to act within
certain bounds.
But this functional power does not come without its own, significant,
practical constraints, which I submit should temper both fear of and reliance
on bureaucratic resistance. The boundary lines within which bureaucrats
operate are often highly circumscribed, and along with the functional power
to act come real practical checks on every exercise of that power. In fact, the
very resistance that bureaucratic power permits also hems in that power from every
direction and at every level of the bureaucratic hierarchy. I explore three
categories of practical constraint on bureaucratic power in the section that
follows: (1) vertical constraints, that is checks on action coming from above
or below in the bureaucratic hierarchy; (2) horizontal constraints, or checks
coming from other similarly situated individuals, offices, or agencies; and
(3) external checks, or those coming from outside the executive branch
entirely.
1. Vertical Constraints on Resistance
Vertical checks on bureaucratic power are those coming from above or
below in the bureaucratic hierarchy. Agencies are hierarchical institutions. 182
Career line officers typically fill the lower and middle ranks of any given office
and tend to answer to a politically appointed head of the office, who herself
will answer to another politically appointed head above her, and so on up to

178. See, e.g., BREHM & GATES, supra note 76, at 9–13; JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 72–89 (1989).
179. See DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS,
NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928, at 5 (2001) (situating
agency autonomy in the agency’s ability to do things that others cannot, and in their “multiple and
diverse political affiliations”).
180. See David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones
Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512, 515 (2013).
181. See Ingber, supra note 15, at 368.
182. ROURKE, supra note 56, at 194; Organization Chart: November 2016, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/dos/99484.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2018).
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the head of the agency herself. 183 Bureaucrats on the front lines will typically
have some discretion in their minute-by-minute, or even day-to-day, decisions,
but superiors will typically have power to review—or even reassign or take on
for themselves—the line officer’s work product. 184 An efficient manager will
permit discretion to officials beneath them depending on the extent to which
they can trust them to carry out their orders, as well as to bring to the
manager’s attention any significant policy decisions or problems that arise. 185
Micromanagement is not without cost for managers themselves. Constant
oversight creates more work for superior officers, who cannot possibly watch
over the shoulder of every line official beneath them as they go about their
daily tasks. 186 They are likely not even aware of every single micro-decision
that arises, and rely upon line officials to bring matters to their attention.
While lower-level officials are constrained by their bosses’ oversight, higherlevel officials are constrained by the sheer impossibility of micromanaging
every action their office takes (not to mention by the oversight of their own
bosses). It is for these reasons that high-level managers seeking to make
significant changes restructure their office to ensure that more decisions must
come across the desks of political officials—either by increasing the number
of political officials in the office or by increasing their oversight of line
officials’ work. 187
Lower-level officials may choose to get with the program, suffer in silence,
or voice dissent, but the last carries risks, including simply being cut out of
the loop. 188 Voicing dissent in and of itself is significant work—it requires
studying the risks of a problem, preparing to raise a concern at a meeting, or
writing a persuasive memo; taking any of these relatively minor acts of dissent
depletes resources. 189 And insubordination can result in the loss of one’s

183. Organization Chart: November 2016, supra note 182.
184. GOLDEN, supra note 62, at 27; LEWIS, supra note 55, at 20–25.
185. See BREHM & GATES, supra note 76, at 32.
186. See id. at 25–46 (examining the difficulties for managers seeking compliance from
subordinates).
187. See GOLDEN, supra note 62, at 88–90 (discussing changes to the DOJ civil rights division
under Reagan, among them “institute[ing] a system under which almost all the work of the career
attorneys was reviewed by political[] appointe[es]” to “reduc[e] the autonomy and discretion
of the career attorneys,” as well as through increased hiring of non-Senate confirmed
political appointees); see also Aberbach & Rockman, supra note 34, at 456 (“[T]he Eisenhower
administration came into office determined to weed out large numbers of Democratic
bureaucrats and to reclassify a number of administrative positions from civil service status to
Schedule ‘C’ or policy-appointive status.”).
188. GOLDEN, supra note 62, at 31 (“[T]he micromanagement techniques used by Reagan’s
strategic appointees . . . took careerists out of the loop and rendered most types of voice all but
impossible,” and demonstrated to civil servants, “[f]aced with ‘hit lists,’ demotion, transfer, and
a general atmosphere of fear and distrust . . . that their utility was enhanced by cooperation,
not resistance.”).
189. See id. (citing career officials who noted that political appointees may have employed a
strategy of “forcing careerists to go to a lot of trouble to prevail” in arguments).
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influence, the loss of position, the loss of job, 190 or even, in specific cases,
criminal liability. 191
Considering the hierarchical and disaggregated nature of most
bureaucratic tasks, organized resistance is exceedingly difficult. This is borne
out by scholarship demonstrating high rates of responsiveness from senior
civil service officials to the President’s policy decisions. 192 Rare historic
instances of organized resistance within the bureaucracy on questions of
policy disagreement have taken the form not of a dramatic refusal to act, but
rather the more mundane vocal registering of dissent, such as through a
group complaint or a persuasive memo. 193 The State Department has created
a formalized process for employees to register disagreement with the agency
or administration’s positions. 194 On at least one occasion, a group of Foreign
Service Officers signed a joint memo opposing the Obama administration’s
policies in Syria, which then came to light through a leak. 195 Such organized
vocal acts of resistance are surprisingly rare. But even more important for the
“deep state” versus benevolent constraints debate, even these rare accounts of
organized resistance resulted in, not significant acts of disobedience, but
rather simple attempts to persuade political leadership of the error of their
policies. 196 The capacity of such bureaucrats to force change through their
organized dissent is not a null set; persuasive power is important, as is the
power of refusing to provide cover for a decision. But ultimately the force of
such dissent is limited by the will of those running the office.

190. See Transcript of April 19, 1971 meeting published in The New York Times 14 (July 20,
1974) quoted in Aberbach & Rockman, supra note 34, at 457 (quoting Nixon as having told the
director of OMB to handle a noncompliant bureaucrat as follows: “Demote him or send him to
the Guam regional office. . . . Get him the hell out.”).
191. Specifically, unlawful disclosure of certain types of information can result in criminal
liability. See Disclosure of Classified Information, 18 U.S.C. § 798 (2012); Confidentiality and
Disclosure of Returns and Return Information, 26 U.S.C. § 6103; Unauthorized Disclosure of
Information, 26 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(1). In the military, disobeying a superior officer may result in
a court martial. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Commissioned Officer, 10 U.S.C.
§ 890 (codifying Article 90 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice).
192. David E. Lewis, “Deep State” Claims and Professional Government, REG. REV. (Dec. 5, 2017),
https://www.theregreview.org/2017/12/05/lewis-deep-state-professional-government.
193. See GOLDEN, supra note 62, at 91–94 (discussing attempts by the career lawyers of the
DOJ civil rights division to persuade the political leadership via memos).
194. See The Dissent Channel, AM. FOREIGN SERV. ASS’N, http://www.afsa.org/dissent-channel
(last visited Sept. 2, 2018).
195. Mark Landler, 51 U.S. Diplomats Urge Strikes Against Assad in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (June
16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/17/world/middleeast/syria-assad-obama-airstrikesdiplomats-memo.html.
196. Id.
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2. Horizontal Constraints on Resistance
Horizontal constraints on bureaucratic action can be equally or more
powerful than vertical constraints, and they exist in more diverse forms, from
office groupthink to inter-agency conflict.
The most immediate horizontal constraints on bureaucrats come from
their own office colleagues: peer pressure, the “group think” of a particular
office, the sense of “professionalism” 197 in which strong cultural norms
reinforce a sense of what it means to be a member of the civil service or, more
specifically, a given office or profession. 198 For career bureaucrats, these
professional norms tend to enforce an office culture that shuns not only leaks
and partisanship, but also certain types of dissent, in particular, straying too
far from the long-held views of the office itself. 199 This may make it difficult to
raise too much of a ruckus by questioning a decision in a meeting, to create
work for other colleagues by raising questions or refusing to take on a task, or
to oppose a longstanding position of the institution.
Horizontal constraints also come from peers in other offices, both within
one agency and from other agencies on matters of inter-agency interest or
coordination. As I discuss above, much disagreement within the executive
branch involves longstanding points of dispute between different agencies or
offices, rather than between the entrenched and transient, or career and
political, bureaucracies. 200 Career officials across several agencies may, for
example, attend the same working group meetings for years, even through
multiple presidential administrations, and continue to have the same policy
or legal disputes, despite transitions in the presidency. 201 Turnover in political
leadership may affect the balance of power among the actors in those
disagreements, but not all decision-making within the executive branch is
inflected by partisan politics; in fact, many conflicts have fault lines that are
primarily horizontal, between agencies, and not vertical, between career and
political actors.
Inter-agencies constraints may flow, for example, from restrictions on
information sharing, or unequal power around the decision-making table.
Even when multiple agencies may have a stake in a particular decision, one

197. See, e.g., BREHM & GATES, supra note 76, at 75–92, 134 (discussing the roles of
professionalism and peers in constraining bureaucrats).
198. See David Kaye, The Legal Bureaucracy and the Law of War, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV.
589, 597 (2006) (describing the “soft law” of bureaucratic accountability—professionalism, “the
opprobrium or sanction of colleagues,” ambition for advancement).
199. See, e.g., GOLDEN, supra note 62, at 49–50, 106 (noting that the career officials surveyed
viewed leaks and sabotage as improper means of resistance); ROURKE, supra note 56, at 205–07
(discussing the “internalized constraints” that “operate within the personalities of
bureaucrats themselves”).
200. See supra Section III.B.
201. See infra Part V (discussing the State Department, Justice, and Defense disagreements
over detention authority).
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may hold more or less of the decision-making “reins.” 202 DOJ may hold the
pen if the task at stake is filing a brief. The DOD may hold greater decision
authority if the question is whether to use military force in a particular
scenario or whether to release a detainee. State may hold power as the head
of delegation to a negotiation. CIA officials wield control through restrictions
on access to information. 203 Sometimes entire offices or agencies are cut out
of the decision-making loop entirely, as a means of curating the decisionmaking process. 204 Cutting out a dissenting voice means reducing one
constraint—that posed by the dissenting agency on others; but it also creates
a constraint on that agency’s ability to act or resist. Thus, the risk of being cut
out may keep an agency or agency actor from dissenting too forcefully from
the actions of another agency official; this threat itself is another constraint
on resistance.
When concerns of actual fraud or abuse are involved, agency actors have
additional tools at their disposal to constrain their counterparts, as discussed
in the previous section: internal offices like the Inspector General, or other
“offices of goodness.” 205 Agency actors likewise employ their relationships
with external actors—such as in Congress or the press—as a tool in changing
the balance of power in an interagency dynamic, or as a means of sharing
information about what they may deem to be misguided policy or abusive
behavior. As one example, recent reports suggest that the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis (“OIA”) within the Treasury Department may have
unlawfully viewed the financial records of U.S. citizens and companies. 206
Another office within the Treasury Department that frequently spars with OIA
over turf, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), reportedly
raised concerns over the activity both with internal executive branch officials,
and with members of Congress. 207 One bureaucrat’s power is another
bureaucrat’s constraint.
202. See Ingber, supra note 15, at 388. Daniel Farber and Anne O’Connell distinguish these
kinds of relationships as involving “advisory or monitoring authority” rather than formal
hierarchy, on the one hand, or symmetry, on the other. Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph
O’Connell, Agencies as Adversaries, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1375, 1389 (2017).
203. In controlling access to certain types of clearances, intelligence officials can reduce
oversight by other agencies, on the one hand, but on the other, may feel they need to do so for
the purpose of containing leaks.
204. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing the Bush administration officials
channeling decision-making on detainee treatment in order to avoid including officials who
might dissent).
205. Schlanger, supra note 122, at 60; Sinnar, supra note 28, at 1034.
206. Jason Leopold & Jessica Garrison, US Intelligence Unit Accused of Illegally Spying on
Americans’ Financial Records, BUZZFEED (Oct. 6, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/
jasonleopold/us-intelligence-unit-accused-of-illegally-spying-on.
207. See id.; Jason Leopold & Jessica Garrison, In Midst of Terror Attack, US Intel Unit
Was Blocked from Tracking the Terrorists, BUZZFEED (Sept. 27, 2017, 1:46 PM), https://www.buzz
feed.com/jasonleopold/us-intelligence-unit-was-blocked-from-tracking-terrorists (chronicling “an
increasingly nasty power struggle” between the two offices).
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3. External Constraints on Resistance
In addition to the horizontal and vertical constraints on bureaucratic
behavior from inside the executive branch, bureaucrats also face limitations
on their discretion from external sources, just as they receive power from
them. External constraints can be either formal or organic and can arise from
both domestic and foreign sources exogenous to the executive branch—such
as the other branches, state governments, foreign governments, the press, and
civil society.
Executive branch officials in foreign policy and national security fields
will often have longstanding relationships with foreign counterparts that
provide both sources of information and practical allegiances necessary to
accomplishing certain tasks. Officials within the intelligence community, for
example, derive functional power from their ability to operate in a space
shielded from public view, the unique expertise that comes from working in
a field where very few have access to information, and also from the
longstanding institutional relationships actors within this realm develop
—with domestic actors as well as with counterparts in foreign intelligence
communities. Those longstanding institutional relationships, and bonds of
trust between career level officials, transcend any given political transition and
form a distinct parallel—though inextricably interwoven—relationship
between national governments alongside the formal one as between the heads
of state. 208 Those relationships may cause friction for a President seeking to
change direction, but they also help keep relationships with allies on a steady
even keel, even as new presidents struggle to get their bearings, or falter. 209
These interconnected relationships also create constraints, both formal
and informal. Ashley Deeks has explored the role that peer intelligence
communities (“IC”) play in constraining the space in which each may act. 210
She describes both formal and informal mechanisms that constrain peer
intelligence actors, including written agreements between states, legal
obligations within one state that circumscribe the space in which partners may
act, “anticipated legal or regulatory changes that instill preemptive caution in
one peer and then shift that caution to another peer,” “aggressive external
oversight of one IC that alters the operational calculations in that IC’s

208. See U.S. Intelligence Officials Reportedly Warn Israeli Counterparts Against Sharing Info with
Trump Administration, HAARETZ (May 16, 2017, 3:23 PM), http://www.haaretz.com/israelnews/1.764711 (reporting that that intelligence officials warned their counterparts in the Israeli
intelligence community not to provide intelligence with the incoming administration).
209. See, e.g., Susan B. Glasser, Trump National Security Team Blindsided by NATO Speech,
POLITICO (June 5, 2017), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/06/05/trump-natospeech-national-security-team-215227.
210. See Ashley Deeks, Intelligence Communities, Peer Constraints, and the Law, 7 HARV. NAT’L
SECURITY J. 1, 23–43 (2015).
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relationship with its peer ICs,” and “face-to-face influence among peer ICs as
intelligence operations transpire on the ground.” 211
For members of the entrenched bureaucracy, new constraints may arise
at times of transition. On the one hand, certain areas of functional power may
seem to increase during the early days of new administrations, when career
bureaucrats have a significant information advantage over incoming political
officials. Yet these career bureaucrats may also find that they have to re-earn
the trust of the political leadership, and that they may be cut out of the
decision-making loop until they do so. 212 Relatedly, the value of U.S.
bureaucrats to their international counterparts is only as good as their ability
to accomplish things within the U.S. government or speak for their
leadership, and therefore their star may rise or fall with the trust placed in
them by political superiors. Thus, while collegial working relationships
between career or long-serving officials in different governments gives them
each some degree of practical power, in the forms of expertise, information,
and ability to get things done quickly, that practical power is not limitless;
international counterparts want to be sure that the word of their interlocutor
has meaning and will not be counteracted by political leadership. U.S. career
officials may find that their longstanding foreign counterparts may secondguess the extent to which they speak with the authority of the new President
and political leadership and may request confirmation of that authority
before taking action or relying on the bureaucrats’ word. 213 As with internal
hierarchical relationships during political transition, faith must be regained
to a certain degree as counterparts seek to understand the power dynamics in
a new administration.
Similar reservations can come from domestic actors, like judges, who may
query, inter alia, whether the Justice Department’s continuous legal position
in a case in fact reflects the considered views of new political leadership. 214
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 59; Eliana Johnson & Michael Crowley, The Bottleneck in Rex
Tillerson’s State Department, POLITICO (June 4, 2017, 1:30 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/
2017/06/04/rex-tillerson-state-department-bottleneck-239107; Nahal Toosi, Leaked Document
Shows Tillerson Power Play, POLITICO (Oct. 26, 2017, 5:02 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/
2017/10/26/tillerson-diplomats-policy-state-department-244190.
213. See infra notes 240–42 and accompanying text (discussing the failure of U.S.
intelligence officials to convince their Israeli counterparts to withhold information from the
incoming administration).
214. E.g., DANIEL KLAIDMAN, KILL OR CAPTURE: THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE SOUL OF THE
OBAMA PRESIDENCY 58–60 (2012); SAVAGE, supra note 98, at 117–18 (discussing Judge Bates’
request of DOJ attorneys, shortly after the transition to the Obama administration, whether the
political leadership wished to take the same position, which resulted in the “March 13 brief”); see
also Oral Argument at 18:30, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2009)
(No. 08-15693), https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view.php?pk_id=0000002777 (during
which Judge Mary M. Schroeder expressed confusion at the career Justice Department attorney’s
continued reliance on the prior administration’s state secrets argument and questioned whether
the “change in administration” had not effected a change in the government’s position).
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When such exchanges occur, they also flag the matter for political leadership,
prompting them to take a closer look at the Department’s interpretation, and
possibly to override the position taken by career attorneys in the case. 215 Thus,
bureaucratic discretion based on proximity to the point of activity, or on being
the point of access for external actors, is circumscribed by external actors’
political awareness of the government’s hierarchy.
4. Leaking as Both Power and Constraint
Leaking merits its own treatment, as this is one area where neither
organized power nor the backing of political leadership is necessary for one
individual to have a significant effect. Leaking may be among the most
powerful, unsanctioned tools a single bureaucrat has at her disposal to resist
or affect the decision-making process. Unlike many of the mechanisms I have
discussed, leaks (with some exceptions) are not typically backed by formal
authority; rather, their power largely stems from functional capacity—access
to information and ability to release it. Moreover, access to large amounts of
information can be a force multiplier; a lone individual may create an
enormous splash simply by having access to and leaking explosive
information. Because of this power, some see today’s leaking as harkening
back to the historical abuses of information by the national security state—in
particular, the “Hoover-era FBI’s use of secretly collected information to
sabotage elected officials with adverse political interests.” 216 Those raising
concerns about bureaucratic resistance thus tend to point to the existence of
leaks as the primary evidence of “deep state” danger. 217
And yet, as with other areas of bureaucratic power, concerns about
leakers and “deep state” power may be overblown for several reasons. First,
the leaking of information by bureaucrats seeking to harness public opinion
in order to affect internal decision-making is entirely unlike the kind of
weaponized hoarding of secrets engaged in under Hoover. The latter is
blackmail, and I have seen no recent evidence today that lower-level officials
are holding the threat of a release of information over the heads of superiors
to force them to change a policy. By contrast, the current President’s selective
public shaming of executive branch officials, both career and political, along

215. See Oral Argument at 18:30, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943
(No. 08-15693), https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view.php?pk_id=0000002777; Respondents’
Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority Relative to the Detainees Held at
Guantanamo Bay at 10–11, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, 577 F. Supp. 2d 312 (D.D.C.
2008) (No. 08-mc-0442); KLAIDMAN, supra note 214, at 58–60; SAVAGE, supra note 98, at 117–18.
216. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, The ‘Deep State’ Is Real. But Are Its Leaks Against Trump Justified?,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 22, 2018, 2:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/
apr/22/leaks-trump-deep-state-fbi-cia-michael-flynn.
217. See, e.g., id.; Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 115–17.
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with their families, over their government work, comes closer to the Hooverera type of abuse. 218
This is not to say that leaking is without dangers, or that leakers should
face no consequence. As I discuss below, they should and do. But the harms
inherent in public disclosure of information are usually different—are in fact
typically the opposite—of the harms inherent in the hoarding of secrets to use
as blackmail. The goal of blackmail is that the policymaker changes position
so as to avoid the public learning the secret; the goal of leaking is that the
policymaker changes position because the public learns the secret. The
former works only if the policymaker fears the secret’s release. The latter
works only if the public cares about the information and demands change.
The former favors secrecy; the latter transparency. For those concerned with
the accountability to the public of government decision-makers—the core of
the “deep state” fear—these distinctions are critical.
Second, the power of leaks is itself constrained by the source of that
power. Leaks work by harnessing public outrage, which means the leaker’s
power is dependent upon it; leaks are only effective if they agitate the broader
public. 219 Of course, the leaker holds the additional functional power beyond
the unauthorized release of information itself, and that is the choice of
selectively releasing information, as well as the choice of timing, both of which
can have a significant influence on its impact. The government can remediate
any false or selectively misleading information with its own release. But, as I
mention above, one significant exception to this is the selective release of
information timed to significant events, such as an election, that makes the
immediate effect of on the public decisive, with little ability to later remedy
any false readings. While we are currently wading through the aftermath of
precisely such momentously timed releases of information, 220 this is fairly
atypical. And while the leaker has certain functional power, it is attenuated

218. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 25, 2017, 5:21 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/889792764363276288 (“Problem is that the
acting head of the FBI & the person in charge of the Hillary investigation, Andrew McCabe, got
$700,000 from H for wife!”).
219. Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 118–19; Orin Kerr, Edward Snowden’s Impact, WASH. POST
(Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/04/09/
edward-snowdens-impact; Bob Woodward, How Mark Felt Became ‘Deep Throat’, WASH. POST (June 20,
2005), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-mark-felt-became-deep-throat/2012/06/04/
gJQAlpARIV_story.html.
220. This includes both the high-level decision by James Comey to release information to
Congress about the Clinton email investigation in the days before the election, which may have
had an unintended effect on the result, as well as the unauthorized leaking by field agents for
the actual purpose of affecting the election. Letter from James Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau
Investigation, to Messrs Chairmen (Oct. 28, 2018), https://assets.documentcloud.org/
documents/3198222/Letter.pdf (announcing, shortly before the 2016 presidential election, the
discovery of new emails relevant to the Hilary Clinton investigation); Jim Dwyer, As Trump Ally,
Rudy Giuliani Boasts of Ties to F.B.I., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/11/04/nyregion/as-trump-ally-rudy-giuliani-hints-at-ties-to-the-fbi.html.
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and reliant upon the public response, which he does not control; there is no
guarantee that public exposure will sway the debate in any particular
direction. 221
Third, there are considerable constraints on the power of bureaucrats to
leak, and severe consequences for those who do. As David Pozen has
explained, these consequences are unevenly distributed to lower-level leakers,
who do not enjoy the discretion of their political superiors with respect to
decisions to release classified information, and thus face harsher
consequences for its release. 222 Unlike senior officials who may have
preexisting relationships with the press and an easy rapport with reporters
from their positions prior to government, as well as access related to their
government positions, lower-level officials have few if any sanctioned reasons
to speak with reporters. 223 Thus they do not have the kind of daily interactions
that would easily permit an added indiscretion here or there; leaking instead
requires an affirmative decision to seek out a recipient. They also may not
have access to the most significant information, which may be closely held by
a few senior officials. 224 In addition, the cultural norms and group think of
the career bureaucracy “vilif[y] leaking as disloyalty,” further constraining
career bureaucrats from doing so. 225 Finally, there is a genuine fear of leaking
among career bureaucrats, because of the serious consequences attached, in
particular, to the release of classified information. Thus, despite the
significant attention drawn by the stories of leaks by career bureaucrats and
lower-level officials like Chelsea Manning, most government leaks come not
from the lower tiers of government but rather from the White House and
other senior officials. 226
Finally, leaking is itself dual-natured; it provides the resistor with power,
and it is also an effective means of constraining resistance. This manifests in
vertical, horizontal, and external constraints, all of which ultimately rely on
221. See Landler, supra note 195.
222. Pozen, supra note 180, at 593–94. Because of their relationship with the press and
differentiated ability to control classification, higher-level officials have both a lower bar for
disclosing information and fewer consequences for violating it. Id. (“[T]he regime privileges
White House officials over agency officials, political appointees over civil servants, senior staff
over junior staff, and non-IC employees over IC employees, both in terms of the type of sanctions
utilized and the amount of disclosure discretion given.”).
223. Id.
224. See Charlie Savage, How 4 Federal Lawyers Paved the Way to Kill Osama bin Laden,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/29/us/politics/obama-legalauthorization-osama-bin-laden-raid.html (highlighting that the information about the raid was
known only to a very small number of people inside the government).
225. Pozen, supra note 180, at 529–30 (“Journalists and government insiders have
consistently attested that leaking is far more common among those in leadership positions.”); see
also GOLDEN, supra note 62, at 49, 106 (noting that, culturally, most bureaucrats found leaking
to be a tool of resistance beyond the pale of what they would consider).
226. For an excellent dissection of the world of executive branch leaking, see Pozen,
supra note 180, at 529–30.
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external interest or pressure. Leaking is an alternative mechanism of
registering dissent with a policy, which may effectively change the decisionmaking power dynamic depending on public reaction. Leaks may involve
personal battles at the highest levels; the first year of the Trump
administration, for example, saw constant reports of disputes within the White
House and among senior cabinet officials within the Trump
administration. 227 But leaks also stem from more bureaucratic disputes
involving turf battles over which office should hold decision-making authority
on a matter, policy disputes over the appropriate course of action, or concerns
regarding abuse by particular offices or actors. Leaking is of course a tool used
instrumentally to increase power, but the resulting transparency—or the
threat
thereof
—serves as another means of constraining bureaucratic action. The constraint
imposed by the fear of transparency even has a title within the
government: the “Washington Post Test,” under the terms of which executive
branch actors are warned to mentally test their proposed course of action by
assuming it were it to be released as front page news. 228 Again, this threat of
transparency—though it may influence policy—is the opposite of “deep state”
unaccountability.
The risk of leaks by partners outside the executive branch—like Congress
or foreign states—serves as yet another constraint. Congressional oversight
inherently involves the risk that the material provided to it will leak,
sometimes immediately. 229 And information sharing with foreign partners is
often a necessary component of intelligence work, but it also exacerbates the
risks that information will ultimately end up in the public domain. Ashley
Deeks has noted the role that leaks have played in pressuring states to impose
greater constraints on their own intelligence communities, which in turn
result in added constraints on their peer communities. 230 Leaks by one
intelligence community also create tensions in the intelligence relationship
—either because the released information creates national security risks itself,
or because the leak creates public outcry about the methods that an
intelligence community has employed. 231 In either case, the relationship may
227. See, e.g., Sarah Ellison, The Inside Story of the Kushner-Bannon Civil War, VANITY FAIR
(May 2017), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/04/jared-kushner-steve-bannon-white-housecivil-war; Graham Lanktree, Did Rex Tillerson Call Trump a Moron?, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 4, 2017,
10:23 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/why-did-rex-tillerson-call-trump-moron-677464.
228. Brian Agreen, How to Steer Clear of Scandal, WASH. POST (Apr. 19, 2012), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/how-to-steer-clear-of-scandal/2012/04/19/gIQApAi3TT
_story.html (describing the test as follows: “Every meeting you have, every decision your office
makes . . . stop and think, ‘What would happen if this got leaked to The Washington Post?’”).
229. The leak of the Comey memos proves illustrative.
230. Deeks, supra note 210, at 11–13.
231. Jack Moore, Trump ISIS Leak to Russia Could End Israel-U.S. Intelligence Sharing, NEWSWEEK
(May 16, 2017, 6:46 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/israeli-and-us-intelligence-services-crisisover-trump-leak-russia-610420 (describing how Israel is angry about Trump revealing sensitive
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become strained, resulting in less information sharing, and thus less power
for the bureaucratic actors on the leaking side. That likely result in turn helps
to create and reinforce the institutional and cultural norms that hinder
leaking ex ante, as well as the ex post formal consequences for doing so.
V.

ASSESSING RESISTANCE

The two conventional models of bureaucratic behavior I discuss in this
Article take radically different approaches to the merits of bureaucratic
resistance to political leadership. And neither provides a framework for
assessing the appropriateness of any given act of resistance.
Under the “deep state” approach, assessing resistance should be quite
clear-cut. In its starkest terms, career public servants and others serving the
President are unelected and therefore unaccountable to the public; their only
legitimate power derives from their role as the mere limbs of the President,
in whom is vested all formal executive power. Any opposition to the President
by those under him, under this account, would be illegitimate. Taking this to
its logical conclusion, the “deep state” approach would require bureaucratic
lawbreaking if the President demanded it, or even seemed to desire it—and
yet that is an untenable position. 232
The benevolent constraints model by its own terms takes a more
welcoming approach to bureaucratic resistance. These scholars, after all, view
the broader bureaucracy as imposing critical constraints on the President, as
heirs to the separation-of-powers mantle. 233 In order to play that constraining
function, the bureaucracy must at times “resist” political leadership, at least
under the broad definition I ascribe to resistance. In fact, scholars in this
camp do not see resistance as a net negative even for the President himself;
instead, the very existence of such resistance legitimizes executive power. 234
Under this model then, some resistance ultimately benefits the President and
intelligence related to ISIS); The Latest on the Manchester Bombing Investigation, N.Y. TIMES
(May 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/24/world/europe/manchester-uk-bombinglive.html (describing British Prime Minister Theresa May’s confronting of Trump over leaks
regarding the British investigation into the Manchester bombing.); see also Aaron Mate, Canada’s
Role in the CIA Torture Program Shouldn’t Be Ignored, VICE (Dec. 19, 2014, 5:02 PM),
https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/4w5b89/canadas-role-in-the-cia-torture-program-shouldntbe-ignored-928 (stating how previously classified information which was publicly released caused
international and domestic political troubles for the Canadian government).
232. A recent example of rogue action by bureaucrats in support of the President’s
prerogative includes the defiance of court orders to halt deportations by Customs and Border
Protection agents in the immediate wake of the Trump travel bans of early 2017. Edward
Helmore & Alan Yuhas, Border Agents Defy Courts on Trump Travel Ban, Congressmen and Lawyers Say,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 30, 2017, 3:57 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/29/
customs-border-protection-agents-trump-muslim-country-travel-ban.
233. Katyal, supra note 3, at 2314; Metzger, supra note 17, at 427–28. Jon Michaels argues
that the “administrative separation of powers” is today a necessary component of the broader
system of checks and balances. See Michaels, supra note 3, at 530.
234. GOLDSMITH, supra note 25, at 243.
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bolsters his authority at a macro level, even if at a micro level any specific act
of resistance may thwart a given exercise of that authority.
But while the benevolent constraint model clearly embraces some
resistance to the President, it does not offer guidance for determining what
kind of resistance is acceptable, how aggressively the bureaucracy may push
back against political leadership, and who decides when enough is enough.
Surely career bureaucrats must be permitted to disagree with political
leadership and explain their dissenting views, but may they ever say, “no?” And
if so, are there limits on when they may do so and for what purpose? Some
scholars seem to draw a line at legal constraint. 235 Under that approach,
government lawyers might appropriately refuse to carry out an unlawful
order, but it would be inappropriate (if not necessarily unlawful) to refuse to
carry out a lawful policy or order they merely dislike, or even believe to be
immoral. 236
Drawing the line at illegality alone imbues government lawyers with
significant power, and non-lawyers with very little. The implicit result of such
a scheme would be that lawyers, and those relying on lawyers, are virtually the
only bureaucrats with authority to resist. Such an approach does not provide
guidance for what a scientist or other professional might do—beyond simply
quitting—when faced with a proposal from leadership that may not be
technically unlawful, but that is unethical, or immoral, or norm-breaking, or
not in line with the congressional mandate, or requires them to disregard
facts or evidence, or is merely a terrible policy that will not work.
Moreover, the legal/illegal dichotomy does not fully account for the
range of actions that bureaucrats are authorized—in some cases even
required—to take that nevertheless fall within my definition of resistance. In
fact, even using legality as the normative trait against which to weigh
resistance, the result is a spectrum of appropriate action, rather than a clear
binary choice. And the question of how to respond to manifest illegality is only
one that bureaucrats must face when considering their legitimate zone of
discretion to resist other bureaucratic actors.
In Section A that follows, I consider how a spectrum of bureaucratic
resistance maps out, using legality as the normative trait against which to
weigh appropriateness of action. This first section is highly theoretical. But
where a specific action will fall within these zones is dependent not only on
the act itself, but on the purpose for which it is taken. I therefore map out the
relationship between purpose and mechanism in Section B.

235. See Quinta Jurecic, The Lawfare Podcast: Goldsmith v. Lederman on Yates, LAWFARE (Feb. 1,
2017, 5:54 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-goldsmith-v-lederman-yates
(discussing the firing of Yates).
236. Id
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A. ASSESSING ZONES OF RESISTANCE ACCORDING TO LEGALITY
This section maps resistance into four distinct zones according to
authorization and legal prohibition. As I discuss below, legality is only one
normative criterion we might employ for such a mapping. The potential
repercussions that attach to each of these zones varies depending on the
individual’s employment status, but the basic conceptual framework applies
all. In the first zone, I place acts of “resistance” that are not merely lawful but
are required by law, such as insisting upon following the legal requirements of
one’s position despite being asked to skirt them, such as refusing an order to
commit a war crime, or to unlawfully doctor a report for one’s boss.
In the second zone are actions that are not strictly required, but that are
fully within the bureaucrat’s legal authority to take. This zone covers a lot of
ground, and would include actions ranging from asking questions at a
meeting to writing a memo to one’s boss raising concerns with a course of
action to whistleblowing in accordance with statutory protections. For civil
servants acting within this zone, it would typically be unlawful for a political
superior to take an adverse employment action in response to the
bureaucrat’s act, even if it amounts to what I identify generously as
“resistance.”
The third zone is the diciest—the bureaucrat’s course of action is not
authorized, but neither is it unlawful. He or she may act, but must face the
consequences of doing so. An example within this zone would be refusing on
policy grounds to take a particular position in court, such as Sally Yates’ refusal
to defend the President’s travel ban, for which she was dismissed. Even civil
servants may face adverse employment actions such as reassignment or
removal for actions taken within zone three, though this is contextdependent. 237
And finally, the fourth zone is resistance that is itself unlawful and could
engender criminal punishment. Unprotected and unauthorized disclosures
of classified info would typically fall within this zone, as would embezzlement
of funds, mistreatment of detainees, and other unlawful activity. 238

237. Questions of removal or other adverse employment actions will differ dramatically
depending on the actor at issue, and whether she is, for example, a politically-appointed and
removable-at-will head of an agency or a protected civil servant.
238. Even disclosures of classified information are at times protected if made in accordance
with Whistleblower statutes.

A4_INGBER (DO NOT DELETE)

204

10/26/2018 8:47 AM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 104:139

Zones of Resistance
Zone 1: resistance legally
compelled
Zone 2: resistance not compelled
but within bounds of authority
Zone 3: resistance is
unauthorized but not unlawful
Zone 4: resistance is unlawful

The framework I lay out above is tied strongly to legal authority and
prohibition. But legality is not the only normative trait one might consider.
Other values, like morality, might also be mapped into zones similar to what
I describe above. And such a mapping would raise additional questions worth
pondering, such as whether resistance even within legal zone four might at
times be “legitimate” if not lawful. Reliance on different normative values
could thus result in somewhat different interpretations of particular
bureaucratic action, at least at the margins. That said, the vast majority of
bureaucratic action—even resistance—does not occur anywhere near the
margins. As discussed in Part IV, most mechanisms of resistance, even those
that provoke fear, are fully grounded in traditional sources of authority. And
even these fully sanctioned actions are severely constrained by layers of
practical limitations on bureaucratic discretion to act. Moreover, truly ultra
vires acts, like unauthorized disclosure of classified information not covered
by whistleblower protections, carry the threat of severe consequences,
including criminal punishment. The idea that there may be significant
consequential bureaucratic action taking place within zone 4, or even zone 3,
that meets with impunity, is fanciful.
B. ASSESSING MECHANISMS OF RESISTANCE ACCORDING TO PURPOSE
The zones above are highly theoretical. Assessing any specific act of
resistance requires first breaking down the event into its component
features: who are the actors involved; what precise acts have they taken; which
mechanism of resistance did they employ; for what underlying purpose; and
under which authorities (if any) do they act? Different actors will have
different authorities based on both their placement within the bureaucracy as
well as their specific skills, professional allegiances, and expertise. And
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different mechanisms may be employed more or less aggressively depending
on the underlying purpose behind the action. All of these could be mapped
out and then superimposed on one another. For our purposes here, I will
focus on the mechanism-to-purpose relationship.
In order to map any given act of resistance into one of the zones I discuss
in Section A, one needs to consider not only the action itself but the purpose
for which it is employed. The potential mechanisms of resistance, which I
discuss in Section II.B., range from the anodyne (asking a question, raising a
concern), to the more assertive (seek to slow-roll, “build a record,” bring to
the attention of superiors or “offices of goodness” inside the government), to
the most aggressive (refuse to act, bring to the attention of congressional
overseers, leak). The purposes underlying resistance also can be weighted
according to a related scale—resistance based on disagreement over policy
direction having the least weight, or merit, to resistance for the purpose of
challenging illegality and abuse at the other end of the spectrum, with
concerns over norm-breaking, or evidentiary disagreement in the middle.
There is then an inverse relationship between the purpose for resistance
and the aggressiveness of the mechanism that may be used in carrying out
that resistance. Raising questions, noting dissent, and other forms of light
resistance might appropriately be taken for any purpose, including simple
disagreement over policy. These might all fall within zone two. Refusal to
change a document might fall within zone one if taken in response to an order
to doctor facts, but zone three if done for the purpose of a mere policy
dispute. And on the other side of the scale, all of the potential mechanisms,
including the most aggressive, like refusal to act or even the disclosure of
information, if employed for the purpose of defying an unlawful order, could
even fall within zone one. This leaves zone four, unlawful resistance. If one’s
framework is legality, then actions within this realm may never be taken. But
in some cases actions that might otherwise be unlawful or prohibited (such as
refusal to follow military orders) might be lawful if taken for the purpose of
refusing illegality. Moreover as I note above, other conceptions of legitimacy
will create further ambiguities. Resistance within this zone is, in any event,
exceedingly rare, due both to the consequences for so acting, and to the
protections now available for whistleblowers that could move some actions out
of Zone 4 that would otherwise be placed there.
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I map out the relationship between mechanism and purpose as follows:

Additional axes—if only I could draw this in multiple dimensions—are
necessary to engage the full picture. These would include the specific
placement of the particular actor within the bureaucracy, and the formal
authority she wields. In the next section, I apply the framework I construct in
this Article to familiar accounts of bureaucratic resistance.
VI.

RESISTANCE REVISITED

The anecdote I include in the introduction appears at first blush to be a
classic example of the darkest “deep state” fears: U.S. intelligence officials
gone rogue and undermining the President using their ties to a foreign
power. It is also a Rorschach test. One’s immediate reaction to the story may
turn dramatically on one’s substantive views of the President in question and
the merits of the intelligence officials’ concerns about him. And yet, as with
the other stories that I dissect in this Part, the closer one looks at the details,
the less one can discern either a picture of unaccountable bureaucrats going
rogue or even one of effective undermining of the President and political
leadership.
We may never learn all of the details of this story, but the picture that
continues to emerge suggests both more high-level involvement—this was not
rogue action by career bureaucrats—and more practical constraints than the
initial tale suggests. 239 In fact, according to reports, when U.S. intelligence

239. E-mail from Susan E. Rice, National Security Advisor, to Susan E. Rice (Jan. 20, 2017,
12:15 PM), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2018-02-08%20CEG%20LG
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officials passed along their warning about the incoming administration to
their career Israeli counterparts, the Israelis’ subsequent warnings to their
own political leadership went ignored. 240 Quite possibly, this dismissal by the
Israeli political leadership was due to the fact that they were already forging
their own relationships with their new political counterparts, who were
making their disdain for career bureaucrats known; 241 prior relationships
would therefore be suspect. Israeli officials may also have been at a loss for
how to put the American warning into action; the reported Israeli reaction to
the statements was “shock,” having “never heard Americans say something of
that kind about their . . . president.” 242 That reaction, and the lack of a
pathway for putting the information to work, demonstrates both the rarity of
such statements (countering the idea that this kind of action is par for the
course for the “deep state”), and their ineffectiveness. 243 These elements of
the story are damning to the “deep state” narrative.
Thus, while at first glance this tale suggests rogue intelligence officials
freelancing in a dangerous affront to the President’s power, the reality is likely
more tedious: U.S. career officials soberly passing along information to Israeli
counterparts with the blessing of their then-political leadership, to little
practical effect due to the constraints of their counterparts’ similarly
constrained bureaucratic positions, and the budding relationship between
the political leaders. Ultimately—whether because of the unusual nature of
the warning, or the political reality of the Trump-Netanyahu relationship,
both of which demonstrate the practical hurdles to bureaucrats in seeking to
check political leadership—the U.S. officials appear to have failed to prevent
the disclosure they feared. Rather than effective action, it seems the U.S.
bureaucrats received raised eyebrows. This is hardly a powerful shadow state
at work.

%20to%20Rice%20(Russia%20Investigation%20Email).pdf (describing a conversation in which
President Obama told his national security team to be “mindful to ascertain if there is any reason
that we cannot share information fully as it relates to Russia”).
240. See Howard Blum, Exclusive: What Trump Really Told Kislyak After Comey Was Canned, VANITY
FAIR (Nov. 22, 2017, 2:27 PM), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/11/trump-intel-slip/amp.
241. Joe Davidson, Is Trump Making the Political Environment for Top Civil Servants Worse?, WASH.
POST (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/08/22/
is-trump-making-the-political-environment-for-top-civil-servants-worse (citing examples of senior
executive career civil servants who have quit in response to President Trump’s policies, and
quoting one saying that “[e]ven though career SESs understand their role as nonpartisan
professionals, nobody likes to be called a swamp denizen or have their mission denigrated in
public. That’s deadly for morale”); Mark Landler, For Trump and Netanyaho, a Budding Symbiotic
Relationship, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/world/middle
east/israel-benjamin-netanyahu-trump.html (highlighting President Trump’s exceptionally close
relationship with Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu).
242. See Dave Davies, Journalist Details Israel’s ‘Secret History’ of Targeted Assassinations, NPR
(Jan. 31, 2018, 2:11 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/31/582099085/journalist-details-israelssecret-history-of-targeted-assassinations (interviewing Ronen Bergman).
243. Id.
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Other well-known accounts of bureaucratic resistance provide more
developed evidentiary trails. In this Part, I draw from historical and more
contemporary events to evaluate three such accounts in accordance with the
Article’s framework for assessing such behavior.
A. PRESIDENT NIXON’S LAST DAYS, AND DEFENSE SECRETARY JAMES
SCHLESINGER’S EFFORTS TO CONSTRAIN THE USE OF FORCE
I will start with the more distant past: the oft-repeated story that in the
waning days of the Nixon presidency, as the President’s grip on power was
slipping, his Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger, took efforts to restrain
his ability to take significant military action unilaterally. While the narrative
has shifted somewhat over the years, the basic account is as follows: In the
final days of Nixon’s presidency, Schlesinger issued orders to the commanders
of the military services not to act on any direct order from the President to
launch a nuclear attack before first confirming such order with him or the
Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. 244
Described at that level of abstraction, the suggestion that a Secretary of
Defense might direct officials to disregard the President would seem clearly
to undermine the President’s authority to defend the country from attack, full
stop. And to be sure, of the examples I dissect in this Part, this one is the most
difficult to classify as “business as normal.” It might at first blush seem to fall
squarely within what Jack Goldsmith refers to as “sabotage”—possibly
“virtuous” sabotage in extraordinary circumstances, which these certainly
were, but damaging to the state nevertheless. 245 Yet, upon further inspection
of both the facts and the authorities in question, the line in even this case
between inappropriate undermining of the elected President and legitimate
resistance becomes fuzzier. Contemporaneous accounts suggest that the
precise order Schlesinger gave was not to disregard the President, but rather
a direction to ensure that the normal lines of command from the President,
through him, down to the military commanders would be followed. 246 He did
so for two purposes: first to ensure that the President would not
inappropriately reach out to individual military units directly (either to
subvert the “constitutional process” by attacking Congress, or to create a
diversion through a nuclear attack on a foreign country), as well as to ensure
that “some official” would not try to direct a military unit to “oust the

244. See, e.g., Garrett M. Graff, The Madman and the Bomb, POLITICO (Aug. 11, 2017),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/08/11/donald-trump-nuclear-weapons-richardnixon-215478.
245. See Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 109.
246. See Context of ‘August 22, 1974: Pentagon, Joint Chiefs ‘Kept Watch’ on Nixon to Prevent Coup Attempt,
Newspaper Reports’, HIST. COMMONS, http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a082274
mediacoup#a082274 (last visited Sept. 3, 2018); Bernard Gwertzman, Pentagon Kept Tight Rein in
Last Days of Nixon Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 1974), https://www.nytimes.com/1974/08/25/
archives/pentagon-kept-tight-reinin-last-days-of-nixon-rule-no-event.html.
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President.” 247 The actual mechanism used—a memo to the services stating
that the normal lines of command were to be followed in the event of unusual
circumstances—is hardly outside the bounds of the Defense Secretary’s
authorities. To the contrary, this is exactly the chain of command created by
the Secretary of Defense’s, and more generally the Department of Defense’s,
statutory authorities, and is probably best placed in Zone 2 of the above
franemwork. 248
Ultimately, the circumstances Schlesinger feared—in particular a
military order from the President in those last days—never came to pass; thus,
we cannot know what Schlesinger would have done were a real conflict to
arise. Moreover, had such a conflict arisen, the President could simply have
dismissed Schlesinger (and based on what we know, probably would have),
and then faced the political consequences of doing so.
Of course, it is rare for a President to find himself under real threat of
having to step down, and for his subordinates to have cause to fear his rash
actions as a result. But the fear of what a President might do with his
enormous military powers—nuclear power in particular—is not unique to the
Nixon era. More recently, Air Force General, John Hyten, commander of U.S.
Strategic Command, made some waves when he responded to questions
regarding how military commanders should handle a potential “illegal” order
from the President to launch nuclear weapons. 249 Press reports painted his
response as a promise to “resist” the President. 250 Yet Hyten’s actual comments
were more nuanced, in fact, equivocal. He stated that in the event of an illegal
order, he would tell the President, “that’s illegal,” and that as a result, they
would “come up with options of a mix of capabilities to respond to whatever
the situation is.” 251 The raising of legal problems and seeking to provide a
better solution are both squarely within the authority, and in fact obligation,
of a military commander in such a circumstance.
The much more difficult question, which each of these examples raises
but does not ultimately address, is how an adviser to the President or a military
officer would respond to an actual illegal order. Military officers in particular
are duty-bound to obey lawful orders, and military orders are generally

247. Gwertzman, supra note 246.
248. See 10 U.S.C. § 113 (2012) (establishing the Secretary of Defense as head of the
Department of Defense); Id. § 161 (establishing combatant commands under the direction of
the Secretary of Defense).
249. See 2017 Plenary 2: Nukes: The Fire and the Fury, HALIFAX INT’L SECURITY F. (Nov. 18,
2017), http://halifaxtheforum.org/media_library/2017-plenary-2-nukes-fire-fury.
250. See Daniella Diaz, Top General Says He’d Push Back Against ‘Illegal’ Nuclear Strike Order, CNN
(Nov. 20, 2017, 5:07 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/18/politics/air-force-general-john-hytennuclear-strike-donald-trump/index.html; U.S. Nuclear General Says Would Resist ‘Illegal’ Trump Strike Order,
REUTERS (Nov. 18, 2017, 1:20 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nuclear-commander/u-snuclear-general-says-would-resist-illegal-trump-strike-order-idUSKBN1DI0QV.
251. HALIFAX INT’L SECURITY F., supra note 249.
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presumed to be lawful. 252 And yet, there is a concomitant duty to disobey a
patently unlawful order; in fact, an individual will be held responsible for
carrying out an unlawful criminal act, despite having been ordered to do so. 253
Thus, at least theoretically, such officers might find themselves in a situation
of true conflict, torn between competing legal obligations. 254 In such a rare
circumstance, the legality of the order itself could place a soldier’s refusal to
carry it out within either Zone 1 or Zone 4—either legally compelled, or
illegal. For the soldier deciding whether to obey a potential unlawful order,
the consequences of erring in either direction could be severe, and include
dismissal or criminal charge. 255 And while much is made of this theoretical
obligation to disobey an illegal order, the standard for determining illegality
is quite high—it must be “manifestly” or “patently” illegal. Though rarely this
extreme, other officials throughout the bureaucracy may also face competing
demands from different masters; this is the nature of drawing authority and
obligation from multiple sources. For the rare instance of true conflict, there
are no pat answers; the reality is the official must make a decision and face the
consequences for erring either way. In the interim, the President’s ability to
remove and replace that official with another who will do his bidding is
significant and is usually limited by practical considerations and politics rather
than law. 256
B. PRESIDENT OBAMA’S FAILURE TO CLOSE THE MILITARY DETENTION
FACILITIES AT GUANTANAMO BAY
President Obama came into office in 2009 with the well-publicized
intention of shuttering the military detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay,
and either prosecuting or releasing all of the remaining detainees in order to
do so. In one of his first acts in office, he signed an Executive Order creating

252. See 10 U.S.C. § 892 (codifying the obligation for members of the military to obey
orders); United States v. New, 55 M.J. 95, 109 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (“The duty to disobey an unlawful
order applies only to a positive act that constitutes a crime that is so manifestly beyond the legal
power or discretion of the commander as to admit of no rational doubt of their unlawfulness.”);
JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MILITARY JUSTICE, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL IV, at 20 (2016)
(clarifying that under Article 92 “[a]n order requiring the performance of a military duty or act
may be inferred to be lawful and it is disobeyed at the peril of the subordinate,” but “does not
apply to a patently illegal order”).
253. U.S. v. Calley, 48 C.M.A. 19, 27 (1973) (stating that a subordinate can be held criminally
liable for acts he should have known were unlawful); see Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283,
292 (D.D.C. 2016) (“[T]here is no right, let alone a duty, to disobey military orders simply
because one questions the Congressional authorization of the broader military effort.”). To be
sure, the use of nuclear weapons may elide the distinction between these two bodies of law.
254. For a discussion of these opposing pulls see generally Keith Petty, Duty and Disobedience:
The Conflict of Conscience and Compliance in the Trump Era, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 55 (2017).
255. See supra notes 252–53 and accompanying text.
256. The ongoing debate over whether Trump’s firing of FBI director Comey, and the
political ramifications, are one example; we have yet to see whether there will be any legal
implications, but even these will likely result in only political remedies.
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an interagency process to effectuate the closure of the detention facility by
the end of his first year in office. 257 His failure to do so, not only within that
first year but within his entire eight years in office, was a source of frustration
both for him and for his supporters. 258 In explaining that failure, many have
pointed to bureaucratic factors, such as continuity of personnel at both the
career and political levels. 259 This continuity did play a role in encumbering
the closure process, but the known examples of bureaucratic intransigence
suggest that bureaucrats neither exceeded the scope of their formal authority,
nor could they have prevented the President from closing the facility had he
been willing to expend the political capital to do so.
Several bureaucratic factors both encumbered quick closure of the
facility and guided the incoming Obama administration toward adopting
certain legal theories the prior administration had espoused in continuing to
defend detention at the facility. I have written about the bureaucratic factors
that influenced the perhaps surprising continuity of legal positions between
the Bush and Obama administrations in the war on terror. 260 These factors
include the continuity in the executive branch personnel populating all
relevant agencies: At DOD, which was charged with assessing risk of individual
detainees, even the Secretary of Defense himself, Robert Gates, appointed by
President Bush, remained in his position for years into the Obama
administration, in addition to career officials. Career officials continued to
serve through the transition at DOJ as well, which was charged with defending
their detention in court, 261 as well as on the executive order-created task force
for determining whether to transfer or release individual detainees
—necessary for closing the facility—which was staffed with many of the same
individuals who had been making these risk assessments for years under the
prior administration. 262

257. See Exec. Order No. 13,492, 3 C.F.R. § 13492 (2009) (requiring an interagency review of
the status of each detainee to be conducted by officials drawn from the national security agencies).
258. Greg Jaffe, Obama Regrets Not Closing Guantanamo on First Day in Office, WASH. POST
(Mar. 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/03/18/obamaregrets-not-closing-guantanamo-on-first-day-in-office.
259. See Connie Bruck, Why Obama Has Failed to Close Guantánamo, NEW YORKER (Aug. 1, 2016),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/08/01/why-obama-has-failed-to-close-guantanamo
(discussing DOD opposition to closing Guantanamo); Huq, supra note 44, at 540–47 (discussing
the role of “bureaucratic resistance” in hindering the President’s efforts to close Guantanamo—as
part of a “bureaucratic-legislative alliance”). I have also discussed the role of these forces in a prior
work, which focused specifically on the bureaucratic reasons for continuity between President Bush
and Obama’s legal positions relating to the war on terror. See Ingber, supra note 6, at 687–99.
260. Ingber, supra note 6, at 682–84.
261. Bruck, supra note 259; Huq, supra note 44, at 540–47; Ingber, supra note 27, at 114–18;
Ingber, supra note 15, at 372–77; Ingber, supra note 6, at 687–99.
262. BRAD WIEGMANN & MARK MARTINS, DETENTION POLICY TASK FORCE, PRELIMINARY REPORT
1–5 (2009), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/documents/preliminary-rpt-dptf-072009.pdf;
see also GUANTANAMO REV. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 3 (2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/
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Though some of the bureaucratic actors in these agencies may have
opposed the new President’s decision to close Guantanamo on policy
grounds, the mechanisms I discuss here that resulted in “resistance”—risk
assessment, or zealously defending the government in litigation—were hardly
outside the zone of their authority, allocated not only by Congress and courts
and past presidential action, but by the sitting President himself through his
executive orders and other sub-delegations.
Nor did resistance to the President’s stated goal of closing Guantanamo
divide along a clear career-political dichotomy. While some actors within the
entrenched bureaucracy may have opposed the plan, others—particularly at
agencies like the State department—had long been working to effectuate
closure. 263 Moreover, members of the President’s own team were not all on
the same page. Some of the President’s own appointees shared the views of
those in their agencies and seemed reticent to effectuate closure or to change
the government’s legal positions. 264 Even some of the President’s inner circle
in the White House were not sufficiently on board with the plan; many
prioritized other goals over Guantanamo closure. 265 And just five months into
his presidency, Obama himself gave a speech suggesting he would retain
military detention as one of the options for the disposition of Guantanamo
detainees, thus yielding on one of the most controversial issues related to the
facility before his first year in office was even halfway through. 266
Even the bureaucratic dynamic on Guantanamo within the Obama
administration was hardly as simple as the career bureaucracy resisting the
President. Some members of the entrenched bureaucracy sided with some
members of the political leadership in opposing some or all of the President’s
default/files/ag/legacy/2010/06/02/guantanamo-review-final-report.pdf (describing the structure as
making up “60 career professionals” from across the national security agencies).
263. See generally, e.g., Declaration of Pierre-Richard Prosper at paras. *1–8, O.K. v. Bush, 77 F.
Supp. 2d 102 (D.D.C. 2005) (No. 1:04CV01136), 2005 WL 5727872 (Mar. 8, 2005) (describing
efforts by the Bush Administration State Department Office of War Crimes Issues (“S/WCI”), in
coordination with the Department of Defense, to transfer detainees to foreign countries).
264. See ROSA BROOKS, HOW EVERYTHING BECAME WAR AND THE MILITARY BECAME
EVERYTHING: TALES FROM THE PENTAGON 62–67 (2016); Bruck, supra note 259 (citing a string of
Defense Secretaries under Obama as reticent to approve transfers).
265. KLAIDMAN, supra note 214, at 2 (noting that White House staffers “used the abbreviation
AHC, or ‘after health care,’ to refer to everything else they hoped to accomplish”); SAVAGE, supra
note 98, at 24 (noting that national security matters were “one ball among many being juggled,”
including the “top domestic-policy goal”—health insurance overhaul).
266. Barack Obama, Remarks by the President On National Security, 5-21-09 (May 21, 2009,
10:28 AM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-President-nationalsecurity-5-21-09 (noting that after a review of the detainee cases, there would remain a group who
could be neither prosecuted or released); see also Stephen I. Vladeck & Benjamin Wittes, How to
Get Congress and Obama to Agree on Closing Guantanamo, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2016), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-to-get-congress-and-obama-to-agree-on-closing-guantanamo/
2016/01/21/ccbd2b50-bfad-11e5-bcda-62a36b394160_story.html (“The main political obstacle
to closing Guantanamo is a fundamental disagreement over whether military detention should be a
legally available option—not just for those already in custody, but for future terrorism suspects.”).
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plan; and other members of the entrenched bureaucracy sided with other
members of the political leadership in aggressively supporting it, and this fell
somewhat, although not perfectly, along agency lines, rather than a division
between the career and political bureaucracies. 267
Moreover, while the holdover of personnel from the Bush to Obama
administration, particularly in the national security space, contributed to the
status quo bias that encumbered any change of course, these bureaucratic
actors could not have actually prevented the President from closing the facility
had he insisted on doing so, at least before Congress enacted restrictions in
2012. 268 In fact, many of the bureaucratic hurdles to closing Guantanamo
were well within the President’s and political leadership’s power to modify, as
well as Congress and the courts. Political leadership had authority to change
the staffing and standards employed for both the transfer and detainee
litigation decision-making processes. For example, attorneys at DOJ who had
defended “war on terror” cases under the Bush administration continued to
do so under the Obama administration and, until directed otherwise,
continued to file the same briefs. 269 But when political leadership stepped in,
they could—and did—amend the positions the government took in
litigation. 270 The courts, for their part, need not have upheld the
administration’s detention standards. Congress could have stopped
appropriations, or legislated different detention standards; instead, they
enacted statutory restrictions. 271 But before they did, President Obama could
simply have released all of the detainees into the United States, or transferred
them to countries willing to take them, without insisting on any security
guarantees above what they were willing to provide. He did not do so. And he
did not do so, not because he was prevented from doing so by the career
bureaucracy, though this was a hurdle, or because he was prevented from
doing so by his political leadership, though this was another hurdle. He did
not do so because he did not choose to expend the capital necessary to force
the bureaucracy—including his own appointees—to effectuate this plan.

267. KLAIDMAN, supra note 214, at 162–67 (describing internal battles between Rahm
Emanuel, Greg Craig, and Eric Holder over whether to move the 9/11 trial from a military
commission at Guantanamo to an Article III trial in the SDNY and its effect on Guantanamo
closure plans); SAVAGE, supra note 98, at 149–52 (describing battles between State Department
and DOD officials over Guantanamo and the government’s legal theory for detention).
268. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81,
125 Stat. 1298; Stephen Vladeck, The Bass-Ackwards Detainee Transfer Provision in the FY2016 NDAA,
JUST SECURITY (Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/26491/bass-ackward-detaineetransfer-provision-fy2016-ndaa (explaining the line of statutory restrictions in recent years
further hindering the President’s ability to close the detention facilities at Guantanamo).
269. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
270. See KLAIDMAN, supra note 214, at 58–60 (discussing the high-level involvement in the
“March 13” brief).
271. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
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Thus, while bureaucratic resistance did play a role in President Obama’s
failure to close Guantanamo, it was not a clear-cut matter of career resistance
to political leadership. Nor was it dispositive of the outcome. Bureaucratic
resistance can be overcome if political actors are willing to pay the cost to
doing so. Here, that cost would have involved new staffing and new standards
for risk assessment decisions about transfer. It would also have involved
insisting that the stream of Secretaries of Defense under the President get on
board with his plan or resign. And ultimately, because much of this would be
subject to public scrutiny, it would have involved shouldering the
responsibility for the release of detainees, without the full support of the
military and intelligence agencies who could absorb some of the political hit
should any detainee later engage in violence. Instead of doing so, the
President simply prioritized other policies, liking passing healthcare
legislation. Prioritization of policies, and decisions on where to expend
political capital are well within the President’s prerogative, just as continuity
of analysis and fact-finding are well within the prerogative of bureaucrats.
Bureaucratic friction of this sort may be a hurdle to aggressive presidential
change, but it hardly suggests bureaucrats have taken the wheel.
C. PRESIDENT TRUMP’S CLASHES WITH DOJ AND THE FBI OVER INVESTIGATIONS
INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN
The Trump presidency provides a deluge of well-reported examples of
tension between the President and his inner circle and the broader executive
branch bureaucracy. The first year of the administration has involved conflict
and firewalling between the political leadership and scientists at the EPA;
between the Secretary of State and career foreign service officers; and
between the Interior Secretary and civil servants within the agency, to name a
few, as well as a steady stream of resignations among the upper tier of the
career bureaucracy. 272 Reports suggest that the political leadership at these
agencies has frequently isolated itself from and sought to disempower career
bureaucrats within their respective spheres, professedly based on a belief that
these career bureaucrats themselves would attempt to undermine the will of
the political leadership. 273

272. See, e.g., Coral Davenport & Eric Lipton, Scott Pruitt Is Carrying Out His E.P.A. Agenda in
Secret, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/11/us/
politics/scott-pruitt-epa.html; Evan Halper, Civil Servants Charge Trump Is Sidelining Workers with
Expertise on Climate Change and Environment, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/
politics/la-na-pol-trump-civil-servants-201709-story.html; Nik Steinberg, Rex Tillerson Is Running
the State Department Into the Ground: Skilled and Patriotic Diplomats Are Leaving Like Never Before in an
Exodus that is Damaging the United States, POLITICO (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.politico.com/
magazine/story/2017/10/04/rex-tillerson-is-running-the-state-department-into-the-ground-215677.
273. See Halper, supra note 272.
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I focus here on just one of these fraught relationships: The President’s
repeated—and thus far failed 274—attempts to shutter the ongoing
investigation of Russian interference in his presidential campaign by several
executive branch agencies, and his related efforts to break down the norm of
independence between his White House and the law enforcement agencies
of the executive branch. The President and his surrogates have expressed
surprise at the President’s encumbrances in commanding law enforcement
directly, and—as an alternative to simply shutting down the Russia probe
directly, at least for now—have sought to delegitimize the investigation by
tainting it as politicized resistance to his presidency.
These efforts have included the President’s referral to the continuing
investigation—which has involved not only DOJ and the FBI but also the
intelligence community—as a “witch hunt” by actors bent on discrediting his
election. 275 He has criticized both political appointees and career officials in
the intelligence community, the FBI, and DOJ. His efforts to discredit them
have involved frequent suggestions that they are tainted by partisan politics,
and therefore are biased against him. 276 The President’s supporters have run
with this narrative. 277 The overarching message is that the Russia investigation
is politically-inflected, wrongful resistance by the career bureaucracy against
the President.
Intertwined within these critiques, the President has expressed alarm and
confusion at the prospect that actors within the executive branch—here
specifically the law enforcement and intelligence communities—might act

274. Even as this Article enters the final stage of the editing process, media reports suggest
that one of the central figures in this story—Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein—may
resign or face imminent dismissal. Michael D. Shear et al., Rod Rosenstein’s Job Is Safe, for Now: Inside
His Dramatic Day, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/24/us/
politics/rod-rosenstein-justice-department-trump.html.
275. Mark Landler, Trump, Citing ‘a Witch Hunt,’ Denies Any Collusion With Russia, N.Y. TIMES
(May 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/18/us/politics/trump-back-on-twittercomplains-of-witch-hunt.html.
276. Sarah N. Lynch, U.S. Attorney General Orders Probe of FBI Agents’ Text Messages, REUTERS
(Jan. 23, 2018, 1:02 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-texts/u-s-attorney-generalorders-probe-of-fbi-agents-text-messages-idUSKBN1FC2OQ; Michael D. Shear et al., Trump Attacks
Rosenstein in Latest Rebuke of Justice Department, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/06/16/us/politics/trump-investigation-comey-russia.html.
277. Devlin Barrett & Sean Sullivan, Republicans Hammer Mueller, FBI as Russia Investigation
Intensifies, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
republicans-hammer-mueller-fbi-as-russia-investigation-intensifies/2017/12/06/4a6097ca-dabb-11e
7-b1a8-62589434a581_story.html; Maggie Haberman & Nicholas Fandos, Donald Trump Jr.
Demands Leak Inquiry of House Intelligence Committee, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/us/donald-trump-jr-leak-investigation.html (quoting Mr. Trump’s
lawyer, Alan S. Futerfas, as saying, “[t]his committee should determine whether any member or
staff member violated the rules by leaking information to the media” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Hannity on New FBI Revelations: ‘Powerful People’ Must be Investigated, Indicted & Probably
‘Thrown in Jail’, FOX NEWS (Jan. 24, 2018, 8:18 AM), http://insider.foxnews.com/2018/01/24/
sean-hannity-monologue-fbi-peter-strzok-texts-powerful-people-should-go-jail.
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independently and against his explicit wishes. 278 According to reports and
direct testimony, he has sought—and failed—to confirm the personal loyalty
of key actors throughout these agencies, political and career, reportedly
asking them direct questions about their loyalty or their election votes, and
publicly denigrating his own appointees when they have acted
independently. 279 And furthermore, he has sought to fire or pressure the
resignation of those who have disappointed him in this regard. 280
The President’s attempts to challenge perceived disloyalty have had
mixed results. He fired James Comey, then the FBI director, which led not to
a weakening of the investigation but rather a formalized entrenching of it. 281
The Deputy Attorney General, Rod Rosenstein, appointed a special counsel
to continue the investigation in Comey’s stead. 282 Rosenstein, as Deputy, had
the authority to do so only because the Attorney General, Jeff Sessions, had
recused himself from the Russian investigation—also in contravention of the
stated preference of the President. The President has pressured Sessions
himself to resign, which would ultimately result in a new Trump-appointed
AG taking oversight of the Mueller investigation, but he has as yet been
unsuccessful. 283 The deputy head of the FBI, a career official named Andrew

278. See Ashley Parker et al., Trump Sought Release of Classified Russia Memo, Putting Him at Odds
with Justice Department, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
trump-sought-release-of-classified-russia-memo-putting-him-at-odds-with-justice-department/2018/01/
27/a00f2a4c-02bb-11e8-9d31-d72cf78dbeee_story.html (reporting that “Trump, appearing frustrated
and at times angry, has complained to confidants and aides in recent weeks that he does not
understand why he cannot simply give orders to ‘my guys’ at what he sometimes calls the ‘Trump
Justice Department’”).
279. Statement for the Record: Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 3–4
(June 8, 2017), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-jcomey060817.pdf (statement of James Comey, former Dir. of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation)
(testifying that the President had said to him, “I need loyalty, I expect loyalty”); Pamela Brown
et al., Trump Asked Rosenstein If He Was ‘on My Team’, CNN (Feb. 1, 2018, 6:15 AM), http://
www.cnn.com/2018/01/31/politics/donald-trump-rod-rosenstein-december-meeting/index.html;
Seung Min Kim, Sessions Won’t Recuse Himself from DOJ Trump Probes, POLITICO (Jan. 23, 2017, 8:38
PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/jeff-sessions-trump-probes-234087.
280. See, e.g., Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, but
Backed Off When White House Counsel Threatened to Quit, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/01/25/us/politics/trump-mueller-special-counsel-russia.html; Eric Tucker
& Sadie Gurman, FBI Deputy Director McCabe, a Frequent Trump Target, Abruptly Leaves Post, CHI.
TRIBUNE (Jan. 29 2018, 7:33 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/
ct-andrew-mccabe-fbi-stepping-down-20180129-story.html.
281. Michael D. Shear & Matt Apuzzo, F.B.I. Director James Comey Is Fired by Trump, N.Y. TIMES
(May 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/us/politics/james-comey-fired-fbi.html.
282. Appointment Memo from Rod J. Rosenstein, Acting Attorney Gen., to Appointment of
Special Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference with the 2016 Presidential Election and
Related Matters (May 17, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/967231/
download (appointing Robert Mueller as special counsel).
283. If Sessions were to resign, a new Attorney General—once confirmed—presumably
would not recuse himself from the Russia investigation, and thus would be able to take back
oversight from Rosenstein.
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McCabe, stepped down, reportedly under political pressure to do so. 284 The
President reportedly tried, and failed, to fire Mueller earlier this year, and
there is constant speculation that the President will try to fire Rosenstein, or
is pressuring him to resign. 285
And still the investigations continue, at least for now, against the quite
explicit preferences of the President. Certainly, this is an example of
bureaucratic “resistance” to the President’s will. But is it a politicized attempt
to bring down his presidency, based in partisan or policy differences, by
“unaccountable” bureaucrats at DOJ and the FBI, as the President suggests?
If not, what is the justification for their marked resistance? And, perhaps most
important of all, should we be afraid of this power? If the President himself
has not been able to shut down this investigation, is the power of these
bureaucrats unaccountable to any democratic source?
In employing the framework I lay out in this Article to assess the
“resistance” at hand, we first must consider who are the precise actors here.
While the President has deployed language suggesting a conflict between his
administration, on the one hand, and “holdover” career bureaucrats, loyal to
his opponents, on the other, the relevant individuals in fact cut across many
of the different axes discussed above. These include high-level political actors
appointed by Trump himself (Sessions, Rosenstein, Wray); high-level political
actors appointed by Trump appointees (Mueller); high-level political actors
appointed by the prior President but hailing from the President’s own
political party (Comey); and high-level career officials who have risen to
positions of power but who continue to have statutory protections from
partisan coercion (McCabe). To be sure, many lower-level civil servants have
been involved in the investigations as well, and some have been reported to
have expressed political preferences—both in favor of and against this
President. 286
All of these individuals face different kinds of practical constraints on
their power—the most obvious being constant threat of dismissal or
reassignment; these are vertical constraints coming from the President or

284. Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, Taunted by Trump and Pressured from Above, McCabe Steps
Down as F.B.I. Deputy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/29/us/
politics/andrew-mccabe-fbi.html. McCabe was ultimately fired before he could receive his pension. Id.
285. Schmidt & Haberman, supra note 280.
286. Compare David A. Graham, The Peril of Taking on the FBI, ATLANTIC (Jan. 31, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/01/trump-fbi/552062 (describing that during
the campaign, “some FBI employees were leaking anti-Clinton information, including to Trump
adviser Rudy Giuliani”), with Devlin Barrett, FBI Texts Reveal Anti-Trump, Pro-Clinton Comments,
WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-textsreveal-anti-trump-pro-clinton-comments/2017/12/12/e0685f80-dfa4-11e7-bbd0-9dfb2e37492a
_story.html (discussing “[t]exts between two senior FBI officials involved in both the probe of
Hillary Clinton’s emails and possible connections between Trump associates and Russia” which
“show[ed] [that] the pair frequently discussed their political views, their intense dislike of
candidate Donald Trump and their fear he might win”).
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political leadership itself. 287 They face horizontal constraints as well, from the
formal guidelines of their agencies, the norms of professionalism and nonpartisanship of their office, and from the Inspector General, who has been
reviewing this entire set of events. 288 And they face external constraints—in
this case the constant spotlight of media attention on their actions, and the
heightened scrutiny from congressional officials, aligned with the President,
seeking to ferret out any potential evidence of partisanship against him. 289
The formal authority these actors wield in continuing to adhere to their
investigation, even against the President’s professed will, is well-sourced to an
array of authorities. But this authority is not immutable. It stems from the
norms of professionalism and independence among the law enforcement
entities, some of which have been codified in internal documents; the
delegations and sub-delegations from this President who has appointed many
of the relevant officials (and can remove them), and from past presidents and
political officials who appointed others; congressional statutes delegating
internal organization authority to the heads of agencies, 290 to the Attorney
General specifically, 291 and investigatory power to the Office of the Inspector
General; 292 as well as the executive branch regulation delegating to the
Attorney General the power to appoint—and sole power to remove, under
specific circumstances, a Special Counsel. 293 Each of these authorities is
reliant upon actors inside and outside the executive branch continuing to
support institutional checks on the President. The President has already made
clear his interest in disposing of these checks, but he continues to be reined
in by other internal advisers, who are no doubt warning him of the political
consequences to doing so. Should those actors change course, and should a

287. McCabe reportedly stepped down in the face of a demotion; the former FBI General
Counsel, James Baker, has reportedly been reassigned as well. Devlin Barrett et al., FBI’s Top
Lawyer Said to Be Reassigned, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/fbis-top-lawyer-said-to-be-reassigned/2017/12/21/2ac76640-e6b5-11e7833f-155031558ff4_story.html; Goldman & Apuzzo, supra note 284. Reports suggest that Mueller
removed a career assigned to his team upon discovering he had expressed antipathy toward the
President. Id.
288. See supra Section III.B.
289. See Memorandum from the U.S. House Intelligence Comm. Staff to the U.S. Permanent
Selection Comm. on Intelligence (2018), https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hpsci_
fisa_memo_charge_and_response.pdf.
290. 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).
291. 28 U.S.C. §§ 509–10, 515–19.
292. Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 5315–16).
293. 28 C.F.R. § 600.1 (2018); see also id. § 600.7(d) (“The Attorney General may remove a
Special Counsel for misconduct, dereliction of duty, incapacity, conflict of interest, or for other
good cause, including violation of Departmental policies.”).
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sufficient segment of Congress take up the President’s crusade, these powers
could—and are currently being—eroded, and these checks could fail. 294
As the practical constraints on the exercise of these authorities suggest,
each of the actors involved in the continuing investigation, officials who sit at
every end on the various bureaucratic spectra I have laid out in this Article,
are heavily circumscribed and—while they have both authority and internal
support in continuing to act independently of the President here, they are
hardly firewalled entirely from his or other political influence. The recent
spate of firings, demotions, and political spotlight highlights this
precariousness. The President, for his part, does wield practical capacity to
end the internal investigations. He could, for example, fire Rosenstein or
Sessions and appoint someone willing to fire Mueller. He has in fact
previously directed his White House Counsel to do so, though when faced
with the prospect of internal hurdles and the political consequences of
undermining the norms of DOJ independence, he has—thus far—backed
down. Ultimately, however, internal constraints are doing significant work
here in the daily checking of the President, but they are not alone sufficient
to keep the investigation on track. This example well highlights the extent to
which internal constraints play a critical role in the regular circumscribing of
presidential power, but ultimately rely upon external constraints to create,
protect, and continuously support them.
The examples I discuss in this Part involve well-known accounts of
bureaucratic resistance that have been painted, sometimes in nefarious tones,
as undermining the sitting President’s authority. And yet in each, the specific
mechanisms employed for the purposes at hand were within the formal
authority of the relevant bureaucratic actors; moreover, these actors were far
more constrained, as a matter of functional power, than the common
narratives suggest. I certainly do not contend that illegitimate or
unauthorized bureaucratic behavior never occurs. Officials at any locus within
the bureaucracy might exceed their authority to act. Such ultra vires action
could be due to confusion over the authorities in question, or simple missteps,
or true acts of intentional malfeasance. Sometimes, officials might face a
genuine conflict in obligations to different sources of authority, or a situation
in which the legal requirements may be genuinely ambiguous. The
appropriate response to each of these may include a reining in or even an
expanding of power, based, respectively, on whether the problem is an abuse
of power, or insufficient power to accomplish necessary tasks, or insufficient
clarity in the law. But that response should be based on the reality of
294. For example, reports suggest that intelligence officials have declined to accept
“kompromat” on the President (which under normal circumstances would be worth analyzing
whether accurate or not, for defensive purposes) from Russian interlocutors for fear of political
blowback from superiors or Congress. Matthew Rosenberg, U.S. Spies, Seeking to Retrieve Cyberweapons,
Paid Russian Peddling Trump Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
02/09/us/politics/us-cyberweapons-russia-trump.html.
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bureaucratic behavior, authority, and constraint, rather than on unfounded
fear or over-reliance on what such bureaucrats are capable of—and actually
are—undertaking.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The vast and multifaceted executive branch bureaucracy is a complex
ecosystem essential to checking modern executive power, but it is neither
unaccountable nor all-powerful. Its internal checks are not “second-best”
alternatives to the traditional Madisonian separation of powers; 295 rather, they
are necessary modern-day extensions of those powers. Internal checks operate
symbiotically alongside the external checks of the courts and Congress,
extending their reach into the darkest, secret corners of the executive branch,
where judges and members of Congress are themselves unable to tread. In
addition to extending the practical reach of the other branches, bureaucratic
constraints provide checks tied specifically to the traits of non-partisanship,
expertise, knowledge, competence, and professionalism that are expected of
them, and which are lacking in their political counterparts. Judges rely on
those traits in areas of competence they themselves do not possess, and
Congress relies upon them to operate responsibly to effectuate good
government at a remove from the political chaos of any given moment, which
is a luxury that members of Congress do not themselves have. Abuses do
occur, as with any human-based institution, and the balance of accountability
is rarely perfect. Thus the power allocated to bureaucratic actors does and
should ebb and flow with their actual embodiment of the above traits that
inspire that grant.
In fact, even when highly-functioning, these internal checks are not the
complete solution to presidential tyranny or executive aggrandizement. The
institutional forces of the bureaucracy do constrain a President seeking
radical change at a useful remove from the partisan politics of the twenty-fourhour news cycle, and those overarching forces of continuity may stymie some
dangers emanating from the President himself. But as I demonstrate in this
Article, bureaucratic resistance to presidential prerogative—and bureaucratic
action generally—is itself severely circumscribed. Ultimately, internal
constraints alone will not defeat a President willing to pay the political price
for thwarting them.
Moreover, there is one presidential threat that the bureaucracy does not
even impede: While the multifarious components of the bureaucracy have a
range of competing interests, the one interest they share is the protection of
executive power. This may manifest as resistance in the occasional instances
when a President seeks to dial back that power, but more often in this realm

295. Katyal, supra note 3, at 2322 (arguing that “[b]ureaucracy can be reformed” to become
a “second-best solution[] to the traditional separation of powers”).
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the President and the broader bureaucracy are in alignment. 296 Executive
branch protection of its turf is not itself evidence of a “deep state”—it is an
open and notorious expression of precisely what the founders expected of
each branch of government, yet which the executive branch may be alone
today in fulfilling. It is the insufficiency in external competition to the
executive branch, from the courts and especially from Congress—and not the
internal tension that is only able to pick up some of the slack—that is the real
threat to our intended form of government.
The internal executive branch ecosystem of bureaucratic checks is thus
essential but not sufficient, and it cannot sustain itself. It requires constant
support and deliberate calibration by the external sources that create and
protect it. The risks of unbalancing this symbiosis make it critical to grapple
with the full complexity of bureaucratic behavior and dismantle
misconceptions about bureaucratic resistance. Over-reliance on internal
checks to constrain the President may result in complacency on the part of
the courts and Congress, who may find it easier to let internal actors take the
heat, and may as a result abdicate some of their responsibility to rein in the
President directly. 297 This is all the more likely when the politics of the
moment do not favor tussles with the President. And yet, as this Article
demonstrates, the bureaucracy acting alone is an insufficient to rein in a
President who can ultimately surmount bureaucratic hurdles when there are
no external costs to doing so.
Likewise, unfounded fear of the bureaucracy is itself pernicious. Because
bureaucratic power depends on external sources, it is not a constant. Those
sources—such as the courts and Congress—may, and sometimes should,
recalibrate it. But it may be eroded imprudently should unfounded fears
cloud our understanding of how bureaucratic behavior actually works.
Bureaucratic constraints rely upon and cannot continue to exist without the
support of the sources that created them. Norms of professionalism may be
shattered; protections for whistleblowers or civil servants may be diluted;
buffers of independence can be ground down. Complacency and fear are thus
complementary dangers vis-à-vis bureaucratic behavior. They can lead,
alternatively, to over-reliance on or over-erosion of bureaucratic power. Both
approaches result in an insufficiently constrained President, which should
concern most advocates and opponents of the administrative state.
Bureaucratic resistance is a partial answer to the threat of presidential tyranny
in the modern state, but it depends for its life on a healthy symbiosis with the
traditional safeguards on presidential power.

296. See Ingber, supra note 6, at 680.
297. Adrian Vermeule more forcefully calls this “abnegation,” by courts in particular, but also
by Congress, to the administrative state. ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S
EMPIRE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 1–11 (2016).

